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When in January and February 1934 I was lecturing in the University of Cambridge
about industrial combination in Germany I became impressed with the idea of dealing
more fully with what is at present one of the foremost English industrial problems.
As I was one of the first to write on English monopoly organisations and have some
knowledge of the special features of the problem in England I felt myself qualified
to write a book with the express purpose of comparing the German and English
conditions of quasi-monopoly. Whether I have succeeded in doing this the reader must
decide. It may seem audacious to choose so comprehensive a title as Industrial Germany
for a book which mainly describes and analyses certain aspects of industrial
organisation. But in fact the problem of industrial combination is so intimately
connected with the most prominent economic, organisational, administrative, legal,
technical, financial and even sociological conditions of German industry that I am
anxious to show by the title that the aim of the book is to draw a picture of cartels,














The problems of industrial monopoly, if not studied from a merely theoretical and
abstract viewpoint, may afford a welcome opportunity of improving our insight into
the differences in the economic structure and organisation of the nations. In fact the
development of “Kartells” and trusts or monopolist associations of any kind or type
has been in every country influenced by the specific attitude of its producers, by the
structure of law and legal principles, by a different attitude of the State towards
monopoly, not to mention the different material conditions favouring or checking the
growth of combines. A theory of monopolies based upon marginal utility reflections
and mathematical formulas will never lead to the necessary understanding of their
actual conditions, effects and deficiencies, however interesting such deductions may
be from the point of view of the theorist, while on the other hand a theory of modern
industrial combination based exclusively upon the experiences of a single country
would be of little general value, unless the specific structure and organisation of that
country’s industry was taken into account. The study of industrial combination must
necessarily be “comparative” and the truth evolved out of the study of the conditions
of a single country may have to be regarded as essentially “relative.” In failing to apply
this presumption to its investigations of cartels and trusts economic science has
frequently been led into generalisations and conclusions which are not borne out by
the international aspect of the problem.
In the United States as well as in Germany the organisation of industrial monopoly
has developed along pretty clear lines. One may say that the structure of the American
“trust” seems less complicated than the far more differentiated monopoly form of
German cartelisation. In England the evolution from free competition to associativeHermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 7
organisation has been obscured in many respects. Although at an early date books like
that of Mr Macrosty or myself had called the attention of the public to the monopolist
development in British industry, the Report on Trusts of 1919 (and 1924) with its
statement that there were ninety-three quasi-monopolist associations in England,
regulating prices and production, came as a surprise to the general public. Yet it was
expressly stated by Mr Percy Ashley in that Report that by far the greater part of these
trade associations and combinations restricting competition and controlling prices “had
come into existence since the end of the century.”
The belief that British industry would ever be characterised by a system of monopolist
organisation such as was known to exist and to be on the increase in the rival German
industry was shaken by many circumstances and considerations. In the first place, the
development of industrial monopoly organisation in England came certainly much
later than in Germany. Here as early as in 1883 the first cartels were “discovered” and
described by Prof. Kleinwachter. The first official investigation into the cartel problem
in 1905 revealed the fact that there were no less than 353 associations of that kind.
In the chemical industries alone forty-six associations were reported, while a good
many more were said to be in existence. In England, on the other hand, there was very
much less publicity given to industrial combination. Associations and even
amalgamated companies were led to hide anything in their business management which
could be interpreted as a monopolistic control of prices or output, for fear of being
prosecuted as infringing the law against restraint of trade. Certainly German industrial
monopolists had to be careful not to arouse political anger with regard to their price
policy. But there was no law penalising or forbidding monopolies as such. On the
contrary in many cases the formation of cartels seems to have had official support from
an early date; the State, as in the case of coal and potash, becoming a partner in private
syndicates. Since, by the end of the ‘nineties, the wave of German economic liberalism,
never a very strong factor in political life, had almost spent itself, there was never a
real popular opposition to cartels from any individualistic or liberal standpoint. If there
had been any strong antipathy to the growing power of combines it would have been
dictated by anti-capitalistic feeling rather than by the desire to uphold the principles
of free competition. In view of the very weak position of the German Liberals of thatHermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 8
time, any powerful opposition in parliament to industrial monopolies had to come from
the social-democratic benches, which alone were free from the influence of industrial
capitalists. Socialists, however, were not likely to oppose too strongly these forms of
organisation, which in their eyes did not differ in principle from any other giant form
of capitalist organisation, such as big banks or department stores, but which could be
regarded as the forerunners of a future state socialism.
A third reason why cartelisation in England was much less conspicuous than in
Germany was the fact that English monopoly associations were not to be found in those
industries which are most likely to attract general interest. In Germany the playground
of cartels and amalgamations was from the beginning of the movement to be found
in the great extractive and heavy industries, such as coal, potash, iron ore, iron and
steel, and the heavy chemical productions. These industries enjoy a sort of general
popularity. Important events happening or developing in such industries can hardly
be silenced by the press or hidden from public knowledge. They will be a topic of
general economic discussion. The price of coal or iron to-day is almost as important
as that of bread or butter. In England amalgamations and associations were at first
mainly formed in industries, which were of a special type or character, as for instance
in textile specialities or in certain finished goods (Coats, Fine Cotton Spinners and
doublers, calico printing, wallpaper, rails as contrasted with pig iron or raw steel, etc.).
A coal trust or a steel combine would probably have aroused public interest and
political discussion in England as much as in other countries and the “ cartel” problem
would have swiftly become a topic of general public importance. It was, however, the
most important English industries such as coal, iron, steel, shipbuilding, cotton spinning
and weaving which, generally speaking, all seemed to be left outside that sphere in
which English amalgamations developed. It was only with the foundation of the
Chemical Trust that the existence of a really powerful and dominant monopolistic
organisation was brought to the knowledge of the English public. All these
circumstances may explain the fact that up to the present the trust and cartel movement
in British industry has been far less conspicuous than in Germany. This being the case
it is only natural that a specific explanation had to be found for the supposed absence
of monopolies. It was pretended over and over again that the English producer by hisHermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 9
individualistic attitude towards business management was unwilling to form or join
combinations. In popular language this meant that English entrepreneurs did not like
to have other people poking their noses into their affairs; while expressed in terms
of traditional economic theory it was the belief in free competition, in the survival
of the fittest and the greatest possible efficiency of the individual subject which
effectively checked the movement towards cartelisation. It may be conceded that
English psychology was not very favourable to the formation of industrial monopolies.
The German producer was certainly not hampered in his decisions by any doctrine
of laisser-faire or economic liberalism. Very early on a writer like Prof. Lujo Brentano
— one of the foremost pioneers of German liberalism — pointed out that the principle
of coalition might just as well suit the egoistic instincts of capitalist producers as that
of individual competition, if in the long run the competitive system proved harmful
to each individual manufacturer. There was certainly very little resistance to
combination from that point of view among German producers. But has this
individualistic attitude in England de facto prevented the formation of combination
where it was possible and profitable? We do not believe it. It is well known that
between the end of the eighteenth and the middle of the nineteenth century, there
existed a most powerful combination among northern coal owners — the Newcastle
Vend — a cartel which was the first of its kind. This combination should not be
confounded with many of the loose or unconventional associations frequently styled
as “cartels.” We possess an agreement dated 1835 which with its thirty-three paragraphs
differs in no way from the much later statutes of the Rhenish-Westphalian Coal
Syndicate. In fact the first genuine cartel in the coal industry is to be found not in
German, but in English economic history. Moreover, this combination seems to have
been just as complex in its regulations as many of the most modern German “cartels,”
combining with the regulation of prices and output at the collieries regulations
regarding the shipping of coal and common agreements with the London coal trade
and its distributive organisation. The cause of the collapse, in the ‘forties, of this
powerful combine was not the awakening of individualistic feeling among colliery
owners, but merely the rapid progress of railway communication throughout England,
as a result of which the London market became open to competition from almost everyHermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 10
English mining area, thereby freeing itself from the monopoly of sea-borne coal. Thus
the theory of the individualistic attitude preventing effective combination has always
been refuted by events, wherever material conditions were genuinely in favour of
combined action on the part of the producers.
On the other hand it cannot be denied that German manufacturers, with their complete
freedom from any prejudice against concerted action, may have found it much easier
than their English colleagues to form monopolist organisations where ever the
opportunity arose. While in England the fierce battle against monopolies during the
reign of Charles I had left an almost inextinguishable mark on English economic
sentiment, the freeing of German industries from the rules of crafts and guilds and
from the domination of privileged companies (corresponding to the English “patents
of monopoly” in the seventeenth century) was effected in 1810 and 1811 (Gewerbefrei-
heit) as a timely concession to the rise of modern methods in industry and as a result
of the development of the factory system.
1 The organisation of early industrial
monopoly in Germany had never been exploited by German petty princes in their own
interest, at any rate not to the extent that it was done by the Tudors and Stuarts who
recklessly bestowed their economic privileges upon capitalist entrepreneurs, patentees
and projectors in order to diminish the financial straits of the Crown. Monopoly
organisation in eighteenth-century Germany was far more guided by the aims of
paternal government. The abolition of monopolist organisation came much more as
a bureaucratic reform, necessitated by new economic and technical developments, than
as a measure of revolution following a popular outburst against monopolist exploitation.
This difference explains why it is that the word “monopoly” has never acquired any
popular meaning in German economic terminology, that no “anti-monopolistic” spirit
or reasoning can be found among the German masses and that it would have been quite
incomprehensible to the German mind, if for instance protective tariffs had been
attacked along the lines of the popular English argument that protection was in itself
a kind of monopolising of the home market. All such considerations are quite
unfamiliar to the German economic mind. In Germany there was no definite outcry
against monopolies intimately connected with the most important political and
democratic reforms, and as a result the word “monopoly” never had that importanceHermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 11
in economic terminology that it attained in England where it passed from the mouths
of the excited people into the classic writings of men like Adam Smith and David
Ricardo. One may say that in Germany there has never existed what might be called
the “sociological” aspect of monopoly, that is a deep and almost immovable
psychological distrust of everything which might lead to the restriction of unlimited
competition. Mr Patrick Fitzgerald could argue rightly in his book on industrial
combination in England in 1927, that “not many years ago” it was the custom in
England to regard the trust movement as “purely alien.” We have been trying to explain
the manifold reasons for that attitude, which were to be found in the relatively late
development of industrial associations and amalgamations in England, in their lack
of publicity, in the existence of an anti-monopolist spirit leading to a fanatical belief
not only in the benefits of free competition but also in its unimpaired position in English
economic development.
In Germany — in sharp contrast to the English attitude towards combination —
economic science tried at an early date to reconcile the new monopolist movement
with the still existing academic “respect” for a system of individualism and free
competition. Economic historians, like Gustav v. Schmoller, whose followers had for
a long time the first claim to chairs of political economy all over Germany, did not
dislike the revival of a system of organisation which certainly bore more resemblance
to their own favourite field of study, i.e., paternal and governmental industrial
organisation in the time of mercantilism, than that of the “Manchestertum” and
laisser-faire of the nineteenth century. He expressed the view (in 1905) that cartels
meant the beginning “of quite a new order of public life,” with more resemblance to
mediaeval ideals than to the nineteenth-century worship of freedom of trade, and Arnold
Wolfers quite properly remarks that this attitude was characteristic of the whole German
theory of industrial combination of that period.
From the beginning, the development of industrial combination was regarded in
Germany as a change in organisation rather than as monopolistic profiteering.
Economists like Kleinwachter, Schaeffle and others had for some time been arguing
that the much admired system of free competition was most likely to end in “anarchy.”
The development of producers’ associations to control output and price came to themHermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 12
as a verification of their views. “The cartels have suddenly struck down like a flash
of lightning from the unclouded sky of faith into the free play of forces and the harmony
of competition,” wrote Schaeffle in 1898. To economic writers of the socialist type
or those with an inclination to socialist ideas cartelisation was from the very beginning
a most welcome proof that even private enterprise was trying to get away from
uncontrolled competition and favouring some sort of planned organisation. While
radical-socialists adhered to the thesis that the movement towards combination was
merely a preliminary to general socialisation — the first of these was Schönlank, who
called the cartels a “Durchgangsstufe zum Sozialismus” — the later school of reform
or moderate socialdemocrats (revisionists) like Calver or Hilferding were eager to point
out that industrial combination might have a stabilising and harmonising effect within
the framework of capitalism. Sombart regarded the “replacement of free competition
by a principle of mutual agreement” as one of the facts which signalised the beginning
of the decay of the epoch of “ Hochkapitalismus “ system, which in his opinion had
reached its climax and was gradually showing symptoms of senility.
It seems rather strange that support of cartelisation and even trustification should
have arisen from the ranks of the very hottest opponents of the capitalist system, while
in fact private industrial monopolies had to be regarded as the most powerful exponents
of the capitalist order. The reason is that socialism has been for a long time the
expression of the German liking for organised control. We may again quote Wolfers,
who, writing of the most recent attitude of German socialism to industrial combination,
says that the latter was regarded as”eine hohere Wirtschaftsstufe,” a higher stage of
economic evolution. This stage, if once reached, is formulated as “organised
capitalism.” Economic policy must take it into account. Cartelised capitalism is
welcomed, because it is preparing the way for state-controlled economic organisation.
It is not so much the cartels themselves which are considered to be the pioneers of
socialism as the newly created power of the State to control and even to exercise an
influence upon these associations. The private monopoly, controlled by the State, is
regarded as the last step towards that condition of economic organisation, in which
the State incorporates industrial combinations as self-governing administrative bodies
in its scheme for the socialisation of certain groups of industry.Hermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 13
This being the socialist attitude, any serious attack on industrial combination from
that quarter would be based only on the actual price policy, which might in some cases
appear hurtful to the public, and not on general economic principles. The bureaucratic
tendencies inherent in socialism found their counterpart in the “organic” administration
promised by cartels and trusts, reconciling, at least in this sphere, the bitter antagonism
between the leaders of industry and the representatives of the working classes, so
conspicuous in other fields of political life. The “monopoly” argument against industrial
combination was of no value to socialist thought. The only political party which was
by its principles prepared to fight monopoly organisations as destroying the order of
free competition and individual efficiency, the liberal party, was on the down grade
at the moment when cartelisation became a much discussed topic. Its voice was
practically unheard and frequently enough ridiculed as being in conflict with the present
trend of events, which in many fields of German economic and administrative life —
for instance in the growing number of state and communal enterprises — showed a
much greater tendency towards collective and corporate organisation than ever before.
What may be called the “organic’‘ or organisational significance of industrial
combination seemed to gain a new justification, when after 1924 the movement towards
rationalisation set in. It seemed evident that the tremendous financial and technical
task involved in the programmes of rationalisation could be solved on much safer and
more efficient lines by a concerted action of producers or by the big amalgamated firms
than by smaller manufacturers acting on their own individual lines and having
In most cases insufficient capital. In fact industrial combination seemed at one time
the very condition necessary for the effective execution of the programmes of
rationalisation. When, after 1929, the rationalisation fever was slackening and the high
hopes of social benefits from the rationalisation movement had ended in disappoint-
ment, the big firms were frequently criticised for not having had due regard for the
practical limits of technical expansion. The argument was developed that the big
concerns had done much too much in the way of technical “improvements” which may
have appeared very tempting to a body of zealous directors, but proved in fact to be
quite out of proportion to the real demand of the markets for increased production.
The enthusiasm for rationalisation was followed by sharp criticism of what was nowHermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 14
called “over-rationalisation.” Now again, after a long interval, certain doubts were
voiced as to the organising ability of cartel and trust directorates, and some writers
at least were found to praise individual efficiency and to point out the dangers of
over-organised bodies of directors not always in touch with the actual life of the
industries in question. These criticisms came mainly from representatives of
commercial science (Betriebswirtschaftslehre). Thus Prof. W. Hasenack, of the
Technische Hochschule, Berlin, declared in a very able study published in 1933 that
the organisation of cartels had always been in his opinion the most dangerous “bazillus”
threatening commercial versatility in the management of industrial units. He sharply
criticised those results of industrial combination which were leading to a rigidity
excluding free mobility in the exchange of goods and thereby preventing in many cases
a possible shortterm compensation of supply and demand on the one side, while
planning on the other hand was decided in many cases on a longterm basis not perhaps
in accordance with the genuine demand of the future. This was indeed the first time
that objections were raised which could have come from the ranks of the old liberal
school of economic thought.
A review of the psychological attitude to the problem of industrial combination in
Germany and England, as it has here been attempted, shows a very remarkable contrast
between two countries which are industrially not so very different. While in England
a number of circumstances has certainly caused the importance of associations and
amalgamations in the organisation of modern large scale industry to be underrated,
in Germany the forces of economic and political thought were actively supporting this
“new form of organisation” or at any rate not obstructing its progress. It is interesting
to note, with this contrast in mind, that of late a decisive change has taken place in
England. From being an organisation at first regarded with the gravest suspicion and
later on as a sort of “alien” import, un-English in itself, and hardly defensible on the
lines of traditional English economics, the movement towards industrial combination
has in recent years become a much discussed topic in English public life. Things have
changed so drastically that the lack of industrial combination and co-operation among
producers suddenly came to be considered as a defect in English industrial organisation;
the coal mining industry and the iron and steel industry were sharply criticised for notHermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 15
entering into an effective agreement to regulate output and control prices, shutting
down inefficient works and setting up common rules for the working of the most
efficient plant. How much opinion as regards “monopolistic” organisations had changed
was to be gathered from the fact that the maintenance of protection to the steel industry
was made dependent on the inauguration of some sort of combined action, i.e., the
formation of a national cartel, by the iron and steel manufacturers.
As an instance of this change of attitude one may take the speech delivered by Sir
Ernest Gowers, Chairman of the Coal Mines Organisation Commission, to the Cardiff
Business Club on 24 February 1933. Discussing the question of amalgamations Sir
Ernest said: “I believe amalgamations to be vitally necessary to the industry, but that
is because I do not see how it can be set right without them... they are not the final
goal, but they are a means to an end.” The scheme drafted and approved by the National
Committee to consider plans of reorganisation of the steel trade followed the same
line of thought. The incorporation of the Iron and Steel Corporation of Great Britain
was proposed, a body intended to supervise approved associations in the iron and steel
industry in all matters of general policy in order to  secure the orderly progress of the
industry, to promote desirable amalgamations, etc. “Compulsory amalgamation” has
for some time now been a favourite term in many official circles, the State instead
of being called upon to act against monopolist associations being rather invited to bring
them into existence. A good number of new expressions has been invented to make
the monopolistic structure, which is necessarily inherent in any kind of effective
association to regulate output and prices, more palatable to the public mind, such as
“reorganisation,” “orderly production,” “reconstruction,” “planning,” but all of them
lead to the same end. As Sir Ernest Gowers put it in the speech already referred to:
I believe myself that what we really want ultimately is not only
amalgamations but also a looser form of cooperation over an area wider
than the industry is willing to take as its unit of production. I do not
think this can be done except by building a ground floor of amalgama-
tions first and adding this looser form of wider cooperation as an upper
storey. In other words, it would mean grouping the units of productionHermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 16
into much bigger associations — call them cartels or what you will —
with two main purposes. One purpose would be to cooperate in selling
and distribution. The other would be to exercise a general control over
the development of the area and share the expense of buying and
closing mines which no single unit might think it worth while to acquire
because it could not be sure enough of getting their trade.
One recognises in these utterances that the question of combination in England had
indeed undergone a remarkable change, since any hint as to the possibly monopolistic
effects was deliberately avoided. One may confront this argument with the drastic
refusal only a few years ago of any sort of industrial combination by high authorities
on English economics. Thus Prof. Gregory in 1926 declared emphatically: “All
industrial combinations begin with a heavy financial charge which they get back from
the community in the form of higher prices or from shareholders in the form of watered
capital. The trust movement hinders the development of industry.” Seven years later,
in 1933, Mr Harold Macmillan, M.P., in his study on “Reconstruction” — a plea for
“national policy” — was certainly in agreement with the majority of his readers and
with a good many English politicians and economists, when he wrote: “We are faced
then with this choice: either to allow haphazard and unco-ordinated competition to
go on producing its wild lurches from normality to depression, or to face the problem
of finding a method by which the interest of monopoly-producing organisations can
be brought into harmony with the interest of the nation as a whole.”
From being considered an instrument unsuited, on the whole, to English conditions
and needs, monopolist organisation, if properly and harmoniously managed, came
suddenly to be regarded as a “device” to save a critical economic situation. In
recommending the formation of industrial combinations as one of the few means of
escaping the continuance of severe economic depression in the big industries, the point
was hardly considered that organisations of that kind are not merely dependent on the
determination of manufacturers to abandon free competition for a sort of combined
action. Though much may depend on the willingness of manufacturers or traders to
enter into agreements, if conditions are favourable to combination, little can be effectedHermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 17
by this willingness alone, if material conditions making for successful monopolist
organisation are wanting. Those who today support the formation of industrial
combination in England have hardly grasped that there is a very decided difference
between forming, say a co-operative society among farmers, which can be done by
persuasion and propaganda, and forming an efficient amalgamation or cartel. In the
latter case the mere belief in concerted action, the theoretical knowledge of the
advantages to be gained by a policy of associated planning, are of very little practical
use, if the material conditions are unfavourable to the final realisation of possibly very
attractive proposals. The history of the English coal trade in the last forty years is full
of examples of well-defined plans to form national or local associations of collieries,
but the far too great number of units m the local as well as the national area of English
coal mining has been over and over again the primary obstacle to all these schemes.
We certainly do not underrate the influence of psychological and even sociological
factors on the development of industrial associations, factors which we have been trying
to reveal in comparing the history of the German and English attitude to monopoly.
But it would be most erroneous to overestimate the influence of that attitude, either
by pretending that individualistic feelings were in the long run capable of checking
the movement towards combination, or on the contrary by arguing that it merely needed
economic insight or associative education and persuasion to induce manufacturers
to modernise the organisation of industrial economy.
The history and the latest developments of monopoly organisation in Germany can
show better than any other evidence that the road to industrial combination is a very
steep one, cumbered with difficulties and complications of many kinds. The formation
of large amalgamations has seldom been the outcome of a scheme invented by some
public-spirited leaders or of advice by well-meaning Government representatives: it
has generally been the outcome of bitter fighting between industrial units of different
size and structure, and the result of revolutionising company organisation by forms,
whose success at first seemed doubtful, and which do not even to-day seem to be the
final stage of the movement. The trust movement in the United States, owing to the
entirely different nature of American industrial conditions, resembles European forms
of industrial organisation only in its broadest aspects; but industrial combination inHermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 18
Germany may be considered as in many ways typical of European development. A
study of its characteristics and peculiarities may prove not only useful in itself, but
also of comparative value with regard to developments outside Germany.	 !
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The industrial organisation represented by cartels and trusts can hardly be elucidated
by statistics. On the contrary, one may say that there is no field of economic
organisation in which figures prove or even explain so little.
Amalgamations and fusions, resulting in the formation of dominant combines or
trusts, have never been statistically enumerated. If it were done, they would have to
be separated from cartels, as being associations of producers, while from the point
of view of monopoly organisation they ought to be grouped together. Thus a general
and comprehensive survey of all genuine monopoly organisation seems a statistical
impossibility. Moreover, efficient statistical review of industrial monopoly or
quasi-monopoly organisation ought to lay stress on the fact of dominant control, either
by associations or trusts or even by big concerns, while the form of such monopolies
would be a matter of secondary consideration. The figures showing what percentage
of production is actually controlled by trusts and associations or both, should be the
essential and primary object of a statistical survey of modern monopoly organisation.
In the U.S.A. the predominance of the trust type of monopoly facilitates such a task.
In Germany, where the monopolist organisation of industry is partly represented by
cartels, partly by trusts, and partly by a combination of both forms, this method of
surveying the total field of action of the monopolies in contrast to the remaining sphere
of free competition has never been attempted.
The number of cartels, which as already mentioned was stated as being 353 by the
Kartell-Commission of 1905, had enormously increased when, about twenty years
later, the Reichsverband der Deutschen Industrie (Federation of Industries) gave a
survey of industrial combination. They were then estimated to be 1500. Ine German
Government stated in 1925 that the whole number of German cartels amounted to 3000,Hermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 20
of which 2500 belonged to the sphere of industry, while the rest was distributed among
wholesale and retail trade.
It is, however, important to note that such enumerations do not give anything like
a true picture of German cartelisation. Liefmann declares quite rightly that they
probably comprise such organisations as “Konditionen-Kartelle,” which in fact are
merely agreements concerning certain trade usages which do not regulate output or
fix prices, and thus correspond to “trade associations” in the U.S.A. One may be entitled
to range an agreement between a number of hotels in the Black Forest, fixing the prices
of their rooms and certain general conditions of catering, as a “cartel,” but with regard
to the general and important problems of industrial combination such agreements bear
an entirely different character. On the other hand Liefmann quite rightly explains that
the goods which are affected by combination in Germany show a very great diversity,
ranging from the economically most important goods to those of a rather specialised
or secondary importance. For more than 1000 different kinds of goods there have been
cartels in existence. Again in the different groups of industry there is a great multiplicity
of cartels to be found. We may quote the most important of these groups and the
number of cartels which were in existence in each group when the Reichsverband der
Deutschen Industrie made its enquiry in 1923. The ironand steel-finishing industry
together with the iron-producing industry (blast furnaces) took the lead with 307 cartels;
then followed the textile and clothing industries with 201 and 71, engineering with
147, the paper industry with 107, brewing, milling and malt industries with 97, the
chemical trades with 91, the metal industry with 78, mining with 51, boiler-making
and engineering (not enumerated in the foregoing group) with 48, food industries with
49, and leather and leather manufactures with 46, wood-working industries with 46,
stone and earth with 30, oils and fats with 36, sugar and allied industries with 24, glass
industries with 20, metal furnaces and semi-finished metal manufactures with 17, motor
cars and motor cycles with 8, shipping and carrying with 4, ceramic industries with
10 cartels, and the railway waggon manufactures with one cartel.
This list while showing how widely industrial combination has been scattered over
the whole of the German industrial area, can hardly elucidate the really important
features of the condition of industrial combination in Germany. The student who isHermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 21
not conversant with the facts might be led to deduce, for instance, the importance of
cartels in the textile and clothing group of German industry, whereas in this very group,
as we shall explain in a later chapter, the number of really important monopolist
combines is insignificant. On the other hand the existence of only a single cartel in
the railway waggon industry is easily explained by the fact of the paucity of firms in
that group. A multitude of cartels in a certain group of industry may be simply
explained by the fact that there may be many specialised trades in that line of
manufacture (Liefmann tells us that there is not only a cartel specially organised for
the manufacture and sale of toilet paper, but also one for the making and distributing
of crepe toilet paper). On the other hand an industry possessing only a few cartels, but
those in its leading lines, may in fact be much more cartelised than a group of industry
having cartels in many, but only secondary, branches of production. Important as the
number of cartels may appear as revealing the general tendency towards industrial
associative organisation, it counts little as regards the actual significance and weight
of the cartel in the framework either of a single group of industry or of national industry
as a whole. This latter could only be brought to light by a detailed and elaborate survey
of the percentage of production actually controlled by cartels or trusts. We possess
some examples of such statistics, but they do not cover anything like the whole field
of associative activity in German industry; on the contrary they are only found in some
prominent cases of monopolist organisation such as coal, iron or steel.
Again, in observing the multiplicity of industrial associations, one has to remember
that a great deal of interlocking may take place among the cartels themselves.
Manufacturers may, owing to their line of production, become members of more than
one cartel. In 1923 not less than 137 associations were affiliated to the Verein Deutscher
Maschinenbauanstalten, one of the big combines in the finishing lines of the iron
industry. In the iron and steel industries themselves vertically combined works are,
according to the different stages of their production, necessarily members of a good
many cartels or syndicates. If, as in the case mentioned before, the members of such
cartels are affiliated to a central cartel or association — regulating certain phases of
the manufacture or its distribution — this “Rahmenor Grundkartell,” as Liefmann has
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a much more far-reaching influence than any of the single associations, a fact
demonstrating again the unimportance of “numbers”. Moreover, it is to be borne in
mind that the strength of any cartel may depend on a very few of its members,
especially in cases where amalgamation has been going on. Some few members of
a cartel may indeed have a dominant influence and control the whole industry. This
is the case in the Mühlenbauindustrie (works for the construction of milling plants);
here a few big firms only, concentrated in the “Miag“ -Concern (Miag Mühlenbau-
Industrie A.G.), are the dominant factor in the cartel as well as in the industry, although
there are still in existence about thirty smaller works affiliated by price agreements
to the “concern” -group, but in fact of very little influence in the cartel.
An insight into the strength of cartels in German industry cannot be gained by the
figures relating to their numbers in certain groups of industry. Yet it can be taken as
a fact that an essential part of the power of monopolist organisation and the principal
forces in its historic development are to be found in the extractive industries and those
industries dependent on mineral production. This is so evident that at one time it was
generally assumed that industrial monopolies of our days were the outcome of a
monopolisation of such instruments of production as could not be increased indefinitely
or at any rate at equal or decreasing cost. This view was largely supported by the
consideration that most American trusts were connected directly or indirectly with
the “monopolisation” of land, as explained by Theodor Vogelstein and others. Like
all explanations attempting a “wholesale” interpretation of the causes of monopolist
organisation by alluding to certain “special” conditions, such as the existence of tariffs
or the pressure of depressions, etc., this theory may be useful in part, but can never
give a satisfactory solution of the general causes underlying the formation of industrial
monopolies. We know to-day that there may be monopolies of producers in free-trade
industries as well as in protected ones and there are examples to prove that protective
tariffs by no means necessitate the formation of cartels and trusts, as may be shown
by the paucity of effective combines in the highly protected German cotton spinning
and weaving industries. We have experienced an increase of industrial combination
in a time of depression, as a means to save manufacturers from a depreciation of their
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has also noticed that times of prosperity have given a new impulse to industrial
combination, the manufacturers being led by the desire to make the most out of the
boom by concerted action. Again, there have been a good many failures of agreements
in times of depression, as some people are inclined at such times to break away from
their obligations, in order to catch business by individual methods, a tendency which
has been dangerous to a good many “Interessengemeinschaften” since 1929.
The same remark may apply to the argument that monopolies predominate wherever
there is mineral wealth to be exploited. In English coal mining, which after so many
attempts at cartelisation, has up to the present not succeeded in getting an effective
central organisation of its producers, we have a very striking example showing that
the mere existence of extractive industries will not infallibly encourage monopolisation.
One might even argue that a good many cartels or trusts in the field of mineral
production, as for instance in the case of the German potash industry, would not have
had a very long life, if the State had not stepped in and forced newcomers into the
combination by means of compulsory cartelisation. Certainly the existence of mineral
resources, which can easily be monopolised, will be in many instances an effective
condition for the making of cartels or trusts. But however much weight one may attach
to this condition, it would be erroneous to generalise from it.
No doubt the large prevalence of mineral resources has greatly favoured the formation
of German cartels and amalgamations, not only directly but also by demonstrating to
other industries the advantages of industrial combination. In that respect coal and,
before 1918, iron ore have to be mentioned in the first place; after the war the
development and use of brown coal, as will be described later on, made enormous
strides, potash, the mineral production of which was before 1918 entirely a German
domain, rock salt, and some metallic ores, chalk, cement have to be added to the list
of important German industries connected with the possession of land. The importance
of the mining industry in Germany may be gathered from the fact that out of a total
production value, in all except the food industries, of about 61 milliard R.M. in
1927–28, according to Dr Wagenführ, 4.230 milliards were represented by mining,
2.775 milliards by the industries connected with stones and quarries, 6.9 milliards by
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industries, and 5.7 milliards by engineering, manufacture of apparatus and metal wares,
while textiles as a whole represented not more than 8 milliards, the chemical industries
(which in some lines were also connected with extractive German industries) only
3.6, the wood and wooden material industries 3.4, the paper industries 3.5 milliard
R.M., so that in fact the leading role, which cartelisation played from the beginning
in the German coal, iron and steel trade and allied industries, may be contrasted with
the much later and on the whole far less important industrial combinations in many
other, though not all, groups of industry, which — for example textiles, paper, leather
or wood — had to import the bulk of their raw materials. If “net” figures of the value
of production are taken into account the figures concerning mining and iron and steel
become still more significant, as of course in the “brutto” figures the finished and
semi-finished goods show a relatively enhanced value, including the value of the goods
entering the preliminary stages of production. If the “net” value of production at the
date mentioned is taken as being 33–34 milliard marks, the value of the mining
produce, of stones and quarries and of the iron and steel producing and finishing
industries alone would amount to 8.5 milliards, that is, to about 25 % of the whole,
even if the food industries are included.
A great number of German industrial combinations will therefore come under the
heading of monopolies connected with mineral resources. On the other hand, another
group of combinations must be taken into account, the structure of which has little
or nothing to do with the foregoing conditions. This is the case where monopolist
combination is mainly the result of a concentration of plant or of units of business.
Such concentration may be the result of a long and painful process of absorption of
smaller firms by bigger ones, a process accompanied by hard fighting on the one side
and frequent reorganisation on the other. It may be the outcome of fierce competition
in long existing industries and among firms proudly fighting for what they consider
to be their “independence.” It may have been in recent times the final stage of a process
of rationalisation or planning to safeguard industries from utter ruin. Moreover, there
are industries of a modem type which from their very beginning have shown a tendency
towards big units, thereby facilitating the conclusion of agreements. This has been
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to other lines of the heavy iron and steel industry. The railmakers have been among
the first to conclude agreements leading very soon to an international cartel, of which
even English steelmakers were early members. But the chief example of combinations
of that kind, resulting from an inherent tendency towards concentration, is furnished
by the so-called “new industries,” which started their type of unit on a basis of technical
expansion and financial outlay unknown in the ‘eighties or ‘nineties of the last century.
Dr Wagenführ mentions, as examples of such “young” industries in Germany, the
making of briquettes, the motor car industry, the radio industry, the manufacture of
nitrogenous fertilisers, the making of artificial silk, the electrical industries, the rubber
industry and others. These industries may be contrasted with the “old” industries, such
as the manufacture of porcelain, leather goods, musical instruments, linen yam, ships,
gas mantles, gloves, etc. Dr Wagenführ, in a very able study published by the Institut
für Konjunkturforschung in 1933, has grouped together some of the more prominent
of the “old” and “young” industries and constructed an index of their comparative
progress. According to these figures, which represent of course a segment only of both
groups, the young industries have stood the strain of the times much better than the
“old” ones. If the 1913 figure is taken as being 100, the production index of the “ new
“ industries had risen to 405 in the peak year 1929, dropping to 362 in 1932, while
the production index of the old industries selected by Dr Wagenführ shows a decline
to 53 in 1928 and to 19 in 1932. Inasmuch as the new industries are generally
characterised by a much greater concentration from their start than the traditional, much
differentiated older industries, with their generally much smaller capital and technical
outfit, one may in reading these figures come to the conclusion that it has been
cartelised and trustificated industry which has stood the downward movement of
productivity best. There may be exceptions here and there, but even in the rayon
industry, which in Germany, England, Holland and Italy, in spite of being a
highly-concentrated new industry, has not shown permanent prosperity, this would
probably have held true, if a very reckless international overproduction had not










In trying to give a review, however condensed, of industrial combination in the main
groups of German industry, the foregoing remarks will be of some use. They certainly
tend to suggest that an analysis of monopoly organisation grouped by industries should
begin with the extractive industries and those manufactures directly or indirectly
connected with mineral production. Here, as in the following chapters of this book,
in so far as they deal with monographical descriptions of cartels or amalgamations,
it will not be our task to give anything like a full list or a full statistical “tableau” of
German cartels and trusts. Readers anxious to get some detailed information about
almost all really important industrial combination existing at that time in German
industry and trade may safely apply to the “Verhandlungeund Berichte” of the so-called
“Enqueteausschuss,” reports published between 1929 and 1930, and quoted in the
appended list of the main publications used in this book. It will be necessary, however,
to remember that many statements and developments treated at length in these
exhaustive and elaborate reports have no longer the actual importance which they might
be supposed to have by the unbiassed student. In the first place the work of these
commissions and subcommittees was spread over a rather long period, and many facts
had become obsolete, when the reports were at last published, and secondly, the three
or our years which have elapsed since these publications have rought about many
decisive changes and reorganisations in industry. It is not the intention of this book
to accumulate facts, which, however weighty at the present time, might very soon
become out of date, and it is a consolation to the economic chronicler of the problems
of industrial monopoly, that generally such facts seem rather more important to the
ad hoc writer or the “day by day” politician than to those who are interested in the
principal and more permanent aspects of the problem. It is therefore far more our task
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the description and study of which promises some results in establishing the
characteristic features of certain industrial monopolies and their structural differences.
We do therefore lay stress on the fact of selection. And in starting this review of
monopolies with some prominent examples from the extractive group we wish to
underline the very contrast between these examples and those in the following chapters.
The German coal mining industry has, from the beginning of its modern development,
had definite advantages to offer to a movement towards combination, since the coal
mining properties of the empire are locally or territorially concentrated. The main
districts of German coal mining have always been the Rhine and Ruhr basin on the
one side, and the Upper-Silesian coal fields on the other. Both districts had always
and have still, besides exporting, their competitive and non-competitive trade, but the
mere fact that by transport charges the dominant German coal districts had a sort of
“ protection “ in the Empire itself gave a very strong stimulus to do away with
competition. Since the end of the War this territorial concentration of the German coal
properties has been further increased, as by the peace treaties the German Empire was
deprived of its coal mines in Ost-Oberschlesien. We may illustrate this by two sets
of figures, first by those of the available resources (reserves) of coal of proved coal
fields to a depth of 1000 m. According to official statistical estimates this reserve
amounts to 55,100 million tons in the Ruhrgebiet, to 7100 million tons in the Nord-Kref
elder Gebiet, to only 4000 million tons in West Upper-Silesia, while other districts
like Niederschlesien, Aachen, Briiggen-Erkelenz, Saxony and Hanover represent less
than 2000 millions each. The Saar territory figure amounts to 12,200 millions of tons.
The concentration of actual mining at the present time may be illustrated by the
following figures, to which we add those of the production of coke. In March 1933
the production of coal and coke amounted to:
Tons
District Coal  Coke
Ruhrbezirk 6,378,144  1,358,360
Aachen 664,406  118,333
West-Oberschlesien 1,366,688  77,612Hermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 29
Niederschlesien 374,816  67,505
Freistaat Sachsen  277,780  18,052
In January 1934 the Ruhrbezirk produced 7,639,806 tons of coal, while all other
districts produced 2,794,476 tons, the corresponding figures with regard to coke being
1,622,110 and 284,073. Of course it must not be overlooked that the German “
Steinkohlen” industry has, since 1918 and the occupation of the Ruhrgebiet,
experienced the rise of a new competitor in the form of the briquette-making industry
and the much enlarged use of brown coal (lignite). The necessity of economising hard
coal, forced upon the Reich in the first years after the War, led to a greatly increased
efficiency in the use of coal, so that in 1925 it was stated that Germany had been
enabled to get 10 % more out of a given unit of fuel than before the War, simply
through a rationalisation of fuel economy. The lignite industry, on the other hand,
became the supplier of many branches of industry hitherto not accustomed to this kind
of fuel, which in the U.S.A. had not been considered as fit for industrial purposes at
all, such as glass-making and electrical industries and the manufacture of ammoniac
fertilisers. The lignite production, which in 1913 had amounted to not more than 87
million tons, compared with 190 millions of coal, had risen in 1933 to 122 million
tons, while that of coal had dropped to 104 milhons; in fact in the “boom “ year of
1929 the lignite figure had reached the peak of 174 million tons. Between 1913 the
production of lignite briquettes had almost doubled; in 1933 the figure was still 30
million tons as compared with 21.5 millions in 1913, in spite of the very heavy
depression. The production of briquettes, like that of “raw” lignite (Roh-Braunkohle)
is centred in two districts, in the so-called “Middle-German” District and the Rhineland.
In January 1934 the production in tons was as follows:
Production of  Production of
raw lignite  briquettes
Mitteldeutschland 8,141,745  1,979,949
Rheinland 3,680,578  803,982Hermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 30
There is no production reported from other districts, so that the territorial
concentration becomes evident.
The German coal mining industry has for a long time shown a tendency towards
increasing technical units. According to the reports mentioned above, the collieries
producing up to 500,000 tons a year amounted to as much as 72-77 % of all the
collieries in 1900. In the year 1928 this figure had come down to 23-75 %! The
percentage of collieries producing from 500,000 tons to one million tons rose in the
same period from 27-23 to 60-29. The number of working collieries had been reduced
from 350 in 1913 to 294 in 1928. The same experience applies to the production of
coke, one of the most important by-products of coal besides gas, tar, benzole, ammonia,
etc. By the so-called “Zentralkokereien,” central coking plants, the production of coke
has been concentrated and improved. From 1913 to 1928 the production of coke ovens
increases from 1.4 million tons to about 2 million tons per oven. Again, there has been
a rapid expansion of coalcutting machinery in the German mines. It may be recalled
that the use of coal-cutting machinery is of recent date. In America at the beginning
of the century 25 % of all bituminous coal was cut by machinery and the proportion
in 1924 was nearly 70 %. In England in 1901 only 1½% of the total output of coal was
cut by machinery and by 1924 the proportion had grown to 19 %. In Germany
coal-cutting by machinery made great progress after the War. The percentage of
machine-cut coal in Germany and England was :
German Empire  Great Britain
1925  59.4 %  20.8 %
1928 77.7  26.0
It will readily be understood that the improvement in the “technique” of coal mining
either by the employment of more machinery and other technical progress or by a more
economic utilisation of the fuel through by-product manufacture led necessarily to
larger industrial units. This was all the more so as all these improvements necessitated
a larger and rather risky outlay of capital not available to smaller undertakings.
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On the one hand the increasing units and the increasing size of the undertakings
facilitated the formation of industrial combination by reducing the number of
competitors and preparing the road to agreement. On the other hand, the cartel, once
formed and established, accelerated the process of unification, as it lay in the interest
of the big collieries to acquire quotas of weak competitors, to shut down their pits and
add the quota to their own more economically working plant. As we shall have to
describe later on, the movement towards vertical combination in the iron and steel
industries, which was partly the outcome of the movements towards a monopolising
of the coal-fields, greatly accelerated this process, strengthening the desire to acquire
more coal mines by the big combined works. So one may say that the cartel movement
in the German coal industry was partly facilitated by the movement of concentration
of units and undertakings, and partly, on the contrary, a means of accelerating this
tendency.
Important fusions in the German coal mining industry date as far back as the ‘thirties
of the last century, for instance the formation of the “ Vereinigungsgesellschaft fur
den Steinkohlenbergbau “ of 1836. But the real movement towards combination started
in the ‘seventies and ‘eighties. As far back as 1878 there existed combinations of certain
of the more important groups of German mines for the purpose of combating
overproduction and controlling prices. Following some earlier associations dating back
to 1882, the Westphalian Coke Syndicate was formed in 1890, and in 1893 the
Rhenish-Westphalian Coal Syndicate, which eventually absorbed the Coke Syndicate
and the Briquette Selling Association. By the beginning of the World War the
Rhenish-Westphalian Coal Syndicate had become one of the most powerful industrial
combinations in the world. It was a cartel of the most highly organised type, with a
system of quotas, called Beteiligungsziffem, for its members, price fixing and pooling
arrangements, a definite policy of coal exports, joint selling agencies, etc. During the
first years of its regime it had been generally feared — in accordance with the general
view of the restrictive policy of cartel production — that the syndicate would lead to
a reduction of output to keep prices up. But the reverse happened. The production of
coal by members of the syndicate almost doubled between 1893 and 1904 and was
again increased by the same amount up to 1914. And even this increase of output wasHermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 32
not sufficient to comply with the demand, so that in some years there was, in spite
of heavily increased output, a sort of “ coal famine ,” compelling the cartel to import
coal from England in 1906 in order to comply with its obligations. As, curiously
enough, in other years the reverse happened and dearth was followed by overproduction
and large supplies, this period, according to Liefmann, has demonstrated that important
changes in business conditions (Konjunktur) cannot decisively be influenced even
by mighty combinations, although their effects might be mitigated to some extent.
The period following, i.e. immediately before the War and after its outbreak, witnessed
some rather critical times for the coal syndicate. The concentration movement, by which
the coal mining industry had become linked up with the iron and steel industries, had
far outstripped the original movement towards larger units in the coal industry itself.
The giant firms now controlling coal mines as well as furnaces and steel works had
ceased to be genuinely interested in the coal syndicate, which at one time had been
regarded by them as an instrument to fight competition. In fact they had succeeded
in acquiring coal fields and in concentrating their coal production in the most efficient
mines. The agreement of the coal syndicate was to end in 1915, and the discussions
for new arrangements were started as early as 1911, as from the beginning the
difficulties of coming to terms with the big “mixed” works and the increasing number
of outsiders were clearly realised. In the year 1912 the syndicate had succeeded in
getting the Prussian State, as the principal outsider, into the syndicate. But in the same
year the Prussian Secretary of Commerce gave notice to quit, as he did not consent
to the rise in prices decided by the syndicate. In February 1914 the pourparlers
concerning the renewal of the syndicate came to an end, as there was no possibility
of reconciling the interest of the so-called “reinen Kohlenzechen,” that is, the collieries
solely engaged in coal mining, with those of the “ Hiittenzechen ,” that is, those mines
which were integrated with the iron and steel works. It was the War which saved this
critical and almost hopeless situation. A breaking up of the syndicate could not be
allowed during the War from reasons of economic emergency and the agreement was
renewed under pressure from the Government. On 12 July 1915 the Government made
a decree to establish compulsory cartelisation, if the syndicate was not reconstituted
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was formed, of which the state mines of the Ruhr district became members. This
agreement was to end by 31 March 1917, but as early as October 1916 a new and
definite cartel agreement was reached of which all mines of the Ruhr district, including
those of the State, were members. This syndicate was composed of 93 mining
undertakings, 19 of which were “ Hüttenzechen ,” that is members who were making
use of their coal in their own iron and steel or other works (Verbrauchsbeteiligung).
This agreement was to last up to 1 April 1922. The termination of the War and the
outbreak of the Revolution encouraged the idea of socialisation and brought about
some new changes; among these the Kohlenwirtschaftsgesetz of 1919 (March), by
which the coal cartel became a compulsory syndicate. The number of individual
undertakings has since diminished again, being now 56. The independent action of
the coal syndicate has been limited by important bodies such as the Reichskohlenver-
band, a national coal committee, and the Reichskohlenrat, a Coal Council of the Reich,
whose powers and tasks we shall discuss in a later chapter. The Secretary of Commerce
to the Reich is entitled to protest against any decisions of the syndicate. The seat of
the Rhenish-Westphalian Coal Syndicate has always been at Essen. The name of the
syndicate has been changed to that of Ruhrkohle A.G. In recent times co-ordination
in the German coal trade has made further progress. Since 1 April 1934 the big mining
companies of the Aachen District, such as the Eschweiler Bergwerksverein and others
have joined the Rhenish-Westphalian Coal Syndicate. Although of course coal mining
in the Aachen district cannot be compared in magnitude with the industry on the Ruhr,
this consolidation of district interests has been welcomed as a step forward towards
a “national” coal organisation of the Reich. At any rate the considerable overlapping
between the two districts in their sale in South-German markets will now disappear.
As in fact the Rhenish-Westphalian Coal Syndicate is by far the most important cartel
in the whole coal mining industry of Germany it does not seem necessary to give a
description of combinations of minor importance. It may be mentioned, however, that
the Upper Silesian Coal Syndicate represents the same kind of organisation in the mines
of that district. This syndicate has, in 1933, been prolonged until March 1938. The
three largest coal mining concerns of that district formed at the same time a selling
organisation of their own for their products under the name of “InteressengemeinschaftHermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 34
Oberschlesischer Steinkohlengruben (Kohlen I.G.), G.m.b.H., Berlin.”
The factors then which have essentially influenced the formation and duration of
monopolist organisation in the German coal industry are the following:
1. The territorial concentration of coal mining.
2. The early concentration in the technical and financial units of collieries and the
concentration of mining undertakings.
3. The compulsory action of the State.
It is worth while to make comparison with the conditions of the English coal mining
industry, which form a regular counterpart to those existing in Germany. It is well
known that the United Kingdom abounds in coal almost everywhere. Coal districts
of almost equal commercial importance are spread over the whole economic territory
of Great Britain, whether we look to Northumberland or Durham, Scotland or Wales,
Yorkshire or Lancashire, the eastern counties or the midlands. Since the development
of railway traffic it has not been possible for any district to rely for the formation of
a cartel on a condition of “local” monopoly. It must not of course be forgotten that
the above mentioned districts do not all produce the same quality of coal, and in so
far as some districts have for this reason a preference in the market they are not always
in competition with each other. But if any one district were to attempt to put up prices
to any marked extent, consumers could obtain coal supplies from other districts, though
possibly of different quality, the only exception being the anthracite district in the
extreme west of South Wales. The relatively small size of Great Britain coupled with
an industry scattered over the whole country makes the position with regard to
competition very different from what it is in Germany, where the natural concentration
of coal fields in two main districts and the protective influence of long distances on
markets was favourable to industrial combination.
As regards the concentration of units and undertakings the German figures given
above may be compared with English data published by the Report on the Coal Industry
of 1925. This Report stated that there were at that time 2481 mines producing coal
as the principal mineral, a figure which may be contrasted with the German figure of
295 coal mining units in 1928, or the 312 units in the lignite industry. Under these
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mines employed less than 50 men, others more than 3000. Some produced coal at 12s.
a ton, some at a cost of 30s. The Commission visited a mine in Lanarkshire, which
employed 24 men and had a capital of £350. It was also engaged in extracting some
good coal, accessible by an adit, that had been left unworked many years ago. The coal
was sold in the neighbourhood, a small motor lorry conveying it. This was the structure
of a coal mining industry, which had not experienced the closing down of uneconomic
or technically backward pits by any central association or any quota arrangements
between members of a combination. We have quoted a figure showing that in Germany
in 1928 mines producing up to 500,000 tons of coal a year were reduced to 23.75 %
of the whole number of collieries. In Great Britain, however, in 1925 out of 613
undertakings (not even mining units!) 443 had an output disposable commercially of
from 5000 to 400,000 tons! The Report was well aware of this contrast between
German and English sizes of unit. It was expressly stated that the Westphalian coal
field was very differently organised in that respect from English mining. “The output
of that field in normal years is in the neighbourhood of a hundred million tons, but
the number of separate undertakings responsible for this large output is only seventy.”
The figure of 653 undertakings given in the Report on the Coal Industry represented
an output of 239 million tons of coal in England. Not less than 43-6 % of this output
was produced by undertakings producing from 500,000 to 600,000 tons a year. Of
course things have changed a good deal since then in the English coal mining industry.
The figures of to-day, if available, would probably show a far more concentrative
picture, although the last Report of the Coal Mines Reorganisation Committee (1933)
has not been very optimistic with regard to effected rationalisation. But the German
figures prove at any rate that the movement towards associative concentration of units
and undertakings had long begun when little of it was heard of in England and that
it had reached a very high level between 1924 and 1928, when a keener interest in the
desirability of such developments was just awakening in England. There can be no
doubt that it has been the lack of concentration which has been the main impediment
to effective associative organisation in the English coal industry. As, however, we could
see from the history of German coal organisation that even strong cartelisation would
in all probability not have held its own, if the State had not come to the help of theHermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 36
shattered Ruhr-Kartell before and during the War, so we are led to the conclusion that
in England too a mere facultative and voluntary arrangement between coal owners
would probably not have been of a permanent character. The reluctance of any English
government, up to recent times, to enforce amalgamation or to enact compulsory
combination, if voluntary action should fail, has certainly kept back the movement
towards combination in the coal trade. It has, however, lately become evident,
especially as regards the English steel industry, that voluntary agreements, as Sir
William Firth has put it in a speech before the London Iron and Steel Exchange in
January 1934, would only be consented to by the parties interested, if the prices agreed
to were showing a profit to the “least efficient” plant. The same reason has in all
probability reacted against the frequently discussed arrangements in the English coal
mining industry and will probably lead to further failures of well-meant schemes, just
as in Germany the coal cartel would have broken up without the interference of
government legislation.
The second important group of German extractive industries presenting a notable
example of combination is the potash group. Here an unique advantage was bestowed
on German producers. In contrast to the coal industry, which is open to international
competition, the potash mines were, up to the end of the World War, a natural
monopoly of the German Empire. There was in fact no competition to be feared from
any quarter of the world, when the costly process of producing potash from wood ashes
or sea salines was superseded by potash mining. The potash reserves of the world,
up to the last ten years, when the Spanish potash mining industry began to be developed
and Russian prospects for potash mining became brighter, were in fact centralised in
German territory by Nature, and there was no reason for the German potash industry
to be afraid of any international competition. Before the War Germany possessed two
distinct districts of potash properties, those situated in Middle Germany, mainly near
Stassfurt, Magdeburg, Halle, Mansfeld, Hanover and the Siidharz mountains, and the
Alsace-Lorraine potash mines, which Germany lost to France after the War. It was
then that for the first time the German potash mines had to face a competitor, but terms
of mutual understanding were soon arranged between the two parties. In 1932 Germany
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France produced in those regions formerly belonging to the Reich 1.9 million tons.
Russian potash production, which was frequently said to be becoming a serious
competitor in world markets, has not yet practically developed to that stage, while in
the last few years the potash production of Spain has made remarkable strides and the
U.S.A. were producing 129,000 tons in 1932. These developments, however, have
as yet hardly touched the monopolist position of the German-French potash industry.
It was certainly this monopolist condition of the industry within the world market,
which gave the first impulse to combination. Of course, there were even here, in a
production so exclusively confined to a definite area, certain limitations as regards
the exploitation of monopoly. In many cases, both with regard to inland consumption
and to the big consumers in the newly developed agricultural areas overseas, especially
in the U.S.A., the increasing use of the new fertiliser, however cheapened by the
development of the potash supply from mines, was largely dependent on its price. An
attempt to overstrain the power of monopoly by putting prices very much up would
certainly have reacted promptly on the demand, especially where the use of potash
would not have seemed a stringent necessity to farmers. It was among others this
reason, which led the Government of the Reich to refrain from the attempt to take a
share of the prosperous development of the industry in the form of an export duty,
however tempting from the mere treasury’s viewpoint such a measure seemed to be.
It was frequently discussed, but never carried through.
Yet there was ample room for an effective association among producers to exploit
the monopolist position of the industry. The first “ Kalisyndikat” was founded as early
as 1879. There were not more than four firms existing at that time, two being privately
owned and two owned by the State. Even twenty years later there were no more than
ten undertakings. This shows the very striking difference between the opportunities
for association in the potash industry and those in the older extractive industries such
as coal. The formation of a cartel was really a matter of little difficulty. But another
epoch soon followed. The mining of potash had become recognised as a most profitable
business. There was a general rush into the industry, a “Kalifieber,” as it was called.
Undertakings increased rapidly, as on the one side the syndicate seemed to offer a good
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newcomers to join it. At the beginning of the century a great number of new reserves
were discovered, in MiddleGermany as well as in Alsace, and the number of
undertakings increased still faster than before. By 1908 the undertakings had increased
to 50, by 1910 to 68! As the existing works now showed great differences as regards
the cost of production, a good number of the newly opened mines being less efficient
than the older ones and there having been considerable overcapitalisation since the
“Kali-rush,” very grave conflicts arose within the syndicate. In fact, the most efficient
works would have approved of the restoration of free competition, in order to fight
their weaker competitors and to be able to make full use of their productive capacity
instead of seeing their output limited by the quota. Thus a breakdown of the cartel and
the beginning of cutthroat competition would have been an unavoidable stage of their
development, if the Prussian State had not stepped in with compulsory measures. The
compulsory syndicate (Zwangssyndikat) was formed by the Kali-law of 1910.
Economists conversant with the problems of industry, such as Prof. Liefmann of
Freiburg, had predicted that this step would hardly lessen the evil in question, that is
overcompetition. Looking back now to the experiences of those days one may come
to the conclusion that overproduction in the potash industry would in fact have been
abated with greater success by leaving competition alone, as this in the long run would
have led to a “survival of the fittest.” The participation of the State in the cartel and
the policy inherent in such half-governmental organisation, to protect the weak elements
in industry against their more efficient competitors, has increased overproduction
instead of diminishing it, much to the “detriment of the German economic develop-
ment,” as Liefmann remarks. The increase of undertakings and pits was so much
accelerated after the compulsory cartelisation, that in 1913 the number of undertakings
had risen to 167 and to 207 in 1916. A catastrophic amount of overcapitalisation
accompanied this development; while Liefmann asserts that “about a dozen efficient
works with about 100 Million Mark of capital investment could supply the whole
demand ,” already before the War 2000 millions of marks were invested in the potash
industry. Yet in the long run the movement towards concentration could not be checked
by these conditions; on the contrary it became far more urgent. The concentration
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as, for instance, through the Still legungsverordnung of 1921 (an act to enforce the
closing down of inefficient plant); it has partly been effected through amalgamations
financed and promoted by capitalists and bankers specialising in that line of industrial
activity. The Enqueteausschuss (the committee on German industrial conditions already
mentioned) was able to state that, while the sale of pure potash had been reduced from
100,000 dz. (100 kilo) per unit of mine in 1912 to not more than 59,000 dz. in 1921,
it was again increased to 237,000 dz. in 1928. The same development has been going
on in the potash factories, producing the chemical product KgO. This has been achieved
through an entire reorganisation of the units of production and a very complete
rationalisation. As to the technical side of the latter, it may be mentioned that the costs
alone resulting from the use of power and fuel had been reduced by about 50% per
100 kilo of potash between 1924 and 1930. The German potash industry, which in
spite of compulsory cartelisation and state interference, has been going through very
harassing times for a long period, has of late been endeavouring to increase the
chemical side of its business, called Kalichemie. While the French potash producers
were desirous of expanding and increasing the mining productivity of the newly
acquired industry, German producers were increasingly devoting their attention to the
manufacturing processes and the chemical utilisation of potash, thereby making up
for the losses resulting from the Treaty of Versailles.
All these conditions have led to a movement of concentration of undertakings within
the German potash cartel. What neither the syndicate nor governmental action had
been able to effect, the dire necessity of economic development has accomplished
during the last few years. It is perhaps too early to speak of trustification in the German
potash industry, but a movement towards it can certainly be discerned. The leading
concern has been for a long time the “Wintershall-Deutsche Kali-industrie “ group,
its quota in the syndicate being 41 % in 1933. Two other dominant groups are Burbach
and the Saizdethfurt concern, the latter’s share in the syndicate’s production being
almost 25 %. It comprises the three very important and efficient undertakings:
Saizdethfurt, Kaliwerke Aschersleben and Westeregeln. The works of the Prussian
“fiskus” and that of Anhalt have become of secondary importance, and so has the
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combination of important manufacturing works with its mining activity. The
Westeregeln company for instance owns besides mines two factories producing chloride
of potassium, one factory producing sulphate of potash and sulphate potashmagnesia,
and one electro-chemical works. Saizdethfurt possesses a power station of its own,
representing 4000 kilowatt. Overcapitalisation in the potash industry, as can be studied
from detailed reports of the Enqueteausschuss, has recently been drastically dealt with
by reducing the share capital; the last transaction of that kind was the withdrawal and
cancelling of shares of the value of 16.65 million marks by the Wintershall concern
in the spring of 1933. The process of concentration and reorganisation, however, does
not yet seem to have reached its final stage. At any rate the historical development
of the potash mining industry presents an interesting example of the many different
facts which may finally be decisive in the formation of industrial combination. The
condition of monopoly of land, here so definitely present, has not prevented the industry
from passing through very critical periods, which have even occurred lately, leading
to drastic reductions in the dividends of the great concerns. The German potash industry
has been far from prosperous in recent years. Its case shows that the formation of
industrial combination in the form of cartelisation is not an allround remedy against
depression, resulting from overproduction and too many producers. Probably if the
industry was starting to-day, the lessons of its fifty years’ development would find
expression in measures counteracting the reckless multiplication of mines, by giving
the cartel some definite powers to regulate the number of new mines; an attempt which
was in fact made for some years in the ‘nineties by the so-called “ Schutzbohrgemein-
schaft” (an association to regulate the number of new potash enterprises). It is
interesting to note, that the same circumstances, which have led to a weakening of
the potash syndicates in Germany, had once operated to undermine the position of the
Limitation of the Vend in the northern English coal fields, the number of new
participants in the combine reducing the allocations of all mines concerned to the
detriment of the most efficient undertakings. It will be seen in the future how far the
movement of amalgamation in the potash industry will correct the mistakes made by
a prominent cartel and by the former cartel policy of the State.
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organisation of which is largely connected with the potash industry. Germany produced
as much as 2.1 million tons of rock-salt in 1933, being the second largest producer
of salt in the world after the U.S.A. The North-German Salt Syndicate was renewed
in December 1932 until the end of 1937 and the name changed to the “Norddeutsche
Salinenvereinigung G.m.b.H.” About 60 % of the German salines are owned by the
potash industry, who also control the Rock-Salt Syndicate. Of the 22 works concerned,
8 with a quota of 15% have been closed down and received compensation at the rate
of 10 R.M. per ton of output quota.
A very important role in the cartelisation and trustification of many countries has
been for a long time played by the cement industry. Cement belongs to those not very
numerous industries which have shown an upward trend of production since the
beginning of the World War, up to about 1928–29. Germany has been able to increase
its production of cement from 6.8 million tons in 1913 in the former territory of the
Reich to 7.5 millions in its reduced area in 1928, the U.S.A. from 15.8 millions to as
much as over 30 millions, Great Britain from 2-9 million tons in 1913 to 5.9 millions
in 1931, and there has been the same tendency in Japan, France, Belgium, Spain, and
even Russia. After 1929 a severe setback was experienced. Production in Germany
dropped to as little as 2.7 million tons in 1932. The position of cement — by which
we mean Portland cement, as it represents more than 75% of the world’s output —
is the very reverse of that in the potash industry. While potash had to be regarded right
up to recent times as being the natural geographical monopoly of a single restricted
national area, cement is in fact produced in almost every industrial country. As the
raw material for the making of cement can be supplied in almost any part of the world,
it is in general the demand which dictates the location of the industry and the principal
consumer countries have become the principal sources of supply. Yet this industry
based upon a product of such ubiquity has been a field of great activity as regards
industrial combination. In Great Britain from 70 to 90 % of the production has been
controlled by the Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers, which indeed is one
of the oldest English industrial combinations, having been founded in 1900. In the
U.S.A. four firms control about 35% of the output, in Norway and France the same
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industry. The conditions in general do not seem to favour combination. As Fitzgerald
rightly states: “There are in the cement industry practically unlimited sources of raw
material; the process of manufacturing is relatively simple.” But, on the other hand,
in England as in Germany: “The existence of a comprehensive federation naturally
enables the cement makers to exploit the large measure of national and local protection
conferred by the heavy cost of transport.” In fact like the potash industry the German
cement trade — although local cartels were in existence —  has been at times a field
of great overcompetition. During the War this led to a restriction of new production
by State action. The erection of new works was forbidden in 1916 and a strict regulation
in other, though minor, respects enacted, which lasted up to 1923. A central body, called
the Reichzementstelle, was created to make these orders effective. The endeavour to
bring about a national cement cartel, comprising all producers and uniting local cartels,
failed; an association of a loose type called the “Zementbund” was the only outcome.
On the other hand, within the local districts a strong tendency towards concentration
has been going on. In fact the industry of to-day is dominated by four leading concerns:
1. The Wicking Cement-works at Miinster (comprisingfifteen undertakings of the
Wesphalian district).
2. The Heidelberger works (comprising fourteen works in the State of Baden).
3. The Dyckerhoff concern (with works in the Rhineland and Southern Germany).
4. The Upper-Silesian works (Schlesische Portlandzement Industrie).
All these groups are characterised by a very strong tendency towards concentration.
The Upper-Silesian works are with one exception concentrated in the Schlesische
Portlandzementindustrie A.G. Before the War there were eleven independent works
outside the cartel. Since then the process of amalgamation went on, resulting in the
formation of big concerns, which after some time tried to come to a common basis
of management by forming Interessengemeinschaften, i.e., a community of interests.
It is only natural that such development had to lead one day to the national cartel,
which, in spite of many efforts, would not have been realised as long as local interests
were not completely unified. In March 1933 the four cement groups in Germany came
to an agreement for the next three years, which enabled them to cancel their special
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with a view to curtailing output. This new arrangement facilitated agreements with
one of the foreign competitors. The Dutch cement interests undertook not to deliver
further quantities of cement to Germany and quotas and minimum prices were fixed
for the Dutch market.
The history and structure of monopolist organisation in the cement trade is certainly
of marked importance. The example of this industry shows that a theory of monopoly
cannot be constructed upon the increasing costs characterising the production of the
soil or extractive industries. It would never have been possible to “monopolise” cement
by monopolising land, as had been the case with coal or iron ore, even if we do not
take into consideration the fact that there was always potential competition from Roman
cement and cement derived from iron-furnaces (Eisenportlandund Hochofenzement,
Htittenzement). The condition of monopoly was rather the “protection” afforded to
local procedure by the incidence of the freight. But it is again interesting to note that
this monopolist advantage could never have been exploited unless a strong movement
of amalgamation and even State action to suppress new competition had led to a
thorough concentration of works within the districts and from that to the wider
combination among the districts themselves through their respective monopolist
organisations. So in fact it is again the increasing size of the industrial and commercial
unit which has been of dominating influence.
One of the leading pre-War domains of German extractive industry, which since
1918 has very much diminished in importance, is that of iron-ore mining. In 1913 the
Reich produced as much as 40 million tons of iron ore, while in England mines were
producing 16.2 million tons and in the U.S.A. about 63 million tons. By 1929 the
German figure had dropped to 6.3 million tons and the increasing economic pressure
since then has brought about another diminution of iron-ore mining results to 2.6
millions in 1931 and even 1.339 millions in 1932. This enormous decrease to an almost
insignificant figure has mainly to be attributed to the fact that Germany lost by the
Treaty of Versailles the most important of its iron-ore mines, i.e., those of the Alsace
and Lorraine area, called minette ores, on the utilisation of which the German iron
and steel industry was mainly dependent. To-day the Ilsede district, the Lahn and Dill
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Certainly it must be borne in mind that the loss of the “iron-ore” provinces will not
alone account for the shrinking of production, for France produced in 1932 only about
6 million tons more than in 1913, although the whole of the AlsaceLorraine ore territory
has passed into her hands. But the principal cause of the enormous drop of German
production has certainly been the territorial changes since the end of the War.
The German iron-ore problem and its history have been a very prominent factor in
the building up of the monopolist structure of the iron and steel industry, while in
England the iron-ore supply has never played any role in the framing of industrial
combination. Indeed, there is a fundamental difference m the organisation of the iron
and steel industry of both countries resulting from the very different aspect of the ore
problems. English iron and steel producers have for a very long time used more foreign
than national ores, a fact partly due to the easy access and the highly developed shipping
facilities which this country offered to the imports of ore from Spain and Sweden, partly
to the necessity of importing high grade (haematite) ores to be used by the Bessemer
and Siemens-Martin acid processes. Under these circumstances the acquisition of
iron-ore mines by furnaces or steel mills was never considered as a necessary move
to evade a monopoly of raw material. If Mr Fitzgerald points out in his valuable book
on Industrial Combination in England that “the change in England has come about
much later” and if the Survey of Metal Trades of 1928 points to the fact, that it is
estimated that pig-iron manufacturers in England control their ore supply in this country
or abroad to the extent of about 72%, it must not be forgotten that combination of that
kind was certainly more due to purely economic considerations than to any idea of
acquiring ore properties with the intention of ousting others from the cheapest sources
of supply and of forming a monopoly. There is a marked difference between an iron
industry producing about 50% of its pig iron from foreign ores and furnaces relying
for their main supply on home-mined ores from certain geographically concentrated
inland districts, as was the case with the German supply from Alsace, Lorraine and
Luxemburg. This situation, almost like that in the coal industry, produced quite
different results as regards industrial combination and monopolist tendencies than
would have been the case, if German iron and steel manufacturers had relied for a large
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The German iron and steel manufacturers, by adopting the Thomas process at an
early stage, in contrast to their English colleagues who adhered to the making of acid
steel, have raised the neglected high-phosphoric iron-ore reserves of the Western
European districts to a great importance. The greatest concentration of the iron and
steel industry in the Ruhr district was based before the War upon the smelting with
local coal of the so-called “minette,” the situation resembling to some extent the
geographical situation of Lake Superior ores in the U.S.A. shipped to the furnaces of
the Pittsburg iron district. But besides the Rhine and Ruhr the big iron and steel works
in the Saar territory, in Lorraine and Luxemburg, owe their existence to the developing
of these iron ores. In Lorraine and Luxemburg the production of pig iron rose, the 1880
figure giving 100, to 1267 and 977 in 1913, the production of raw steel to 1339 and
5751, while in the whole Customs Union of the Reich the figures were only 707 and
966. But the special significance of this rise of the West and South German production
of iron and steel with regard to the question of ore supplies lies in still another fact.
A very pronounced division of labour had been developing between the then German
western and south-western steel works and others existing in Reich territory. The
western works were concentrating their activity on the production of “Massenmaterial,”
that is the cheap qualities most in use, produced by the Thomas process. For this
purpose the Lorraine-Luxemburg iron ores were the most suitable basis. Therefore
the manufacture of semi-finished products on a large scale suited these concerns,
especially as their location was well adapted to the shipping of iron and steel abroad.
The highly finished kinds of goods in the German iron and steel industries were mostly
produced in the Ruhr district. This was due partly to technical considerations, partly
to the existence of traditionally trained workmanship, while the generally higher costs
of freight in bringing the ore to the coal or coke were compensated by the fact that
the highly finished products required relatively more fuel, while the ores transported
to the Ruhr from the western districts represented the return freight of the coke needed
by the Lorraine-Luxemburg iron and steel works. Moreover, most of the western and
south-western works erected by German or foreign firms had by that time, for reasons
of finance as well as through personal circumstances, become the property of the great
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more or less linked up by common interests in organisation and in the disposal of their
produce. The natural geographical connection between the western ironore districts
on the one side, and the coal fields and traditional iron and steel manufactures of the
Ruhr-Rhine district on the other, had led to an organic interdependency of both
interests, which was characterised by a growing and finally almost complete vertical
combination of all important works. After the War and by the territorial enactments
of Versailles these organic relations were suddenly interrupted. By the loss of their
ironore properties, which had formed the basis of their profitable management, the
organisation of big iron and steel works underwent considerable changes. Besides,
the first years after the peace brought severe political repercussions, the inflation period
was most detrimental to the import of foreign ores and the temporary scarcity of coal
and coke meant an increasing necessity of relying on high grade ores. These
circumstances were partly mitigated by the Franco-German trade agreement of 1924,
but the conditions of the 1919-1924 period left their mark on the structural organisation
of the ore supply. The proportional use of inland mined ores doubled itself in
comparison with pre-War times and only by 1928 receded to its former level. From
the time of the restoration of normal commercial conditions and relations the imports
of foreign ores increased heavily. The imports of iron ores from Sweden had risen from
4.6 millions in 1913 to 7.4 millions in 1929, but the new economic depression since
that year brought the whole imports of foreign ores down to 3.4 million tons in 1932,
of which Sweden supplied r6 million tons. The German iron and steel industry being
to-day largely dependent on the import of foreign ores there has been a growing
tendency for the iron works to move from the original “Ruhr” district to the border
of the Rhine in order to get an easier access to the river and the canals, and to profit
by the facilities for cheaper water transport. This tendency also applies to other districts.
The Dortmunder Union, the Hoesch steel works and the Horder Verein are linked up
with water transport by the Dortmund-Ems Canal, the Rhine-Herne Canal is doing
the same for the Schalker Verein, and Krupp and Mannesmann have sought for their
new works locations situated near rivers or canals. This movement is all the more
important since the minette ores, formerly conveyed by rail, are now shipped by water,
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French interests are much more directed towards an increasing export of pig iron than
that of the raw material, although it will be hardly possible for France to renounce the
profitable shipping of iron ore to Germany. Although the Rhine route has been a means
of cheapening the supply of iron ores to the German iron and steel industries, there
is no doubt that the Rhenish-Westphalian works compare disadvantageously in the
matter of freight with their foreign competitors, especially in England. Even where
the English iron works draw their ore supplies from inland sources the freight charge
from mine to furnace is very low. The Cleveland iron ores have to be transported about
40 kilometres to reach their destination; the relatively few ores which the Rhineland
may derive from near mining districts, the Siegerland and the Lahn-Dill district, have
to be carried about 150 to 250 kilometres to the furnaces. For the same reason the iron
and steel industries of Lorraine, of Belgium and Luxemburg, are to-day enjoying
considerable advantages over their German competitors.
From all that has been said about the German iron-ore supply in the past and at the
present time, it will be understood that post-War developments have had a decisive
influence on monopolist organisation in that group of industry. The monopolisation
of iron-ore mines by the big concerns had been going on on exactly the same lines
as in the coal trade, as in fact the concentration of the minette ores in Lorraine and
Luxemburg (which before the Treaty of Versailles belonged to the German Customs
Union) offered the same facilities to monopolisation as that of the coal fields in the
Ruhr district. Yet, as iron ore was solely used in German industry, and owing to its
special qualities, neither having an outlet abroad, nor being used, like coal, for other
than smelting purposes, syndicates, though they existed, have never played anything
like such a distinctive role as they did in the coal mining or the coke industry. It is a
vertical combination with the steel industry, the big undertakings acquiring iron-ore
mines sufficient to meet their demand, which has led to a strong concentrative
movement in the iron-ore mining industry. While the Treaty of Versailles, as we have
explained, has interrupted this combination as regards the iron-ore mines which lie
to-day in non-German territories, the mines in the remaining iron-ore districts of
Germany belong exclusively to the big iron and steel undertakings. The economic
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“Without the big iron works on the Ruhr and the Rhein,” so writes Dr Hans J. Schneider
in his elaborate description of the reconstruction of the German iron and steel industry,
“these districts of iron-ore mining would long since have ceased to exist... they are
in a true sense emergency districts.” The big iron and steel concerns have sunk a fair
amount of capital in these mining properties, being led not only by the desire for
economic combination of works, but also by a regard for the preservation of these
mining resources as the last remaining to the Reich after the War. On the other hand
the Reich has been assisting the management of these mines by according temporary
subventions (Erzforderungssubvention) and by granting special reduced freight to the
Siegerland and other districts.
The important part which the iron-ore problem has played in the framework of
German industrial organisation belongs to history. The necessity of acquiring ore mines
to avoid monopolisation and to derive the benefit of combination has not led here to
an antagonism between cartels and giant firms, as in the coal mining industry. Yet
the concentration movement in the iron-ore mining industry of the former German
territories has been a very important factor in the development of industrial combination
in the German iron and steel industries, as it has been largely responsible for the early




Although seriously affected by loss of territory and post-War political events, the
development of the iron and steel industries of the Reich has not been discouraging.
This can be proved by a comparison of the output of iron and steel with that of other
countries:
In millions of tons Pig iron Steel
1913 1929 1933 1913 1929 1933
United  Kingdom  10.26  7.59 4.12 7.66 9.64 7.00
Germany  10.73 13.19 5.18  11.99 15.99 7.44
France  8.93 10.20  6.21 6.86 9.55 6.40
U.S.A.  30.97 42.61 31.73 31.30 56.43 23.57
Figures for 1933 are estimates.
Figures for France and Germany refer to present territory. (1935)
The circumstances which led to the remarkable development of German iron and
steel figures up to 1929 are due to the effort to regain the advantages lost by the
circumstances mentioned in the foregoing chapter. The very disastrous loss of iron-ore
properties in the minette district was partly met by the importation of foreign ores and
by an increased use of scrap (up to 1924), partly by the cheapening of transport facilities
through a transference of works to the most economic shipping points, partly by a
movement of combination on a much larger scale than before resulting in a reduction
of general costs, partly by the introduction of elaborate systems of research and the
introduction of a good many technical improvements, better fuel economy and
rationalised production. Indeed the period in question might be described as one of
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decisive change came about in January 1925, when the “free import” quotas, to which
the Reich had been forced by the Treaty of Versailles, came to an end, and the import
duties were fully restored, while quota arrangements were entered into between the
Governments of Germany, France and Luxemburg regarding the importation of iron
and steel from Lorraine, the Saar district (which was included in the French Customs
Union area as from 10 January 1925) and Luxemburg. Moreover the conclusion of
the Dawes agreement had attracted foreign capital to German industries, of which the
iron and steel industries did not have the least share. Other capital to be invested in
iron and steel works came from the money compensations accorded to undertakings
for their losses of property in the former German provinces, as such funds had to be
reinvested in works within the Reich territory. Those iron and steel companies too,
which before had no works outside the lost territory, were getting compensation on
condition that all such capital had to be invested in the building up of new iron and
steel works within the remaining borders of the Reich. All these circumstances led
to the result that in spite of her very heavy losses the German iron and steel industry
was able to regain her pre-War position almost within ten years, a development which,
as regards the actual output of iron and steel (not the productive capacity), was only
interrupted by the new pressure of general economic conditions since 1929.
A large amount of this remarkable success in the reconstruction of an industry, which
had suffered more than others by the post-War rupture of its traditional and organic
economic connections, was certainly due to the concentrative organisation, which had
been developing long before the War and its fatal consequences to the German iron
and steel works. The same kind of natural territorial concentration, which we have
been describing in the coal mining industry and its concentrative organisation, was
characteristic of the iron and steel industry of the Empire. In fact the two main and
dominant centres lay here also in the Rhenish-Westphalian district on the one hand
and the Upper-Silesian on the other. This concentration has increased even more since
the end of the War, under the territorial decisions of the peace treaties.
According to the Census of Occupation of 1925 not less than 62 % of all persons
employed in the heavy iron industry belonged to the Rhenish-Westphalian district.
In 1927 the pig iron furnaces of that district produced not less than 79 % of the wholeHermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 51
German pig-iron production, the figure being even 82 % in 1929. The respective figures
for the production of steel in that district were 79-5 and 8ri % of the whole German
production. The remaining percentage is split up among many secondary districts, so
as to give a still larger predominance to the RhenishWestphalian iron and steel works,
which in fact are to-day the whole domain of the German iron and steel trade. While
Rheinland-Westphalen produced in 1929 more than 13 million tons of raw steel, the
North, East and Middle German districts together produced not more than 1,300,000,
the output of the Silesian works having dwindled down to only 536,000.
We have pointed out in the foregoing chapter one of the main causes of this
concentration. It was due to the favourable location of the industry as regards coal and,
formerly, iron ore, and to the excellent shipping and freight facilities. In fact, the
Rhenish-Westphalian iron industry, compared with that of other districts, was for a
long time characterised by the domination of the “combined” works in contrast to the
so-called “reine” Werke, “pure” works. This applies to the making of pig iron as well
as to the steel-rolling mills. It has been estimated that 90% of the pig iron produced
in that territory comes from furnaces belonging to undertakings which possess
steel-rolling mills of their own; in that district only 10% of the production consists
of foundry or haematite pig iron. In the other mining districts — much less important
ones, as was shown above —  things are different. In the Siegerland, the Lahn-Dill-Rev-
ier, in Silesia and other districts, the production of these kinds of iron amounts to
30–40% of the whole production of pig iron, although of course as regards absolute
figures the Rhein-Ruhr production leads in these kinds of pig iron too. But the
Rhenish-Westphalian furnaces producing pig iron of the general sort supply a good
deal of this to the steel mills of the other districts.
The importance of such territorial or “local” concentration of industry cannot be
overrated. It is quite evident that it has led to a community and thereby to the unification
of interests. Here again things are different in British industry. In England the
production of pig iron according to official statements in 1927 was distributed among
a great number of districts, the North-east Coast district having the lead with 2-2 million
tons out of 7-2 millions, but” Lincolnshire and Leicestershire ,” the “Yorkshire,
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“Scotland,” the “Lancashire and North-Wales” district each sharing the whole
production with only 500,000 to 900,000 tons each. The same applies to the production
of English steel works producing ingots and castings, and to the British iron and steel
industry in general. The similarity of conditions in the great centre of the German iron
and steel industry was a very important cause of an early development of combination
and amalgamation in industry. As the most favourable location for iron and steel
making was to be found in a few districts, the works in these districts — in
Rheinland-Westphalen as well as in Upper Silesia, which owing to its remoteness had
market conditions of its own, and later in Lorraine-Luxemburg — had a very
pronounced interest in securing and safeguarding for themselves the conditions and
opportunities on which the successful working of the iron and steel making in these
locations depended. This led very early on to the desire on the part of these works to
make themselves secure from the dangers of monopolies latent in the supply of coal,
iron ore and chalk-stone, by combining their undertakings with a supply of raw material
of their own. One may argue that the economies to be effected by such combination,
especially the cheapening of the supply of raw material by freeing the furnaces from
market buying, might have been a sufficient inducement to get into vertical combination
even without the menace of the monopolisation of coal and iron ore. The recent English
example would justify such an argument. But it must be remembered that at the
beginning of the movement — besides some rather unlucky experiments in moving
the industry to the coast in order to enjoy the opportunity of buying imported
nonmonopolised raw material (Hochofenwerk Lübeck) — one urgent reason for the
acquisition of coal mines and ore properties by iron and steel works was the growing
power of cartels and syndicates in the extractive branches, on which furnaces and steel
works depended. This certainly does not preclude the fact that aims mainly directed
towards greater economy and more rational collaboration of the interdependent
technical units were an important factor in the considerations leading to the vertical
combination of works. As the Enqueteausschuss on the German iron and steel industry
(1930) pointed out with great emphasis, the improvement of fuel economy has been
largely brought about by such combination; for instance an iron furnace combined
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of coke, while the coking gases may be replaced by the less valuable waste gases of
the iron furnaces and thereby may become free for use in other directions (this
“exchange” of gases plays an important part in modern fuel economy).
2 All these
circumstances will have to be carefully borne in mind in enumerating the considerations
which led to vertical combination but it must be remembered that technical and
organisational advantages of this kind — as also the combination of iron and steel
works with the production of electric energy
3 — are of a much later date than vertical
combination in Germany. The movement towards vertical combination and the
formation of “mixed” undertakings for the reasons mentioned may rightly be taken
as a very important factor in the post-War development of the iron and steel industry,
but the beginning of this tendency has to be traced to a period when other considerations
were at work. It was certainly the apprehensions with regard to the monopolisation
of raw materials by cartels and syndicates which at first led to the policy of combining
in one undertaking the preliminary stages of production with the finishing industries.
It was between 1895 and 1899 that the first period of this development set in. It was
fully described at an early date by Hans Gideon Heymann in his study on the
Gemischten Werke in der deutschen Grosseisen Industrie (1904). In those days the
“pure” works in the finishing lines began to suffer heavily under the then existing
difficulty of securing an adequate and economic supply of raw materials and eagerly
sought to acquire works of the preliminary processes. In those days, industries which
had never had any connection with coal were getting hold of collieries, in order to free
themselves from the “open” market and its cartelisation. This was the case in the
chemical and sugar industries. As regards the iron and steel industry the process of
vertical combination was penetrating into the highly finished stages of production.
Engineering firms, wire works, etc., were acquiring collieries and furnaces. Even the
biggest German locomotive works of Henschel in Cassel got possession of a coal mine
and a furnace. An early example of vertical combination in the finishing and high-class
production was that of the Friedrich Krupp A.G., in Essen. In 1913–14 this firm was
producing 833,970 tons of rolled products; it had its own steel works, producing
1,593,608 tons, pig iron produced by its own furnaces to an extent of 1,285,172 tons,
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of 1,064,055 and 7,599,234 tons.
The movement towards vertical combination which started in the firms interested
in the finishing lines reacted promptly on the big “pure” mining concerns. These
undertakings were losing to a certain extent their best and largest customers. It was
only natural that the remedy they sought was to get into vertical combination by
acquiring iron and steel works or at any rate by seeking to combine themselves with
existing mixed undertakings. These tendencies bore a very striking likeness to the
changes and struggles preceding the formation of the United States’ Steel Corporation.
In the early days of monopoly formation in the steel industry of the United States the
tendency for vertical combination started from the acquisition, by the iron furnaces
and rolling mills, of control over iron and coal mines, and then reacted on the producers
of raw material, who became afraid of losing their best customers by this very
development and became anxious to counteract this new condition by combining
extractive industries with finishing works. Thus from the one movement towards
vertical combination another one was developing. While the furnaces and steel works
which had acquired ore and coal properties had been described as Hiittenzechen
(collieryfurnaces), the mines which combined their business with that of furnaces were
soon called Zechenhiitten (furnace-collieries). To-day only the Harpener Bergbaugesell-
schaft can be cited as a really “ pure “ colliery concern. This great undertaking situated
in Dortmund and representing a share capital of as much as 90 million marks ordinary
and 300,000 marks preferred shares, with a quota of 6.63 % in the coal syndicate, is
in fact the only dominant pure mining undertaking of the Ruhr district. It produced
over 8 million tons of coal in 1929 and 4.6 million in 1932, besides about 2 million
tons of coke in 1929 and 944,000 tons in 1932. It represents one of the most up-to-date
coalmining enterprises of the Reich, being equipped with the latest technical appliances,
possessing very modern works for the production of by-products and being financially
affiliated by partnerships to undertakings like the Ruhrchemie A.G. and the Ruhrgas
A.G. of Essen. It is said that the satisfactory working of this company even in the recent
unfavourable times was due to the very effective rationalisation carried out in its works.
However, the Harpener type of “pure” colliery is quite exceptional to-day and stands
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ore, or of collieries dependent on the sale of their produce to iron and steel companies.
By far the most important prototype of the big “mixed” undertaking, indeed the
beginning of the trust type within the German steel industry, is represented by the
“Vereinigte Stahlwerke A.G.” of Diisseldorf. This giant undertaking was founded in
1926 under the pressure of a very heavy crisis in the iron and steel trade; by the end
of 1933 its organisation had been subjected to very important changes, which will be
sketched in a later chapter, as in fact these changes, though of great importance to the
structural shape of the concern, do not affect the aims of its primary and initial
development, which found expression in the desire to form a vertical combination of
giant dimension.
The “Stahlverein,” as the Ver. Stahlwerke are generally called, represents a fusion
of the following very important German mining, iron and steel companies:
Deutsch-Luxemburgische Bergwerksgesellschaft A.G.
Gelsenkirchner Bergwerks A.G.
Bochumer Verein fur Bergbau und Gussstahl-Fabrikation.
Phoenix A.G. fur Bergbau und Hiittenbetrieb.
Rheinische Stahlwerke A.G.
Thyssen Hiittenwerke in Hamborn.
To these were added at a later date the most valuable parts of the Stumm and
Rombacher concerns, also the Charlottenhiitte in Lower Silesia and a number of smaller
works. All these undertakings had of course their own history of horizontal or vertical
combination, which can be followed up in many of the earlier descriptions of the cartel
movement in Germany. The position of the new concern can best be judged by the
different participations of the Stahlverein in cartels and syndicates shortly after the
before-mentioned additions to its original status had been effected. The production
of the Stahlverein ranged from 35 to 55 % of the syndicated German output. The
Stahlverein’s part in the pig-iron syndicate was as high as 48.47 % of its production,
in semis it ran up to 56.44 %, in structural steel (Oberbaumaterial) to 55.77 %, in hoop
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%, in tubes to about 50 % according to the prospectus, in wire rods to 38.75 %, all
these figures relating to the percentage of the Stahlverein in the production of the
different cartels or associations. On the other hand the Stahlverein’s policy has been
to concentrate on the iron and steel production and to part with the further finishing
lines as for instance engineering. A new concern, the Deutsche Maschinenfabrik A.G.
(Demag), was formed with a capital of 30 million marks, the Stahlverein merging its
Thyssen engineering works into the new company, which was based upon a
reconstruction of a big existing undertaking.
According to the latest available figures, the position of the Stahlverein as regards
its productive powers is remarkable. It owns 13,400 ha. of land (one ha. equal to 0.45
acre), of which 2900 ha. consist of industrial sites, and 58,314 dwellings connected
with the works (Werkswohnungen). Its coal fields represent a reserve of approximately
5300 million tons, its ore fields a reserve of about 560 million tons. Its yearly capacity
of coal production amounts to 36 million tons. It owns 19 cokery plants with 2790
coke ovens and a productive capacity of 10 million tons a year. In the blast furnace
group it embraces nine blast furnace works with 52 furnaces and a productive capacity
of 9.7 million tons a year. It owns 27 steel works with a productivity of 9.25 million
tons a year. The Stahlverein also possesses the most up-to-date plants in the finishing
branches of the steel industry, among them bridge-building factories, ship-building
works, wire works and others. The railway tracks owned by the Stahlverein amount
to 1300 kilometres, the waggon park to about 11,500 and 421 locomotives. The
company has besides at its disposal 14 ports, partly owned and partly rented, with 78
cranes. It further possesses 209 power stations (Kraftzentralen) with an efficiency of
about 481,000 kw. As regards the steel producing capacity of the Stahlverein of about
10 million tons it may be useful to compare this with an English figure; the Report
on Metal Industries stated that in 1926 the twelve largest groups of companies
(enumerated in the Appendix of that Report) representing the principal English
producers of heavy iron and steel were capable of producing 7.2 million tons of steel
yearly. The much larger concentration of the iron and steel industry in Germany thus
becomes evident.
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unless due regard is paid to the network of financial connections linking up the
Stahlverein — and similarly giant German concerns in other groups of German industry
—  with important industrial undertakings of all kinds. The Enqueteausschuss laid
great stress on this point. We read in this Report: “A statistical description of company
concentration ought not to overlook the fact that amalgamation is reinforced by the
linking up of several independent undertakings through a rather tight network of
financial relations; such combination, while leaving formal independence to the single
undertakings, brings them into the field of bigger groups of interest. The following
example may be cited: the biggest iron-producing undertaking of Germany, the
Vereinigte Stahlwerke A.G. is the greatest shareholder in the Mitteldeutsche Stahlwerke
A.G., which controls by far the greatest number of steel works and rolling plant in
Middle Germany. At the same time the Mitteldeutsche Stahlwerke owns on its part
the majority of the shares of the Vereinigte Oberschlesische Hiitten A.G., i.e., of the
company in which the main works of another great centre of production have been
concentrated. While statistically the three great undertakings, which were themselves
the result of former amalgamations, are more or less independent of each other, they
are grouped de facto by personal relations and organisational connections into one
compact whole, allowing a division of labour.” Besides the before-mentioned steel
works in Middle Germany the most important participations of the Stahlverein relate
to the Essener Steinkohlenbergwerke A.G. in Essen (it is intended to get rid of this
participation in the near future), the Demag (engineering), the Ruhrgas A.G., the
Ruhrchemie A.G., the Gesellschaft fur Teerverwertung (a company dealing with the
utilisation of tar) and the Austrian Alpine Montan Gesellschaft. The organisational
structure of the German iron and steel industry under the influence of industrial
combination and in regard to its nascent trustification will have to be discussed in a
later chapter. The development as described here has sufficiently demonstrated the
important role which vertical combination, started first under the pressure of
monopolistic apprehensions and completed later on by economic, technical and
organisational considerations, has played in the history of industrial combination in
the iron and steel industry of the Reich.
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of the German iron and steel industry. It can easily be understood that in the German
iron industry, which started so much later than the British, the technical unit was never
so much split up as in the English iron and steel manufacture with its much longer
tradition. It is much more convenient to start a factory on “modern” lines, that is in
our days on a “big” scale, than to adapt old-fashioned and smaller works to the growing
size of the technical or commercial unit. At the end of 1913 there were in the Reich
313 pig-iron furnaces in blast, the production of pig iron being then 16.7 million tons;
In 1930 the production of pig iron amounted to only 9.6 million tons, but there were
not more than 107 furnaces working and the number of existing furnaces had been
reduced from 330 in 1913 to 158. In England the pig iron produced in 1927 amounted
to 7½ million tons, but the number of furnaces amounted to not less than 437! “A
number of new blast furnaces of large capacity have been built,” so stated the Report
on Metal Industries in 1928, “but there are still many small furnaces in existence with
a capacity far below that which is found most efficient from the point of view of
quantity of output in modern practice....” In 1925 the output of pig iron per furnace
in blast was on the average 138,000 tons a year in the U.S.A., 96,900 in Germany and
not more than 41,354 in England.
4
The relatively small number of furnaces and commercial units in the German iron
industry prepared the way towards cartelisation in quite a different way from that in
the English iron industry and the same held true for the steel manufacture. Here also
technical progress on the one side and the diminution of undertakings by vertical
combination on the other had led to a gradual but drastic reduction of commercial units;
as regards the latter point it is evident that the desire to combine vertically on a large
scale was leading by itself to the buying up of a good many smaller works in order
to get the supply of raw material or semi-finished products on a sufficiently large scale
to comply with the demand of huge finishing works. While on the one hand
cartelisation, largely assisted by horizontal combination, had been an important though
indirect impetus to vertical combination, vertical combination on the other hand
developed the tendency to enlarge the sphere of horizontally combined undertakings.
At any rate the rapidly growing size of the unit and the constant diminution of single
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syndicates in the iron and steel industry. But another factor must not be forgotten. The
German iron industry has enjoyed tariff protection uninterruptedly from 1879 to the
present time. The tariff first granted in the ‘seventies, after a short period of free trade
tendencies, as a measure to protect an “infant industry” (as in fact the introduction
of the Thomas process and the development of the utilisation of “minette” seemed
at first to be a rather risky experiment), has become an unshakable element of German
tariffs. The duties on iron and steel would have been ineffective if competition among
the producing companies within the Reich had brought prices down below the level
of “world market prices plus duty and freight.” The only way to avoid this was to fix
prices through the medium of cartels, syndicates or conventions. Thus the desire to
make the utmost out of the protection afforded by the State, instead of losing its
“benefit” by overcompetition, became a very strong stimulus to the formation of
industrial combination. It will be understood that industrial associations have by no
means been able to maintain permanently the highest possible level of prices, i.e., the
world market price plus duty and freight. But this fact does not dispose of the argument
that prices would certainly have developed at times in a very different way if the policy
of effective syndicates had not prevented their “free” play. Schneider gives the
following figures concerning the level of bar-iron prices in the last few years:
German price
German (+)  higher
duty  ( - ) lower
German price  Belgian price  R.M.  than Belgian
Year  R.M. per ton  R.M. per ton  per ton  price + duty
1924  128.08 122.92 25    -19.84
1925  129.33 113.47 25  -9.14
1926  129.80 104.78 25  +0.02
1927 131.00  98.88  25  +7.12
1928  135.46 112.15 25    -1.69
1929  138.00 120.59 25    -7.59
1930  137.33 111.17 25  +1.16
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price “policy,” evidently show that the German price, though subject to considerable
fluctuation, has been oscillating around the level accorded by tariff protection,
sometimes even advancing above the world market price plus German duty. The same
has been the case in other branches of the iron and steel industry. As regards pig iron
the price of haematite pig iron from the Rhenish-Westphalian district has been since
1925 considerably higher than the English price for East Coast haematite (Middles-
brough) plus German duty; in March 1930 the price was 91 R.M. per ton in
Oberhausen, while it was 77.16 R.M. in England. The duty being 10 R.M. per ton the
larger difference is accounted for by the freight charge to be added to the price of the
syndicate (Verbandspreis). According to the Enqueteausschuss and under the
assumption that the transport radius would amount to 100 km. on the average the freight
to be added to the “Verbandspreis” would run to about 5.30 R.M. per ton.
There can be no doubt that cartels and syndicates, however their price policy may
be judged or criticised, have been the means of raising prices to the level conceded
by the grant of tariff protection and that it has been one of the avowed objects of
cartelisation and syndicates to bring this about. Neither can there be any doubt that
in this sense the tariff has been a stimulus to cartelisation, although this must by no
means be considered as one of its chief causes. The most important cartels in the
German iron and steel industry are to-day: the pig-iron association, the Roheisenver-
band; the syndicate regulating the output of unmanufactured steel, the Rohstahlgemein-
schaft; the so-called “A” -Produktenverband, a cartel regulating the sales in the
semi-finished and heavy groups, including semi-finished steel such as ingots, slabs,
blooms and billets; railway materials such as rails, ties, fish-plates, bolts, spikes,
bed-plates and structural steel, together with T, U, and I beams more than 80 mm. face.
Both steel syndicates are annexed to the Stahlwerksverband A.G. in Diisseldorf, an
association, which also represents the commercial management of the Stabeisenverband
(bar-iron syndicate), the thick plate, the Grobblechverband (syndicate) and the
Bandeisenvereinigung (hoop iron association). Besides there are cartels in parts of
the so-called “B” -product groups, which include rods, steel bands, barrel hoops, rolled
wire, sheet metal, tubes, cast-steel railway axles, steel forgings, steel rollers, etc.
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Association and others, the cartelisation in the iron and steel trade is undoubtedly
chiefly to be found in the stages of production from the raw material to the half-finished
produce and the heavy material.
The Stahlwerksverband has for a long time been by far the most interesting and also
the most important of all monopolist associations existing in the German iron and steel
trade. The history of this combine also shows how far the formation of giant concerns
within the cartel may lead to a serious conflict of interests between its members. Before
the War the heavy branches of the industry had since 1904 been federated in the
Stahlwerksverband, a union of steel producers, which controlled output and prices
of the simpler kind of products, while within the Verband a strong tendency towards
concentration of undertakings had manifested itself, marked, as we have seen, by
special integration of businesses at successive stages of production. The conflicts within
the cartel led to its lapse in 1919. For several years the industry was unregulated, at
any rate in so far as steel and steel products were concerned. The factors we have
mentioned above, as regards the increase of productive capacity on the one side and
vertical combination on the other, resulted eventually in the absence of any pooling
of interests, in an increase of production beyond the capacity of the market to absorb
it and a consequent price war. After long discussions the
Rohstahlgemeinschaft was formed on i November 1924. It was agreed that this
combination was to regulate output. Each firm belonging to the syndicate is registered
as having a certain capacity of output. From time to time the syndicate as a whole agrees
to restrict output by a given percentage, and every member has then to reduce his
production in a similar proportion below its agreed capacity. The syndicate, however,
does not regulate prices, nor is it in any sense a joint sales organisation; but all orders
given to individual members have to be reported to the syndicate, which allocates them
to a particular works, whether that of the firm which has received the order or another.
The syndicate represents therefore, as Liefmann has put it, “eine blosse
Angebotskontingentierung,” an allocation of supplies federated with a “production
cartel.” Price fixing does not belong to the sphere of the syndicate. It is left to the
special associations formed for various groups of the iron and steel industry, as for
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Rohstahlgemeinschaft, therefore, can be defined as a “frame” or “base” cartel. It may
be mentioned that in the group of wire and wire products there were in 1930 alone
17 different syndicates. The general structure of industrial combination in the German
iron and steel industry therefore presents the following picture:
(a) The Stahlwerksverband, being the managing roof organisation for the sale of the
various products subject to syndicated organisation.
(b) The Rohstahlgemeinschaft, being (to-day) an organisation production for
controlling and allocating the A as well as the B products, in so far as they are
cartelised.
(c) The various cartels federated to the Stahlwerksverband fixing the prices of their
products, but restricted in their functions of production and distribution by (a) and (b).
By the end of 1929 the Rohstahlgemeinschaft was renewed and enlarged by the
formation of new associations in certain branches. The various associations have been
affiliated or federated to that main organisation by agreements lasting over a period
of ten years, that is, up to the end of 1940. A very important and novel function has
been added in the renewing of the Rohstahlgemeinschaft in the form of the so-called
“Gruppenschutz” (group protection). During the agreement mentioned above the
manufacture of new products by the cartel-partners will not be allowed without the
consent of a newly formed “Vertrauensstelle,” a sort of “trustee-board.” This does not
only apply for products syndicated or to be syndicated, but also for the manufacture
of such products as might be allocated to one or to several firms for reasons of division
of labour. This measure is intended to help in the direction of a further stabilisation
of iron and steel production and to lessen the danger of overproduction.
Modern industrial combination in the German iron and steel trade is certainly very
complex. If one had expected that the beginning of trustification in the industry by
the formation and growing strength of the Stahlverein would have lessened the
organisational task and aims of cartelisation and syndicates, this view will certainly
be promptly refuted by the description we have given of the development of the latter.
There is not yet an alternative between “ trustification “ and “cartelisation .” Although
within the sphere of industrial combination represented by both cartelisation and
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attention and interest, they have by no means lessened the importance of cartels and
syndicates. Without doubt the formation of so big a merger as that of the Stahlverein
has in some ways facilitated the task of cartels. In that respect it was very interesting
to hear the evidence given by Herr Nothmann of the Tube Association before the
Enqueteausschuss with regard to the effects of the Stahlverein on the cartel organisation
of his branch. He declared: “The amalgamation of the Vereinigten Stahlwerke has
greatly facilitated management within the tube syndicate. The manufacturing
programme of four big works has been put together and the association was relieved
of the necessity of deciding in each particular case, whether an order was better suited
to the working of this or that works, which may have been expecting it. The Vereinigten
Stahlwerke now undertake to distribute the orders among the amalgamated works,
a task formerly belonging to the association. The concentration of the sales departments
and warehouses of the four concerns has also greatly facilitated the distributive task
of the association, as to-day not four separate firms in each district of the industry —
that is a total of 16 of such firms — send in their orders, but only four in all. These
orders being very large are much better adapted to the necessity of large and uniform
specifications, which are wanted by the Association with regard to a more rational
way of work, and therefore such orders may be passed on without going into an
examination of the manufacturing programme.”
It becomes evident from what the witness explained to the committee that the
formation of the Stahlverein has not weakened the position of the tube cartel and may
not weaken the position of others, as in fact the concentration of organisational power
within the syndicates may be in line with cartelistic aims and even facilitate their
realisation. No doubt, there may be cases and questions in regard to which the interests
of syndicates and those of trustificated concerns within their membership may show
considerable disagreement. But as regards the question of greater rationalisation and
standardisation and other problems of economic and technical unification the interests
of the cartels are certainly deriving advantage from the trust movement within their
borders. The question how far trustification fits in with the aims and necessities of
cartels and other associations will certainly depend very much on the number and
diversity of the firms associated. If, as formerly in the coal and potash industries, aHermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 64
great number of rather small and weak undertakings belong to the combination, the
interest of the big concerns in the cartel will greatly differ from that of such firms. This
will sooner or later result in a very sharp and in the long run fatal struggle within the
association. A strong movement towards concentration, as has been witnessed in the
German steel industry in the last twelve years, will eventually not dispose of the




The development of industrial combination in the chemical trade of Germany may
be rightly considered as being in direct contrast to that of the groups of industry
discussed in the former chapters. While coal and potash mining and other extractive
industries as well as the manufacture of iron and steel were developing from a great
number of very small commercial units, in comparison with those of our days, to
gradually increasing undertakings and finally into huge concentrated concerns, modern
chemical works were characterised from the beginning by relatively large-sized
undertakings. This is not characteristic of Germany alone. A comparison, say, of
English coal mining and textile or iron manufactures with the foremost chemical
products, would give the same result, though of course the most important branches
of the modem English chemical industries have developed much later than in Germany.
As early as in the ‘nineties a very strong concentration of the leading manufacturing
firms, especially in the branches of chemical dyes and pharmaceutical products, was
to be found in the German chemical industries, mostly due to the fact that the
manufacture was to a considerable extent based upon patents and that a great outlay
of capital was needed for the manufacturing processes and continuous and costly
research.
The nucleus of the most important undertakings in the industry were the:
Badische Anilin and Soda Fabrik in Ludwigshafen Mannheim.
Elberfelder Farbenfabriken vorm. Bayer and Co.
Hochster Farbwerke verm. Meister, Lucius and Bruning.
Aktiengesellschaft fur Anilinfabrikation (Berlin).
The form of combination characteristic of even the early development of the industry
was that of “Interessengemein schaften,” communities of interest. The first of theseHermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 66
was concluded between the Hochster works and Leopold Casella and Co. in October
1904, and only a month later there followed the much more important, but similar
agreement between the Badische Anilin and the Elberfelder works, which was joined
a few weeks later by the Aktiengesellschaft fur Anilinfabrikation. This community
of interests — agreed to for a period of 50 years  — was based upon the principle of
pooling profits, of declaring the same dividends and partly upon an exchange of shares.
While up to 1916 the two groups “Badische Elberfelder, Aktiengesellschaft fur
Anilinfabrikation” and “Hochster Farben-Casella” were working independently of
each other, in that year a new Interessengemeinschaft of the two dominant groups
together with two outside companies was formed, also for a period of 50 years. In 1925,
however, it was decided to substitute for this form of organisation a closer union.
Retaining the old name, a trust was formed, “Interessengemeinschaft Farbenindustrie
Aktiengesellschaft,” which is usually called I.G. Farben. The capital in ordinary and
preference shares was 646 million R.M. It amounts to-day to about 1000 million R.M.
The process of formation was that one of the companies — the Badische Anilin and
Sodafabrik A.G. — increased its capital and exchanges shares with the other
companies.
The combination thus formed represents in fact not only the most important
trustification in German industry, but indeed one of the most important trusts in the
international economic sphere. German chemical industries still lead the international
dye markets. Although since the War many traditional markets have been lost to the
German dye industry by national programmes of production, yet in 1928 Germany
produced 43-6 % of the total world output of coal-tar dyes, the U.S.A. 22-5 %, Great
Britain iry %, while the percentage of production in other countries, including Japan,
was much less. Of the European production of dyes of 142,000 tons in that year, the
German industry produced 85,000. Moreover, it must be taken into account that the
German produce is on the average, and with the exception of Swiss makes, far more
valuable than that of its foreign competitors, especially of those who have not been
very long in the business. In 1928 the average value per kilo of coaltar dyes exported
amounted in R.M. to 4.86 as regards German exports, but only to 1.78 in England,
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to show a figure as high as 6.5 %, but her whole production amounted to only 11,000
tons or 5.6 % of the world’s production. There are unfortunately very few figures
showing the dominant position of the German chemical trust in German industry.
According to a quotation of the Dresdner Bank, in the German synthetic dyestuff
industry in 1927–28 about 100 % of the actual national production was controlled by
the I.G. Farben, Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., controlled about 40 %, in France
the Etablissement Kuhlmann about 80 % of the national output. Of the production
of synthetic nitrogen the German trust was responsible for about 85 % of the national
output, while Imperial Chemical Industries controlled about 100 %, Etablissement
Kuhlmann about 30 %, the Montecatini trust in Italy about 60 %, and the E. J. Du Font
de Nemours concern in the U.S.A. a certainly dominant percentage of national
production.
The name of I.G. Farben certainly no longer expresses the enormous field of activities
covered by the huge German chemical combine. Indeed to-day the colour business
does not even represent the most lucrative side of the concern. Here are some of the
leading manufactures besides dyestuffs in which the trust is interested: nitrogen
fertilisers, various acids, including oxalic and formic, pharmaceutical and photographic
chemicals, films, film and tracing papers, artificial silk (viscose, acetate, cuprammo-
nium), motor spirits (methyl alcohol, butyl alcohol and motalin), lubricating oils,
volatile oils, and perfumes, aluminium, copper and electron ferro-alloys (molybdenuin,
wolfram), gypsum, zincwhite, artificial horn, synthetic resins, varnishes, artificial
precious stones, tanning materials. The firms connected with these products are firstly
those which have been associated to form the trust, i.e., the five above-mentioned
concerns which were joined by a number of other rather important companies such
as Kalle and Co. in Biebrich, Weiler ter Mer, the Griesheim chemical works, etc. The
trust is also associated with a great many subsidiary concerns, which again show such
a diversity of production that they may be divided into a number of separate groups
according to their programme of manufacture. There are the following groups of
subsidiary concerns:
1. Fertilisers and Agriculture.
2. Chemicals.Hermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 68
3. Electro-chemical and Metallurgical.
4. Coal, Brown Coal, Oil.
5. Artificial Silk and Textiles.
6. Special Gases.
7. Sundry products (chalk and enamelling works, woodworking factories, etc.).
8. Finance and Credit Institutions.
Considering this variety of products one is led to the conclusion that I.G. Farben
represents in fact an industrial combination of not one, but of a number of products,
although, of course, the combine has not in every one of the above-mentioned groups
anything like a monopolistic position. But the fact remains, that in contrast for instance
to the Stahlverein and other giant industrial combinations in German industries, the
I.G. Farben is surrounded with a network of interests leading into branches, which
at first may seem quite heterogeneous with respect to the nucleus of its primary
production, such as rayon or liquid fuel or photography. In order to manage these
diffused interests the trust has divided its products into five distinct groups: (1)
dyestuffs, (2) nitrogen and nitrogen products, (3) pharmaceutical and allied
manufactures, (4) photographical production and rayon, (5) inorganic products and
intermediate products. The many working plants of the trust have been geographically
divided into four groups: those of the Oberrhein, those of the Mittelrhein, of
Niederrhein and Middle Germany.
The development and basic conditions of the chemical trust give a very good
illustration of the great diversity of factors which may ultimately lead to industrial
combination. The structure of the chemical combine, which differs by its many and
various outlets from the rather clear-cut construction of the Stahlverein, bears
resemblance to other combinations only in having ultimately become a giant unit in
the trade. But the circumstances which have led to this final position must be
distinguished from those dominant in other groups of industry and must be investigated
separately.
The strong position of the chemical combines, in their early days as in their latest
development, is certainly due to a great extent to the importance of patents and special
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developments of the pharmaceutical and photographical branches and the many
chemical manufactures connected with the industry. The most important patents,
however, and the developing of new processes, which were sometimes considered
for many years as of merely “theoretical” interests, necessitated from the beginning
of the industry two conditions which could hardly be found among smaller and
financially weaker undertakings. The one was the building up of costly institutions
of research, the other the disposal of great funds, necessary to support scientific work
in laboratories and elsewhere, to finance the costly beginning and the sometimes slow
progress of new processes and inventions and to compensate for the risk and the
possible losses which might be incurred. It may be mentioned that the Leuna Werke,
the great nitrogen plant near Merseburg, which in fact represents the largest unit of
the trust and which forms the nucleus plant for the utilisation of the nitrogen fixation
process (Haber-Bosch) and the manufacture of nitrogenous fertilisers (Leunaphos,
Nitrophoska, etc.), is constituted as a limited company, of not less than 135 million
R.M. of which the I.G. owns 101.25 millions and the Leopold Casella the remnant.
No smaller firm would ever have been able to enter into the gigantic scheme of building
up this new industry, which has resulted in the erection not only of new plants of a
huge size in Leuna and Oppau (Baden) but in the creation of whole settlements and
towns for the working population and the staff necessary for the development of the
new branches of industry. Another factor connected with the financial requirements
of the industry is to be found in the large outlay required for purposes of propaganda.
This applies to a large degree particularly to the introduction of fertilisers which, though
of the greatest possible efficiency, might be rejected or only slowly accepted by the
farming communities, if not propagated by a very arduous and certainly costly work
of enlightenment.
The outlay of capital, which has been and still is devoted to research work first by
the former independent concerns and today by the trust, may be called generous. We
may quote the words of praise of an English commercial secretary in Berlin, Mr C.
J. Kavanagh: “This large chemical group has not been content to rest on its laurels
in dyes alone, and has advanced rapidly to fresh conquests, for which, principally, they
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numbers of technically trained chemists, and minutely directing their efforts to definite
ends. In experimental work they have shown extraordinary patience and perseverance
and have ever been ready to finance a line of investigation which, although holding
no immediate prospect of results, was, nevertheless, sufficiently promising to return
its due reward .” Inasmuch as in recent years the chief interest has tended to move from
the field of dyestuffs to that of nitrogen and fertilisers on the one hand and to that of
the production of oils and fuels from coal and coke by the methods of liquefaction
and synthesis on the other, one may say that the outlay of capital for the purpose of
research and experimental work has reached still greater dimensions. The futility of
competing with the big concerns in that respect has been further increased by the
formation of the trust, as the I.G. Farben has considered it as one of its chief tasks to
increase the efficiency of the many different branches of research federated with the
originally separated undertakings, by a much closer degree of collaboration through
central control and supervision. Needless to say that by the participation of the trust
in coal, lignite and oil undertakings increasing benefits have been accruing to the
scientific investigations in the sphere of synthetic fuels from coal and other research.
As regards nitrogen fertilisers, large experimental grounds have been established with
a view to investigating crop yields and the conditions most favourable to an
intensification of harvests. The great outlay of capital required for the whole field of
research would never have been found by small or even medium-sized undertakings.
It was this financial condition which gave to the large undertakings a sort of immunity
from smaller competitors and a monopolistic position wherever the costly experiments
were crowned by success. On the other hand, the big chemical concerns of former days
and the trust of to-day became, by this very circumstance of financial superiority, the
first to be informed of all new inventions or discoveries outside their own laboratories,
as inventors and discoverers regarded these companies as the most capable from a
technical as well as a commercial point of view of exploiting new processes on a large
scale. This “protection” from smaller competitors, however important as regards the
foundations of its monopolist place in industry, has by no means saved the chemical
combines from all competition. Actually in the last few years important competition
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nitrogen from coal mining companies. Big coal mining firms, partly in collaboration
with potash works, have invaded the German nitrogen markets. But as competition
among the “great” has generally been settled after some fight by common understand-
ing, one may expect that arrangements will be made here as well, as regards the
regulation of output, a nitrogen syndicate having been in existence for some time, fixing
prices according to market requirements. Patents, however, and the heavy outlay of
capital per technical unit, due to the special circumstances of the manufacture, are not
the only causes responsible for the strong position of chemical concerns in the past
and of the trust of to-day. The size of the commercial undertaking, as it is to-day
represented by the I.G. Farben and its subsidiary concerns, is largely the result of
combinations which cannot be called exactly “vertical,” but yet represent a particular
linking up of the primary and initial productions of the industry with other branches.
The increasing demand on a large scale for certain raw materials, through the increasing
size of chemical concerns, has led to the tendency to secure some private supply of
such materials, as for instance coal. Certainly coal does not play the same role in the
vertical structure of the chemical industry as it does in iron and steel. Yet it has become
of increasing importance to the huge concerns and later to the trust. The result was
the linking up of the trust with coal mining through getting a partnership of 44.9 %
in the Rheinische Stahlwerke of Essen, which has a quota of about 4 million tons in
the coal syndicate, and of 2½ million tons in the coke syndicate, and further, by getting
into a close union with the Riebeck Montanwerke (lignite) in Halle (capital 50 million
R.M.) and by acquiring a partnership of 91% in the Gewerkschaft Auguste Victoria.
Besides this, the I.G. Farben own a great number of collieries, producing coal and
lignite, near Bitterfeld and also in the West of Germany. In 1933 the lignite production
of I.G. Farben amounted to 16.4 million tons! But still more important seems the fact
that another kind of combination in many different branches has been the direct
outcome of new processes started by chemical industries and the research work
connected with them. In fact, many new processes of manufacture have led to new
industries, and it is only natural that the trust, being to a great extent responsible for
their origin, has retained a dominant position in their present organisation. This is
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the connection of chemical concerns like the Agfa (Aktiengesellschaft fur
Anilinfabrikation) with the photographic groups of industry or the financial connection
of the trust with the two leading German rayon concerns, that of the Vereinigte
Glanzstoff in Elberfeld and of the I.P. Bemberg works. It is the particular development
of the chemical research, of discoveries and inventions resulting from the work of
chemistry and its personal leaders, such as Dr Bergius, Prof. Fischer, Prof. Bosch, Prof.
Haber and many others, which has led to the result that the “dyestuff” trust has become
a dominant concern in groups of industry, which may seem as heterogeneous as rayon
textiles, photographical apparatus, petrol, fertilisers, or artificial precious stones. The
amalgamation of the dominant English firms producing dyestuffs, explosives and alkali
through the merger of the Dyestuffs Corporation, United Alkali, Brunner, Mond and
Co. and Nobel Industries into Imperial Chemical Industries may suggest that a similar
tendency prevails in the great chemical industries of other countries. But though
doubtless a tendency to expansion of combines into many heterogeneous or distantly
related branches of manufacture may be inherent in the structure of the chemical
industries, the diversity of fields of activity presented by the German chemical trust
has hardly a parallel in the world. As we shall see in a later chapter the outcome of
so many technical conditions concentrated in one giant undertaking has led to a great
many international connections of the I.G. Farben. In fact, the trust can be considered
in many directions, technically and commercially, as representing a combine of an
international character.
The existence of the chemical trust has not made cartelisation entirely unnecessary.
The quasi-monopolist position of I.G. Farben finds its most important expression in
making new competition more difficult and in rendering small-scale competition
impossible, but this does not mean that other competition is non-existent in a good
many branches. We have already mentioned the position of the trust in the synthetic
nitrogen industry and the existence of “Stickstoffsyndikate.” Another very important
syndicate is the Verkaufsvereinigung fur Teererzeugnisse in Essen. This very strong
syndicate controls all the tar products of coke ovens and gas works and also the sales
and exports of these products, e.g., tar, including prepared tar for road-making purposes,
naphthalene (pure), anthracene (40 % pure), creosote for impregnating wood, etc., pitch,Hermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 73
etc. All purchasers must obtain their supplies through the syndicate and not from
individual members.
Essential as has been the formation of the I.G. Farben to the whole organisation of
German chemical industry and trade —  the importance of trustification with regard
to rationalisation, etc., will be discussed in a later chapter — the commercial wellbeing
of the industry cannot be expected to depend on that factor alone. The German chemical
industry, in almost all its branches and especially in the field of synthetic dyestuffs,
is largely dependent on the sales to foreign markets. New international developments
after the War, the creation of the dye industry of Great Britain, the drastic reduction
of dye imports by China, which had been one of the biggest overseas customers of
the European producers, has not reacted favourably on the German export trade. Yet
in 1928, which may be considered as the last “normal” year before the beginning of
the period of aggravated international depression between 1929 and 1933, the Reich’s
share in the quantity of coal-tar colours exported by all nations was 52.7 %, which






The electrical industry, which may be divided into the two distinct groups of
“electrical engineering” or “electrical manufacturing” (Elektrotechnische Industrie)
comprising the manufacture of generators, motors and transformers, of electro-technical
material, lamps, apparatus of all kinds, installation of electrical plant, production of
accumulators, batteries, scientific instruments, etc., and “electricity “ (Elektrizitat)
power works and electrification (electricity supply), presents in its organisation a picture
very much like that of the chemical industry. It is a “new” industry like that of dyestuffs
or other “modern” chemicals, it has been based and continuously expanded on the
utilisation of patents, as for instance in the manufacture of lamps or later on in the
development of the speaking film or the radio; it has been subjected from the beginning
to the necessity of a great outlay of capital, especially as regards the installation of
electric plant, electrification, and the carrying through of big public contracts; here
as in the chemical industries new industries were evolving out of electro-technical
progress and most naturally linked up with the initial and pioneering concerns of the
industry. In particular the participation in the supply of electrical power, where private
firms in many cases had to compete with public works, was bound to need a large
outlay of capital. There was no room for small private enterprises; indeed, there is
hardly one modern industry so dependent on large capital investment and financing
on a large scale as the electric industries are. As to the supply of electric power, about
half the costs are due to the writing off and the interest on capital and the same feature
of “rigid” costs applies to the cost of labour and staff, while the outlay necessary for
the supplies of fuel and material are relatively secondary. This also explains the
necessity of big units in this industry, as it is well known that the increase in the size
of the industrial unit has in general been largely dependent on the increase of fixedHermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 75
capital as compared with other less rigid items in the cost of production scale.
The German electrical industries have been the pioneers among their European
competitors, and the progress of electricity and of electro-technical trade has been most
pronounced in that country. It is estimated by the Dresdner Bank that in 1913 about
50 % of the world’s trade in electro-technical products was represented by Germany,
a percentage which fell to about 25 % by 1925 and rose again to about 29 % by 1928.
Here as in the chemical trade the War and post-War events had led to the progress
of electric industries in many other European countries, especially in England, France,
Russia, Holland and Sweden. As to electricity, the production per head of population
in kilowatthours in 1931 was 399 in Germany, 1100 in the Saar territory, 375 in Great
Britain and 329 in France, while in Switzerland, Belgium and Sweden, owing to special
circumstances, this figure was higher, though the absolute electric production was very
much higher in the three first-named countries. Vast production, coupled with the
circumstances already mentioned as favouring from its very beginning the large
technical unit of industry, had led to an early concentration of the most important
electrical undertakings. It is not our task here to give a detailed chronicle of this
development which has been associated with the achievements of two names, that of
the Siemens family, whose head had won the reputation of a scientific pioneer in
electricity, and that of the Rathenaus, who became financially the most important
exploiters of the new inventions. These names represent the two leading concerns still
existing in electric engineering: the Siemens-Schuckert group on the one hand and
the Allgemeine Elektricitats Gesellschaft (founded by the Rathenaus), theA.E.G., on
the other. A third concern, the Bergmann ElektrizitatsWerke A.G. in Berlin, is
controlled by both groups. It is said that the two groups controlled about 80 % of the
whole industry before the War. The A.E.G. controls, besides its electrical plants,
undertakings which owe their existence to the latest inventions such as the Klangfilm
Gesellschaft in the sphere of the talking film and Telefunken in that of radio, and in
addition both groups are federated with locomotive works, the A.E.G. with the Borsig
Locomotive works, the Siemens group with Maffei-Schwartkopf. It has been frequently
rumoured that a fusion between the two groups was imminent, and this would really
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effected, and as Liefmann suggests, would never take the form of genuine amalgam-
ation. He writes:
Even if the fusion were effected, which is not to be expected, the
relationship of the parent company to the factories in the finishing lines
or the suppliers of raw materials or to the manufacturers of specialities
such as lamps, motors, wire, telephone work, accumulators, as well
as those to local electricity companies and lastly to holding and
financing companies would certainly retain the form of a con-
cern-company; it is just this diversity and the special features of the
electro-technical undertaking which have had the result that the two
big firms, though no longer the biggest (Liefmann is probably alluding
to the giant concerns in the “electricity” group of industry, which,
however, ought not to be mixed up with those of electrical engineering
and allied lines), are producing the most different kinds of goods.
Moreover, some years back, the A.E.G. entered into a closer alliance with the
American General Electric, which is said to own a third of its share capital. This has
again reacted unfavourably on the fusion of the two groups. But there are many cartel
agreements, partnerships and commonly controlled interests existing between them,
which prevent any competition which would be hurtful to one of the big companies.
A field of electrical manufactures which deserves a special interest and survey is
that of electric lamps (Gliihiampen). This group of electrical manufacturing seems
to be one of the few industrial branches which are developing even under the manifold
economic repercussions of the last 20 years on steadily progressive lines. If the world
production of lamps is taken as having been 100 in 1913, it had advanced to 256 in
1929!
5 It is not surprising to find that an industry promising so successful a progress
has been the field of very hot struggles among those who wanted to capture the market.
This was all the more the case, as from its very start the manufacture of electric lamps
was decidedly influenced by the existence of patents of the most important kind. The
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Company, which started as early as 1881 under the direct influence of Werner v.
Siemens. The lamps produced were of the carbon filament kind, greatly improved
during the next 25 years, through new inventions such as the tantalum filament lamps
and Nernst lamps, while the invention of the drawn tungsten wire filament lamp (first
produced by the American General Electric in 1909) brought about a new line of
production, to which in 1913 the gas-filled lamp was to be added. In the meantime
Emil Rathenau had secured for the A.E.G. the utilisation of the American Edi-
son-coalfilament lamp patents for the German supply. The Deutsche Edisongesellschaft
was transformed in 1887 into the A.E.G., and in fact the production of electrical lamps
was the backbone of the Rathenau business in its earlier days. Early agreements were
entered into between the two groups with regard to their respective spheres of
manufacture and the fixing of prices. When the drawn tungsten wire filament lamp
invention was introduced from America by the A.E.G., a patent fight of unknown
dimensions broke out and endangered the position that company possessed with regard
to the most important patents in Europe; not less than thirty parties contested the patent
rights of the A.E.G., indeed there followed one of the greatest patent struggles in the
history of the German patent law, which at last led to the securing of the patent by the
A.E.G., which had found the support of Siemens and Halske, the General Electric and
the third big undertaking in the lamp branch: the Auergesellschaft. This company,
which from its beginning had devoted its manufacture to the metal filament system,
became the first to exploit the Osram lamp patent (inventors: F. Blau and H. Remane)
and expanded its activity into many foreign countries, in which subsidiary factories
were erected, as for instance in 1908 the Osram Lamp Works in Hammersmith in
collaboration with the G.E.C. of New York. The three dominant concerns, Siemens,
A.E.G. and Auer, were not exactly fighting each other on strictly competitive lines.
There were understandings from the beginning, and in March 1911 these understand-
ings were stabilised by a Patent-Interessen-Gemeinschaftsvertrag, an agreement
concerning the mutual utilisation of patent rights and the granting of licenses, which
in fact was a preparatory step towards the union of the three lamp-producing concerns
into the Osram Gesellschaft m.b.H. This company, which to-day dominates the German
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combination of this company, due to the initiative, in early days, of the A.E.G., is the
control of the Vereinigten Lausitzer Glashutten, which has been acquired to secure
an independent glass supply to the lamp works. Two other important undertakings,
which have merged their interests in those of the Osram Company, are those of the
Bergmann Elektrizitatswerke A.G. and of the Julius Pintsch A.G., both in Berlin. So
in fact the domination of the electrical lamp business by the Osram Company must
be considered complete. The German development in the electric lamp business is
not without parallel. In England as well the bulk of the lamp business is concentrated
in a few large firms, the English General Electric (Osram-G.E.C.-Lamp Works)
controlling about 50 % of the whole English demand. Besides this the British Thomson
Houston Co., the Edison Swan Electric Co., Ltd., the Metropolitan Vickers Electrical
Co. Ltd., and the Siemens Electric Lamp and Supplies Ltd. have a strong position in
the manufacture of lamps. The first three companies are financially controlled by one
corporation, the Associated Electrical Industries, Ltd., which has existed since 1928.
As in Germany, where the first cartel in the lamp trade was founded in 1903, the
English electrical lamp manufacture has been strongly cartelised. The impetus came
from the same reasons that we have mentioned with regard to the German development:
in order to avoid the costly litigation which appeared likely to ensue (and had really
ensued in Germany), owing to the overlapping of the patents, each of the firms
concerned agreed to recognise the other’s patents, to license the other for its patents
and to interchange factory and laboratory experiences. That was exactly what had led
to early understandings between Siemens-Halske, A.E.G., Auer and the American
G.E.C. A selling arrangement was also effected by the English cartel. The firms holding
the principal patents and others thus came to form in 1913 the Tungsten Lamp
Association, followed by the Electric Lamp Manufacturers’ Association of Great
Britain, Ltd. (E.L.M.A.) which was incorporated in 1919. As in Germany, there has
been a good deal of vertical combination in the English lamp manufacture too, the
large lamp manufacturers producing semi-raw material such as tungsten filament, glass
bulbs, lamp caps, argon, hydrogen and liquid air. But this sort of vertical combination
has not endangered the economic position of smaller makers, as by the above-mention-
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from the big firms which guarantee that the materials are of the same quality as those
used in their own lamp manufacture. The English cartel is said to control 85.90 % of
the trade in lamps. It is in all directions, with regard to the fixing of prices, terms of
delivery, rebates to traders, etc., a most thoroughly organised monopolist association.
Yet in a very able study of the lamp manufacture, William Meinhardt, former director
of Osram and a recognised German authority on the subject of electrical industry,
expressly alludes to the fact that “the English undertakings do not concentrate on
electric lamps, but also manufacture along other lines, the consequence being that in
England no such huge concerns have been formed in the manufacture of electrical
lamps as in the U.S.A., Germany, Holland or Hungary, where such firms deal
exclusively with the manufacture of electric lamps.” This may be true. But the
differentiation of units of manufacture has not been great enough to prevent the
formation of a strong English cartel. As to the German cartel development in the lamp
industry we shall have to describe its international significance in the next chapter.
All branches of the electrical industries have been of late overshadowed in their
financial and, one may say, organising importance by the astounding development
of the supply of electric power. This development has by no means yet reached its final
stage. If the average capital investment is taken as being 1000 R.M. per kilowatt —
a figure to be considered as too low rather than too high — the capital invested in all
plant in the world installed for electrical supply purposes was estimated to reach the
figure of 90-95 milliards of R.M. by 1929. Coal and water power being the principal
sources from which electricity supply is to be derived, the importance of the utilisation
of coal has remained of dominant importance in the countries rich in coal, even though
the utilisation of water power has also made progress. Thus in Germany the percentage
of electricity supply derived from coal was 75 in 1928, while that derived from water
power was estimated to be approximately 13. In Germany as well as in England
electrification has not progressed at the same pace as in the U.S.A. and other countries
possessing rather “young” industries equipped from their start with the most modern
appliances. Of the total of existing generating and allied machinery (Kraftmaschinen)
in industry about 75 % in in the U.S.A., 70 % in Germany and 50 % in England were
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Norway, Sweden or Canada, which were able to build up their industrial development
on the utilisation of their vast water power resources, but it must be borne in mind
that all figures on this subject are rather approximate. As to one field of the progressing
use of electric power, that of railroad communication, it may be mentioned that in
Germany 2.4% of the whole mileage had been electrified by 1928, representing 1290
kilometres, while the figures in England were 1.6 % and 640 kilometres. In Switzerland
the figures came up to 62.3% and 3346 kilometres. As regards the electricity supply
the Reich in 1931 was producing 14,408 millions of kilowatt-hours in public works
and 11,380 in private works, while the respective figures were 12,813 and 4000
millions in Great Britain (including all undertakings allowed to supply electricity, also
railway and tramway companies). It must be remembered that the production of
electricity supply on the one hand and the production of electric engineering or
manufactures on the other hand are closely linked together and that the progress of
the one means the progress of the other. The development of electricity supply carries
with it a demand for the products of most branches of the electrical manufacturing
industry, e.g., dynamos, motors, switch gear, cables and other heavy apparatus as well
as domestic appliances. Although much of the basic scientific work underlying the
electric manufacturing industry was carried out by British scientists, prior to the War
Great Britain lagged greatly behind other important countries, such as Germany, in
the growth of consumption of electricity for power purposes. A high level of steam
engineering, based upon cheap and plentiful supply of coal, had been attained in Great
Britain, and the British manufacturer doubtless hesitated to discard a system with which
he was closely familiar in favour of electric power. While the development of the
manufacturing side of the British electrical industry was thus directly retarded, in
addition progress was greatly impeded by the lack of satisfactory provision, both
legislative and technical, for the public supply of electrical energy. The Report of the
Electrical Trade Committee presented in 1917 laid great emphasis on the defective
character of the legislation then governing the administration of the electricity supply
industry, which had encouraged development on a local instead of upon a national
basis. This structure of the industry has greatly changed since, especially through the
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generation in a limited number of inter-connected stations to be operated by the owners
on account of the Central Electricity Board, and termed Selected Stations. In Germany
the process of concentration was characterised by a number of decisive factors. The
importance of electricity power supply to the engineering and manufacturing side of
the industry, especially as regards the industrial penetration of “newly” industrialised
overseas countries, was early recognised by the leading German electrical concerns.
The electro-technical industry, as already mentioned, is greatly interested in the quick
progression of electrical energy for the sale of its products. It was therefore at an early
date the aim of the big German manufacturing companies to enter the field of electricity
supply either by getting control over power works or by financing new power schemes
or by erecting private power stations to supply the requirements of particular firms
or groups of firms, sometimes disposing of excess energy to public electricity-supply
boards. However, two other movements have recently limited this activity of the large
manufacturing firms in the electric industry. Firstly, large power-supply plants have
been created which have their own financial affiliations. Secondly, the purely private
undertakings have had increasingly to meet the competition of works owned and
managed by the State or municipalities or by firms controlled by public as well as
private interests, so-called “gemischt-wirtschaftliche Unternehmungen” (mixed
undertakings). This was also the tendency during the years of aggravated economic
crisis. While in 1928 the number of public works, producing electricity supply, were
responsible for the supply of 14,146 millions of kilowatt-hours, the figure had reached
14,408 millions in 1931. The figures relating to private works were 13,724 and 11,380
millions. It is interesting to note that the degree of utilisation (Ausniitzungsfaktor)
of existing plant is by no means the same in public and private works. The best
utilisation of plant is shown in the private works affiliated to certain groups of industry
such as chemical or metal manufactures, to mining or the iron and steel industries,
as also to the paper and printing trade. As the Enqueteausschuss stated, the
“Ausnützungsfaktor” of the public works lagged far behind the figures for the private
ones, as these works handle only part of the electricity supply to the big industrial
concerns and are mostly suppliers to small and domestic consumers of electricity. The
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electricity by chemical and metal industries ran up to 4164 hours in the privately owned
plant, the figure amounted to only 392 hours as regards the small agricultural customers
getting electricity from public supply bodies. The figures relating to domestic
consumption are said to be still lower.
6 The tendency of recent years, beginning with
1926, has been towards a diminution of newly created privately owned industrial power
plants, so-called “Eigeninstallationen,” in favour of an increasing supply of electricity
from plants not belonging to the industrial users of electricity, that is by so-called
“Fremdstrombezug.” The industrial undertakings have been working their own power
plant to its utmost capacity, but to obtain additional supplies they have not enlarged
their electricity plant but have relied on an increasing supply by “outside” power plant,
especially by the large works in the branch. This has been partly effected by
electricity-supply contracts (Lieferungsvertrage) between manufacturing companies
and large electricity concerns. The Rhenish-Westphalian Elektrizitatswerk for instance
has since the spring of 1929 entered into such contracts with the Vereinigte Stahlwerke,
the I.G. Farben, the Mannesmann works, the Gutehoffnungshiitte and with a number
of other firms in the Diisseldorf district. There is no doubt that for the industries using
electric energy this arrangement seems more profitable than the further erection of
their own generating plant, while the public supply works have in their turn greatly
profited by such arrangements, as they have been able better to balance their efficiency
with the actual demand, being now able to rely on the more regular and much more
intensive demand of large industrial customers. With regard to the former structure
of electricity distribution by the public works, this means a considerable diminution
of fixed costs.
The development alluded to has certainly increased the concentration movement
in electricity. It has laid the necessary basis for unification of production and
distribution according to geographical districts. While in fact the private power plant
affiliated to a certain manufacturing company meant necessarily a decentralisation
of electricity supply (though from the viewpoint of vertical combination it might be
considered as being in line with the development of larger units in industry), the
separation of electricity supply from the industrial undertaking making use of it offered
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stations, possibly inter-connected by high tension main transmission lines. The big
power-producing works have since continued to acquire participations in other
producing and distributing concerns in order that the consumer may be brought closer
to the source of supply, and this linking up of the various electrical concerns has the
support of the new Government of the Reich. This process of co-ordination has already
been of the greatest advantage as regards the reserve electricity “store,” which the
public supply works are obliged to keep. These reserves, which are necessarily a heavy
charge on general costs, could be greatly diminished by the interlocking of power works
and the placing of mutual reserves at common disposal for additional demands.
7
The most important industrial combination, which has so far resulted from this
concentration movement in the electricity trade, is represented by the
Rheinisch-Westphalische Elektrizitatswerk A.G. of Essen (R.W.E.). It would lead too
far to chronicle the process of amalgamation and co-ordination, by which this concern
has reached during the last ten years its powerful position. To-day it represents the
biggest” gemischt-wirtschaftliches Werk “ (see above) of the whole continent of
Europe. The territory, which comes into the sphere of its supply, measures about 45,400
square kilometres (one kilometre equal to 0.386 square miles), including the greater
part of the West-German industrial area. The high-tension system of the area of supply
is connected with the water-power supply of Southern Germany and the Alps and the
sources of electric energy of Middle Germany. The yearly production of the concern
is about 20% of the German electricity production. The efficiency of the power plants
of the R.W.E. amounts to about 1,060,000 kilowatts. The network of its plants
represents a co-ordination of interconnecting supply mains. Besides this the concern
has been able to secure long-term contracts with the most important single industrial
users of electric power in Germany. It has also concluded long-term contracts for the
supply of electricity with neighbouring distributing firms which have been
interconnected . with its mains. The R.W.E. is, besides, a typical example of vertical
combination, as the company has been intruding with great vigour into the coal mining
business. The latest step in this direction was the acquisition of 21 million R.M. shares
of the A.G. fur Braunkohlenbergbau and Brikettfabrikationin Cologne, generally called
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R.M. from Fritz Thyssen. The rich lignite deposits, the large power works and the
considerable liquid assets together with the high earning capacity of “Rheinbraun”
made this transaction attractive for the R.W.E. A community of interests was agreed
upon for a period of 50 years. The agreement provided among other clauses for a
participation of shareholders of “Rheinbraun” in the liquidation of reserves belonging
to the latter concern, which among other valuable assets owns 40 % of the Harpener
Bergbau A.G., the best coal mining concern of the Ruhr district. The participation of
the R.W.E. and its federated concerns in the Rhenish Lignite Syndicate now amounts
to not less than 57 %. The share capital of the R.W.E. was 246 million R.M. in 1933.
Reserve: 77 million R.M. The partnerships of the giant concern are besides
considerable. It owns about 75 % of the wellknown Lahmeyer Company of Frankfurt,
it controls the Roddergrube and Brikettwerke Roddergrube A.G. in Briihl near Cologne
by a direct partnership as well as by the control of “Rheinbraun” and other mining
or power-work undertakings. The development of the R.W.E. presents a typical
example of concentration and industrial combination in the German electricity supply.
Others are: the Thiiringer Gas and Elektrizitats Gesellschaft, the Prussian Elektrizitats-
werke A.G. and the Sachsische Werke, which by concerted action have coordinated
the electricity interests of Middle Germany, especially those of Thuringen and Saxony,
in a similar manner to that described with regard to the Rhine and Ruhr district, and
the same movement is going on in Silesia. Undoubtedly the chance for any smaller
competitors, either in electric manufacturing or engineering or in the supply of
electricity, has passed. It must be left to the future how far the development of
concentration will be accompanied by a further increase of State and communal
interests in the industry, and how far the “gemischt-wirtschaftlichen” undertakings
will be considered a satisfactory medium between purely private and public
corporations. The very elaborate system of international relations of the German electric










The network of economic, technical and financial relations linking up German
industrial combinations with international industrialism is a very elaborate one. It may
be said that it is relatively much more comprehensive than that in other highly
developed industrial countries; besides it matters little whether — as generally
happened — German industrial combination is or has been the active force in bringing
about such developments, or whether, as in branches of the industry just mentioned,
foreign corporations have sought a closer cooperative alliance or even combination
with giant German industrial concerns. Certainly in the post-War period of depressed
German industrial finance American undertakings, with a desire for international
monopolist expansion, have been busy trying to get into closer union with such German
concerns through economic and credit arrangements. This period has more or less come
to an end with the consolidation of German economic development, but of course the
relations once begun have been continued, where a community of interest has proved
profitable and desirable. However, this movement of foreign companies invading the
sphere of German industrial organisation must not be overrated; far more important
has been the development of German international industrial connections through the
growing activity of German cartels or corporations themselves.
We may distinguish three possibilities of the international federation of German
industrial combinations:
(1) German cartels or syndicates may be federated to foreign monopolist associations
by mutual agreement. In that case such associations, “ intemationale Kartelle,” may
already exist or be formed ad hoc. The earliest international cartel of that kind was
the International Railmakers’ Association (I.R.M.A.) founded as early as 1884. It
embraced at first German, English and Belgian undertakings, which were later enjoinedHermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 86
by American, French, Italian, Austrian and Spanish firms. Another example of a great
many associations of that kind is the Incandescent Lamp Syndicate. In 1926 the
manufacturers of British gas mantles entered into an agreement with the German and
certain other foreign manufacturers for a period of five years. The German
manufacturers were bound by this agreement not to sell gas mantles in the United
Kingdom and certain parts of the Empire, whilst the British firms undertook not to
sell to the continent of Europe and the U.S.A. Of course such international agreements
may cover very different fields of common action. They may simply relate to prices
or, what is most commonly agreed, allocate to their members international markets,
or they may regulate both prices and distribution, while agreements relating to a
restriction of output among members are not quite so frequent. A prominent example
of the latter case is represented by the Tin Producers’ Association. This Association
had a remarkable influence on recent prices, as in 1933 the much discussed rise in
prices was only achieved by putting severe pressure on the members of the Association,
whose output was restricted to 33a % of the rated capacity of 1929. Another metal
cartel of that kind, in which, in contrast to the tin agreement, German producers as
the second largest of the world are greatly interested, is the Zink (spelter) cartel. The
production of spelter in Germany and Poland amounted in 1933 to 140,000 long tons
out of a world’s total of almost 1 million tons. In 1928 the European, American and
Australian producers of spelter formed a cartel, but in connection with export-quota
and other difficulties its existence has been frequently endangered, though it was
renewed in 1934. The cartel fixes a quota basis, on which the respective rate of
production is decided. It also fixes fines for excess of the allowed production. This
type of international combination represented by cartels fixing prices and limiting and
allocating production may be regarded as the most common as well as the most
uncomplicated form of international monopolist organisation. As regards the German
industry it may be stated without fear of contradiction that there is a long chain of
cartels of that sort, in which German industry has its part.
(2) Another type of international industrial combination may result from the fact
that dominant concerns in certain groups of industry are expanding their sphere of
activity over foreign economic territories by acquiring manufacturing works or settingHermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 87
up new undertakings abroad, with the intention of conquering or of better controlling
foreign markets. This means international “trustification,” although, as will be seen
below, under (3), it does not represent it exclusively. A typical example, in which
German industry played an important role, was the International Match Trust formed
by Iwar Kreuger of Stockholm. The Swedish Match Trust, being the most important
concern in that branch of industry in the world, acquired the two biggest German match
companies at Kassel and entered into a community of interest with the third largest
factory, the “Union” in Augsburg. A special method pursued by this shrewdly managed
concern was the exploitation of the financial straits of foreign countries in exchange
for fiscal concessions, very similar to the aims of those famous patentees and projectors
in the days of Charles I. While in 1926 the union of German interests had become
complete through an agreement between the trustificated firms and the twenty-three
outsiders still existing, in the form of a cartel bearing the name of Zünd-
hoizvertriebsgesellschaft in Berlin and representing a complete monopolist organisation
as regards sales, in 1929 the Reich granted a monopoly of matches to that syndicate
in return for a loan granted by Mr Kreuger. Here we have the typical international trust
emanating from the strong international position of a single national monopolist
concern. It may be mentioned that aims of monopolisation similar to those of the
Swedish match interests have been going on in England, where the movement has
become most conspicuous since the formation of the British Match Corporation in
1927, a Swedish enterprise started with a capital of £6,000,000. According to Liefmann
in 1930 the Swedish trust controlled the match market in twelve countries by not less
than 80%, in seven countries, among them Germany, by 50–80 % and in most other
countries by 50% or less. The German dye industry, which for a long time had a sort
of quasimonopolist position in the world’s markets, is another example of industry
having monopolist control of the home market and expanding that domination by
foreign acquisitions of all kinds. When the I.G. Farben was founded it possessed a
good many undertakings in foreign countries and a network of distributing companies
abroad, as for instance in the U.S.A. (one of them the General Dyestuff Corporation
with factories in Albany and Patterson), in Spain, China, Brazil, Switzerland and
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field were the Societa Electroquimica in Barcelona, in chemicals the Durand and
Huguenin factories in Basle, in, fertilisers the Koliner Kunstdiingerfabrik in Prague
and in artificial silk and textiles the Philana A.G. in Basle. Later, in 1928 and 1929,
two companies were formed to consolidate the management of the I.G. partnerships
abroad, the one being the Internationale Gesellschaft fur Chemische Unternehmungen
in Basle (I.G. Chemie), a holding company with a share capital of 290 million francs,
the other the American I.G. Chemical Corporation in New York, the latter controlling
the Agfa-Ansco Corporation, one of the largest firms in the photographical branch
and the General Aniline Works which administers the utilisation of the German dye
patents in the U.S.A.
(3) A third form of international industrial combination must certainly be regarded
as the most modern outcome of the development of giant concerns. It is represented
by quasimonopolist or at any rate dominating concerns, which either by their original
or main production or by branches of production, with which they have become
affiliated through processes of technical or financial expansion, are seeking a closer
union with foreign corporations or concerns of equal importance. The difference from
(2) is evident. While the former international industrial combination, though not a
cartel, has its nucleus in the monopolist position of a “national” industry, the latter
is due to a co-operation or even amalgamations between dominant partners, having
the same or a similar strength in their respective national and also international spheres
of business. Where national cartels in such industries play a more important role than
single amalgamated firms, an international cartel may replace international
trustification. Where, however, this is not the case the giant undertakings may find
it useful to replace the lack of cartelisation by closer union of their interests or to
strengthen existing, but less efficient, cartel agreements by such union. A very typical
example is provided by the international relations in the rayon industry. This industry
has been for some time a prominent example of concentration in industry. In Germany
the leading — and indeed the pioneer — concern was the Vereinigte Glanzstoff
Fabriken of Elberfeld, now federated with the Dutch “Aku” concern, and the J. P.
Bemberg A.G. In England Courtaulds are also, with their controlled concerns abroad,
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Societa Nazionale Industria Applicazioni Viscose (Snia Viscosa), in the U.S.A. by
the American Viscose Company and the Dupont de Nemours concern. There have
been for some time arrangements for co-ordination between these giant international
concerns. An arrangement for cooperation between Messrs Courtauld and the
Glanzstoff was made in 1925. Early in 1927 these two companies together with the
Italian Snia Viscosa entered into an agreement, which included an interchange of shares
and was stated to aim at the elimination of wasteful competition and the promotion
of cooperation of a technical and economic kind. Moreover, it must be remembered
that before that arrangement the three participants had connections with rayon concerns
all over the world. The I.G. Farben (Agfa) had since 1925 taken an interest in the
Glanzstoff and Bemberg companies, thereby acquiring a connection with Courtaulds,
which again had a controlling interest in the American Viscose Company, while by
its control over the German dynamite concern of Koln-Rottweiler Pulverfabriken A.G.,
the Dynamite A.G. vorm Nobel and the Rhenish-Westphalian Sprengstoff A.G. the
I.G. became directly connected with the English and American Nobel concerns, the
former being closely allied to the English Celanese interests and the Tubize concerns
in France and Belgium, the latter to the second largest rayon concern of the U.S.A.,
the Dupont group. So in fact the ramifications of the German rayon industry extended
over the whole international field of producers, the Glanzstoff having, besides the
before-mentioned connections, important arrangements and common interests with
Austrian and Czechoslovakian firms. One is entitled to speak of a world-wide
interconnection of the artificial silk industry, the primary condition of which has been
the concentration of the national rayon industries of the respective countries. In 1928
the output of the above-mentioned group of German, English and Italian producers,
with their connections outside their own countries, was estimated to be over 70 % of
the world’s production of artificial silk. Since then the great “revolutionary” factor
concerning rayon has been the astounding progress of Japanese artificial silk interests.
Japan, which in 1929 produced 30 million lbs. of rayon, equal to about half the German
or English output and to even a larger percentage of the Italian, had increased her
production by 1933 to above the level of the English, Italian or German production.
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As there have been no arrangements or affiliations of the former rayon producing
countries with their new competitor, the picture of international trustification in this
group of industry must have considerably changed as far as concerns the percentage
controlled by the international “trust” -group of producers. International arrangements
in the rayon industry do not preclude the existence of very effective national syndicates,
indeed these are to some extent the necessary instruments in carrying out the
international arrangements of the giant concerns. The cartel system with market quotas
continues to be a feature of the rayon industries of Europe; Italian, Dutch, French and
Belgian exporters are participating in the home sales of rayon in Germany on a quota
basis. A very efficient syndicate, called “Kunstseideverkaufsbiiro G.m.b.H.
(Viskosekunstseidsyndikat)” in Berlin is responsible for the distribution of almost all
German as of non-German rayon coming on the German market. The syndicate has
strict rules forbidding any direct sales from the rayon companies to customers. Even
members of the syndicate are not allowed to sell or buy their produce to or from each
other. The foreign members of the syndicate have been obliged to impose on all their
sales outside the German Empire the obligation that the material may not be sold to
Germany in an unmanufactured state; as regards the German dealers they are obliged
to sell exclusively to the finishing works of the industry and not to any other dealers
in the trade. These very stringent obligations of a very potent syndicate, however, would
hardly be effective without the existence of marked concentration of the industry in
Germany as abroad (the Belgian industry also is now almost entirely controlled by
one big combine) and the interconnections of these combines, which in fact form the
backbone of all quota arrangements.
We shall now proceed to discuss some of the prominent examples of international
cartelisation or trustification, in which German industries have become partners, besides
those already mentioned. The reader will easily find out into which of the three
distinctive groups of international monopoly organisation each of these world-wide
organisational inter-connections may be ranged, although it must certainly be
understood that many groups of industries will exhibit partnerships in all three of these
forms of international combination.
The most prominent international combination, with which German industry hasHermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 91
become federated, is represented by the international agreements in the steel trade.
There can be no doubt that it was post-War depression of markets, which led to strong
desire on the part of the producers of Western Europe to form a combination in order
to avoid a further catastrophic drop in prices. It has been estimated by the Enqueteaus-
schuss that the increase of steel production by the continental producers amounted
to not less than 8.3 million tons from 1913 to 1929. While production had been rapidly
expanding in the old continental iron and steel producing centres, the demand in foreign
markets had become limited by national programmes of production, and the economic
effects of the commercial clauses of the Treaty of Versailles had been a further
disadvantage to the organisation and structure of the most important steel districts of
the continent. All this was the chief spur behind the formation of an international
agreement, in which in all probability English producers would have become partners
as well, if the English iron and steel trade had shown a concentration of undertakings
sufficient to make it “kartellfahig” (fit for cartelisation). The agreement concluded
between the ironand steel-producing companies of Germany, the Saar territory, France,
Luxemburg and Belgium (1 October 1926), later joined by the AustroHungarian
succession states, took the name of Internationale Rohstahlgemeinschaft (I.R.G.) and
had its seat in Luxemburg. The agreements of the I.R.G. are intended to grant protection
to the home producers by limiting the quantities of steel imported and by controlling
the direction of foreign supplies of steel. The rules and formalities of the I.R.G. have
been subject to frequent changes and in 1930 to a sort of reorganisation. But the main
purpose, represented by the formation of “Gebietsschutzabkommen” (agreements
relating to the protection of certain districts of production or distribution), has remained,
and the Enqueteausschuss, though alluding to some unfulfilled hopes with regard to
a possible international reorganisation of the iron and steel business by the I.R.G., has
recognised that as regards the German industry the I.R.G. has realised expectations
as to a better control of competition and the support of home cartels in their aims of
stabilising prices. The I.R.G. controls raw steel exclusively. As regards finished or
half-finished products there are other international cartels, such as the International
Railmakers’ Association, one of the oldest international cartels, generally called
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Association (E.R.M.A.). The I.R.M.A., which has also been joined by English and
(in 1929) by American makers of rails, provides what is called “ein gegenseitiger
Landerschutz,” a mutual protection of home markets. There is for instance under the
rule of the I.R.M.A. no direct possibility for German railmakers of making deliveries
to France, Belgium, England, etc. The orders which can be caught by rail manufacturers
for the supply of international markets have to be reported to a central agency in
London, which, in accordance with a committee formed for this very purpose, allocates
the contracts to that “national” group of producers which according to a specific
quota-tabulation is entitled to get it.
8 The commercial side of the transaction, that is
the payment for every contract, is left to the different national groups of producers,
which get the contract and have to allocate it among their members. Another
international cartelisation in the field of heavy steel products is that of tubes. There
had been early German tube cartels, but they had been frequently dissolved, till a
stronger combination was formed in 1935. Since there were in Czechoslovakia tube
works associated with German concerns it was no difficult matter to draw them into
the agreement, which thereby became the nucleus of international understanding.
French, Belgian and Polish works joined in, and in 1929 the five most important
English tube makers, who had been temporarily outside through failing to reach an
agreement among themselves, came to terms with their international competitors by
single agreements. As the American tube manufacturers also joined the cartel in 1929
its connections became of the same world-wide character as those in the rail
manufacture. The organisation of international sales by the firms affiliated to the cartel
is similarly arranged to that in the rails industry. Of late there have been grave
apprehensions among the members of the international tube syndicate with regard to
the progressive development of tube manufactures in Japan. It was about five years
ago that the big Japanese tube firms of Mitsui and Mitsubishi began to compete with
European firms for contracts in China and Siam, while in 1933 they were even able
to export to the U.S.A. It will be seen how this competition will affect the international
tube agreements. In October 1933 an agreement was reached by the international
syndicate and the Japanese makers with regard to the export and price-fixing of
gas-boiler tubes. The international tube syndicate, now consisting of all the importantHermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 93
continental syndicates and the British, American and Canadian manufacturers, was
prolonged until 31 March 1935. Other syndicates relating to heavy steel products are
the International Hoop Iron Syndicate, between German, French, Belgian and
Luxemburg iron and steel industries, formed in May 1933, and the Wire Rod Syndicate,
having the same countries as members and its clearing bureau in Liege.
The above-mentioned international syndicates in the heavy lines of the industry were
regarded as a means of getting the iron and steel industries of the world into that
contact, though decentralised, which the International Raw Steel Syndicate had not
been able to realise. Yet a new International raw Steel Syndicate (the first one was
sometimes termed in English the “International Ingot Steel Syndicate”) between France,
Belgium, Luxemburg and Germany was brought about, after many conflicts and
difficulties among the partners. The original Internationale Rohstahlgemeinschaft,
formed in 1926, had practically expired in 1932, without having succeeded in bringing
about all the expected international advantages. It seemed indeed as if a deadlock in
this sector of international industrial agreements would ensue. But at last, in June 1933,
a new agreement was entered into, when the Internationale Rohstahl-Export
Gemeinschaft, the I.R.E.G., was formed. The chief difference between the old and
the new international cartel is that the latter deals only with the exports of its members,
while a control of output would only come into consideration under quite exceptional
conditions. The quotas of the members are regulated by a rather complicated sliding
scale tabulation. The signing of the agreement was made conditional upon the formation
of selling organisations for a number of rolled goods. In fact two-year agreements for
the formation of six selling offices within the I.R.E.G. were concluded; the German
quotas relating to these products are as follows:
Semis 23%  Thick plate 46 %
Girders 27%  Medium plate 28 %
Bar iron 29%  Universal iron 52 %
Penalties for exceeding the quotas allocated in the selling offices are 15 gold shillings
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per ton for all other products. If the total quota under the I.R.E.G. is exceeded by less
than 5% an additional fee of 3 R.M. per ton becomes due which rises to 5 R.M. per
ton if the quota is exceeded by between 5–10% and to 10 R.M., if the quota is exceeded
by more than 10%. Prices are to be fixed by the selling organisations, the activity,
however, of which will be limited to a registration of the transactions, which will be
carried out by the national syndicates. So in fact the German heavy steel industry of
to-day has been internationally cartelised by two kinds of arrangements: by the I.R.E.G.,
which represents the frame combine with regard to a group of products, and by
international cartels formed for certain lines of production, both organisations
regulating the export quotas. German industrial circles have welcomed the fact that
the new Raw Steel Syndicate does not try to regulate production, leaving this to the
national spheres of interest. It may be in fact under present economic conditions the
best way, to leave the limitation of production to the national syndicates instead of
aiming at an international combination regulating the output of all countries concerned.
Of course, the new plan will necessitate the existence of strong cartels within the sphere
of national industries. In this respect it may be mentioned that both in Belgium and
in France cartelisation in the steel industry has been progressing of late (in Belgium
notably by the “Comptoir Siderurgique Beige,” Cosibel), thereby facilitating the work
of the I.R.E.G. and stabilising its development. Besides their participation in this
network of international steel agreements German producers have tried to remedy
existing deficiencies by single arrangements with Germany’s competitors. Thus in
1934 an agreement was reached with Poland regulating the question of certain imports
and the scrap problem up to 1937, while with English makers of ship-building material
an agreement was reached which was to expire in June 1934.
In the chemical groups of industry the question of international cartelisation has been
of a somewhat minor importance, so long as the big German concerns were in the main
interested in the selling of aniline dyes and other chemical and pharmaceutical products,
in which they had a dominant position in the international markets. This changed when
the chemical industries by the new processes of production already mentioned became
necessarily entangled with other producers in the world. Liefmann calls attention to
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oil concerns of the world, the Standard Oil and the Royal Dutch Shell group, as being
of “great interest and probably of the highest importance for the future.” The agreement
reached related to a partnership or at least some common action as to the exploitation
of the German inventions of coal hydration and the synthetic manufacture of liquid
fuels. The I.G. Farben together with the Dutch Shell were participators from the
beginning in the formation of the “Bergin Gesellschaften,” two in Holland and one
with its subsidiary companies in Germany, which were working or financing the
methods of liquefaction invented by Dr Bergius. These, as well as the inventions and
discoveries made by Prof. Franz Fischer in the same field of research, were of high
importance to the U.S.A., who produce about 75% of the world’s petrol production,
while consuming about 80% (the imports reached about 5 million tons in 1931). It
is only natural that the Standard Oil Company, while trying to secure for itself some
of the new oil properties in different parts of the world, was anxious to associate itself
with the exploitation of those chemical processes, which promised to be of great value
to the petrol supply of the future.
The great importance of the hydrogenation processes has led to an international
understanding, though the final stage of economic production of liquid fuel has not
yet been reached. In 1931 an International Hydrogenation Patents Company was
founded with the object of a pooling of information and a complete exchange of
operating experiences. It remains to be seen how far this agreement will develop into
anything like a cartel or syndicate when the commercial utilisation of the new processes
has made further progress and exports can be envisaged.
Far more important than in the chemical trade has been the development of
international connections in the electric industries. This group of industry shows the
most highly developed and the most widespread international affiliations. As the
electrical industries do not merely export their produce, but are as much interested
in the engineering business abroad, in erecting plant for the supply of electricity, the
electrification of railways, the installation of electric tramway lines, etc., it early became
necessary to initiate the formation of subsidiary companies abroad or to acquire
partnerships in already existing foreign companies. This tendency was largely
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concentration in the German electrical industry, leaving the domination of the industry
to the two giant concerns, the A.E.G. and the Siemens-group with their enormous
technical and financial resources. We have already alluded to the early connections
of the A.E.G. with electrical interests in the U.S.A. (General Electric). But besides
these relations, which date back to the very beginning of electrical engineering and
manufacturing in Germany (the German Edison Company was the predecessor of the
A.E.G.), the most important field of international electrical relations has become that
of a wide network of holding companies. The chief of such holding companies in which
the German electric industry is prominently interested are:
Die Gesellschaft fur elektrische Unternehmungen (now united with the Ludwig Lowe
A.G., one of the biggest German engineering works, and since that amalgamation
generally referred to as “Gesfurel”).
Die Gesellschaft fur elektrische Lieferungen with its affiliation to the “Schweizer
Gesellschaft fur elektrische Lieferungen.”
The Companis Hispano Americana de Electricitad (Chade), formerly known as
Deutsch-Sudamerikanische Elektrizitats-Gesellschaft, taking care of South-American
markets.
The “Societe Financielle des Transports et des Entreprises Industrielles “ (Sofina).
But the most prominent example of international interconnection in the electric
industry is certainly represented by the history and development of the electric lamp
manufacture. We have described the consolidation of interests which had been going
on in this industry taken as a national unit, and which as in other cases was the very
backbone of the ensuing international understandings. It must not be forgotten that
electric manufacturing, by the diversity of its products, their specialisation and
differentiation, has not presented in general very favourable conditions for cartelisation;
the electric lamp manufacture, however, presented a rather exceptional case in this
industry, as standardisation was possible at an early date. Electric lamps could be
produced as a trade-mark ware at a uniform price. The first international syndicate
was formed in 1903 as “Verkaufsstelle Vereinigter Glühiampenfabriken,” an associ-
ation comprising the most prominent European makers of electric lamps. This syndicate
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was revived. Agreements of different character were reached between the German,
Austrian, Hungarian, Swiss and Scandinavian makers. Out of these rose a much more
important international cartel, the “Internationale Gliihiampen Preis-Vereinigung”
(I.G.P.), in 1921. This agreement did not prove very successful, indeed it was dissolved
in August 1924 owing to increasing overlapping by smaller outsiders and a
non-obedience to its rules in the national as well as in the international sphere. But
the big firms in the international trade had long ago come to the conviction that the
salvation of their interests was to lie in the elimination of cutthroat competition and
an international co-ordination centralised as much as possible. In fact the international
cartelisation of electric lamps is the best possible example of the importance of a
concentration of commercial units within the cartel if it is to be successful in the long
run. A network of agreements between the big concerns of the world was already in
existence. Such agreements between the American General Electric and the three largest
German concerns dated from the time before the War and were renewed with the Osram
concern in 1921 and in 1929. Similar agreements representing “Freundschaftsvertrage”
(amicable understandings) or collaboration-agreements existed between the American
International General Electric, the Dutch Philips concern, the British Thomson-Houston
Company, the Compagnie des Lampes in Paris, the English General Electric and others.
By these agreements and understandings not only was a common safeguard of patents
secured but also a territorial division of interests was arranged, the partners in the
agreement submitting to the obligation not to exploit their patents in places accorded
to other partners, an obligation especially relating to the working of licences. There
were besides already existing agreements between the giant firms with regard to the
exploitation of new inventions and the exchange of technical experience. All this
facilitated the final formation of a really effective international combine, when mere
cartelistic experiments had failed. It was characteristic that the endeavour of the
dominant international concerns to come to terms began even before the I.G.P. had
collapsed. At last a settlement was reached in December 1924. An agreement called
“General Patent and Development Agreement” was signed and a central agency acting
as the head of the international cartel was formed in Geneva, the “Phoebus S.A.
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which after 1924 was joined by a number of firms formerly considered as outsiders,
was renewed in 1931 for a period of not less than 21 years, up to the 30 June 1955.
A means of dissolving the agreement before is not provided, unless an extraordinary
general meeting with a majority of votes, laid down by the treaty, takes a decision in
that respect. A single member is not allowed to withdraw from the agreement, except
under certain circumstances. The cartel comprises not less than 27 parent companies,
among them 8 concerns with 36 affiliated companies. The number of separate States
which are partners in the cartel is 18. The only States standing outside the agreement
are Russia, U.S.A. and Canada, although the two latter are both indirectly connected
with the syndicate. Apart from these two countries the manufacture of electric lamps,
represented by the international syndicate, is estimated to be 90% of the world
production. As to the formation of this giant and at last efficient international combine,
Mr William Meinhardt, head of the German Osram concern, states in his book on the
lamp industry:
In contrast to other international agreements it is remarkable as regards
the meetings, which preceded the combination, that they were not
arranged between the national organisations and that they were not led
by the associated manufacturers of the different countries, but that in
the first place the big manufacturers in the world met and came to
understandings, asking the smaller firms to join when the main points
had been cleared up. Success justified this sort of proceeding, but it
must be kept in mind, that special circumstances favoured combination
in the lamp trade and that cartelisation was facilitated by the dominant
position possessed by the leading firms.
The conditions favouring cartelisation in the electric lamp trade are conspicuous
in another of the more “modern” industries, the manufacture of linoleum. Like the
manufacture of electric lamps linoleum offered easy opportunities for standardisation.
Length, width and the general quality of the product were almost the same everywhere
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materials used and the methods of manufacture did not differ anywhere, and while
these circumstances favoured production on a large scale, the capital outlay for the
single unit of production was rather heavy from the beginning. Prof. Hantos asserts
that the linoleum industry represents in fact a classic example of the advantages of
large-scale production in industry. Small undertakings are hardly able to compete. The
big undertakings are able to keep a much greater variety of patterns and designs, an
important factor in the sale of linoleum. Thus the “Deutsche Linoleumwerke” alone
keeps not fewer than 2000 patterns. Although the big unit, technically and
commercially, has been an important factor in the industry from its beginning, industrial
combination has been further facilitated by a process of amalgamation and affiliation
among the original undertakings. The linoleum industry is another example of
cartelisation combined with a tendency towards trustification. Already before the War
a price cartel had been formed by the five leading German linoleum manufacturing
companies. In 1911 international depression in the industry led to the first combination
of European manufacturers (England excepted). This “convention” has gone on existing
ever since, although its structure has been frequently subject to changes. Apart from
this a strong concentration movement had been going on in the German linoleum
industry. The outcome of this was the “Deutsche Linoleum Werke A.G.,” which was
formed in 1927 with a capital of 30 million R.M., which was increased to 40 million
R.M. a year later. Agreements already existing with Swedish, Swiss and Dutch firms
led in 1927 to a closer financial association between the German and foreign
undertakings. A corporation called “Kontinentale Linoleum Union A.G.” was formed
in Zurich, which took over one of the controlling companies of the German concern,
the Deutsche LinoleumUntemehmungen A.G., and which also became the owner of
the majority of the shares in the Swiss company in Giubiasco and of the Swedish in
Goteborg, which again controlled the leading works in Latvia. In 1929 the Zurich
corporation took over the Dutch factory Krommenie, while in fact the whole group
was controlled by the big German interests. Since then there have been new
participations in the French “Societe anonyme Remoise du Linoleum” (Sarlino) in
Reims and in the most important factory in Poland. A giant international undertaking
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from the point of view of company structure, show a rather complicated network of
interlocked connections. In 1929 the total production of the continental trust was not
less than 35 million square yards valued at about 125 million R.M. The German
associated works participated in this figure to an extent of 24 million square yards.
The production of the Continentale Linoleum in 1929 Was estimated to amount to
about 25% of the world production, while the whole German production amounted
to about 20% of it. There is a central agency and six district agencies; the orders to
the various factories are not subject to a system of allocations or quotas, but are
distributed among the works according to temporary expediency. The international
trust in accordance with the national cartels is endeavouring to keep the home markets
for the national works. English manufacturers having formed an association too —
some smaller firms excepted — there was a possibility of drawing British producers
into the continental agreement relating to the prices for exports, and it was stated that
even those English firms which had remained outside the agreement respected these
price regulations. Arrangements between the big continental firms relating to the
pooling of profits and losses will be discussed later.
There are a great number of other international agreements, in which German industry
has become a partner, which are much less complicated in their organisational features
and functions than those already mentioned, so that we can refrain from discussing
them in detail. The Franco-German potash agreement is a syndicate of that kind. It
merely represents a “reconstruction” of the state of organisation existing before the
War, when Germany had been the sole owner of potash mines on the continent. The
Peace Treaty had disrupted this unit of production in handing over the mines of Alsace
and Lorraine to France. It was only natural that the community of interest, which had
led to a wholesale monopolist organisation of German potash mines, should not be
dissolved by the alteration of political frontiers. But competition was going on between
the producers of the two districts (France and the German syndicate), especially hurtful
to the German interests owing to the subsidies which the French State was bestowing
on its potash interests, till in 1926 an agreement was reached in Lugano, which led
to a convention in Paris on 29 December 1926. This agreement was concluded between
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des Potasses d’Alsace, which controls the whole French production, that of the State
works and the only private firm existing, the “Mines de St. Therese.” There were
allocations arranged, Germany getting 70 % and France 30 % of the foreign sales of
potash. The unification of sales was followed by an agreement for the fixing of prices.
The arrangement was made for a period of ten years, expiring on 1 May 1936.
In another branch of the fertiliser industry, the nitrogen production, the problem of
regulating international competition was much more difficult to solve. Production of
nitrogen fertilisers, which had been greatly pushed forward during the War, had since
1918 resulted in a tremendous overproduction. After protracted negotiations a
conference was arranged, in Spring 1930 in Ostend and later in Paris, by the most
prominent representatives of the industry, but an agreement was only reached in August
of that year in Berlin, whereby an association known as “Convention de l’Industrie
de l’Azote” was constituted. The C.I.A. embraces about 80 % of the world production
of nitrogen and embraces 98 % of the European production. A general diminution of
output having regard to the diminished agricultural demand for artificial manures was
agreed to. But any European agreement about nitrogen fertilisers would be incomplete
if the Chilean nitrate production were left out. An attempt was long ago made to bring
both groups of producers into one line of action, but it was not until July 1932 that
a selling agreement was reached by the principal European producers and the Chilean
industry. It must, however, be kept in mind that the importance of the Chilean industry
as a supplier of fertilisers to the world’s agriculture has greatly diminished and did
not even improve, when after 1932 international consumption began again to rise.
While in 1928–29 the consumption of Chilean nitrate had amounted to 419,000 tons,
it dropped in 1932–33 to 129,000 tons, while the consumption of manufactured
nitrogen, which was 1,452,000 in 1928–29, rose to 1,624,000 tons in the latter year,
an increase of more than 200,000 tons over the figure of 1931–32. According to the
Economist of 17 February 1934 this development was due to the relatively high cost
of saltpetre to the consumer.
Among the most recent developments of international cartels the Tin Plate Agreement
may be mentioned, which was concluded in July 1934 between the most prominent
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manufacture enjoyed before the War a monopolist position, at least in the home market,
as American exports had not yet developed to any considerable figure. On the other
hand, while external conditions were most favourable here to industrial combination,
as a relative immunity from foreign imports could have been exploited by a combined
price policy, there was no tinplate cartel in Great Britain before the War. I have
explained this peculiar fact in my book on English cartels and trusts, as being due (in
contrast to American conditions) to the special structure of the English tin-plate
industry, leaving technical and commercial opportunities to smaller and “pure”
undertakings besides the great combined works.
9 After the War several attempts were
made to form a combine, among them the formation of the South Wales Tinplate
Corporation which claimed through its members a control of about 60% of the output
of tin plates, but international agreements, having as their object the regulation of prices
on export markets, encountered serious difficulties, till at last the above-mentioned
pact was concluded.
While we have been discussing the most important international agreements and
affiliations, in which German industries have become partners, we have not paid any
attention to the “geographical” integration, which might be an important factor in the
formation of international industrial combinations. No doubt the most important of
the existing international combines must be regarded as displaying a world-wide
activity. This is the case where big concerns, having a quasi-monopolist hold on their
home markets, have become interlocked by mutual agreements or financial union, as
also where certain national combines possess by themselves an international
preponderance, as the Standard Oil, Coats or the German potash syndicate.
On the other hand and as regards European conditions, the post-War period, by the
alteration of political frontiers, which had meant an economic integration, has certainly
stimulated some sort of inter-state understanding between producers of territories
formerly geographically united. Prof. Hantos, who has devoted a special study to these
cartels, writes:
Central Europe is the classical ground of international cartels. While
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measure by the pressure of industrial depression, there is still another,
not less important, cause of their creation in the new Central Europe:
the structural changes which the once united economic territories have
undergone. In post-war Central Europe international cartels owe their
existence to a large extent to the endeavour of the manufacturers to
correct political facts with regard to their economic effects. The
Central-European cartels are designed to bring into a closer union the
productive and selling activities of economic territories now disrupted
by tariff barriers.
While we cannot agree with the contention of Prof. Hantos that industrial combination
in other parts of the world is mainly due to “economic depression,” he is certainly right,
when he describes Central-European cartels and syndicates as being largely the outcome
of post-War political decisions which did not have due regard for the economic
exigencies of the former frontiers. The cartels and syndicates in question, which can
be justly styled as “Central-European,” relate to agreements between manufacturers
or their associations in various States, especially Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia,
Poland, but according to Prof. Hantos they may also include Jugoslavia, Rumania and
other Balkan States. Among these cartels there are agreements, in which most producers
in the Central-European States have become partners. Thus the Central-European group
of iron works (Alpine Montan-Rima-Czechoslovaldan works) joined the
Rohstahlgemeinschaft oftheWestern-European States in 1927; there are agreements
between the Austrian, Hungarian and Czechoslovakian steel-plate works, which again
have made an agreement with German producers not to invade their respective
territories; and there is a Central-European group of cartelised producers within the
international wire-rod syndicate. There is a Central-European syndicate for the
production of ferrosilicum, of which German, Austrian and Jugoslavian producers
are members. In July 1929 a CentralEuropean glass and porcelain syndicate was
formed, of which, besides many other Central-European States, Germany became a
partner. An association fixing certain selling arrangements, the allocation of
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producers of Germany, Austria, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania under
the somewhat academic name of “Vereinigung zum Studium und zur Vervollkomm-
nung der Knochenleim-Industrie” (association to propagate the study and the progress
of the manufacture of gelatine from bones). Besides these cartels embracing most of
the Central-European industries of one branch, there are a great number of others
between two countries only, as for instance the gas-coke or the cement agreement and
many important arrangements in the iron and steel, the electrical and the chemical
groups of industry between Germany and Austria. The same relates to a good many
arrangements between German and Czechoslovakian producers. While these
arrangements are in general formed for the purpose of protecting the home market
by a mutual agreement about competition or even excluding competition by
“Gebietsschutzabkommen” (agreements to safeguard territorial sales), there are others,
which relate to competition in non-Central-European markets, while the industries
concluding the agreements are mainly situated in Central Europe. There are for instance
arrangements in the paper trade (Rotationspapier-Abkommen), by which German
manufacturers have renounced their liberty of selling to the Balkan States, where
markets are left to Austrian and Czechoslovakian exporters. There is also a convention
regulating the sale of felt hats to the Balkan markets, in which Germany, Austria and
Czechoslovakia are partners besides other European manufacturers. There can be no
doubt that affinities of economic geography such as those existing within the
Central-European States, especially those of the Austro-Hungarian succession States,
may facilitate cartelisation, especially where industrial combination of some sort or






Students of the development of cartels and trusts in different groups of industry will
be struck by the great variety and diversity of conditions which the various industries
present to industrial combination. This does not by any means apply only to the form
of organisation, which is in many ways directly or indirectly connected with these
differences and which, as we have already seen, covers a great number of different
types, from loose associations to mighty cartels and syndicates, from special agreements
to wholesale monopolist organisations, from amalgamations and vertical or horizontal
combinations of firms to the formation of giant concerns and final trusts, from the mere
industrial combination of one group of industry to the ambiguous monopolist
concentration of various branches and heterogeneous lines of production. However
different these forms of organisation may be, in their common aim at some sort of
monopolist domination they may be taken as one, and in fact their diversity may be
regarded as more or less “structural.” Far more complicated, and one may say,
disturbing, seems the question, as to which of the great number and variety of
circumstances, which we have been able to trace as being responsible for industrial
combination, was the essential condition for the formation and duration of cartels and
trusts in general. Let us remember that among the many industrial quasi-monopolies,
whose history and present position we have described in the foregoing chapters, there
has been very little uniformity in the main conditions, which may be considered as
the basis of their monopolistic domination. Cartels and trusts are by no means “Kinder
der Not,” emergency expedients, enacted under the pressure of severe and repressive
competition, as Prof. Hantos still wants us to believe. We have seen that in the chemical
industry of Germany, “depression” could hardly be talked of as a factor seriously
menacing that group of industry, that on the contrary there has been hardly any industryHermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 106
in the world showing so much prosperity and stable progress as this one, and yet it
has become one of the most complete exponents of trustification. This certainly does
not do away with the fact that increasing competition and depression has in many
industries and in many ways stimulated the desire of manufacturers to combine, in
order to avoid individual losses by common agreement. But the sole consideration
that desire alone cannot “make” industrial combination, where the material conditions
of monopolisation are lacking, shows that it would be very short-sighted to attribute
to depression the main cause of cartelisation. The same applies to the question of the
influence of tariffs on German industrial combination. Examples such as that of coal
or potash can amply show that tariffs are by no means solely responsible for the
existence of industrial monopolies, as there may be trades which need no tariff at all
to enjoy immunity from foreign competition. On the other hand, there are plenty of
German trades in which, in spite of tariffs, it has been very difficult to form cartels
or amalgamations of a dominant character. This for instance was the case in the German
textile industries, which show very few signs of genuine cartelisation and trustification
although tariff protection has not been lacking. Some years ago, Prof. Kurt Wiedenfeld
of Leipzig gave the following explanation in a report to a committee of the World
Economic Conference:
The German textile industries represent a field of industry, which is
characterised by the most divergent varieties in the forms of organisa-
tion. Mixed works and a looser kind of concern exist in both the cotton
and woollen industries, but they are by no means the rule and have not
yet attained any conspicuous preponderance. In the manufacture of the
finer grades of woven goods and cloths the works, limiting their activity
to one single branch of trade, are still predominant. This is still more
the case in other lines of the textile manufactures, except in the jute
industry, which, owing to the coarseness of its manufactures, has been
much more liable to the development of mixed undertakings. It has
been a characteristic of the textile industries that they are permeated
by a great number of cartels, but these consist essentially of loose priceHermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 107
conventions and agreements about certain conditions of selling which
are of secondary importance; only in a few cases have these agreements
become of a more stringent character. In earlier days the textile cartels
had the nickname of “mock-cartels,” as they left to their partners a great
deal of liberty to evade the agreed rules, when market conditions
became a stimulus to overlapping.
Conditions in this’‘protected” industry were just as little favourable to industrial
combination as was the case in English freetrade spinning and weaving. It was,
therefore, very wisely said by the Committee on Industry and Trade that industrial
combination in Germany “has received such encouragement as may be derived from
the existence of a tariff.” On the other hand there can be no doubt, that in certain groups
of industry the existence of a tariff (though not comparable in its height with that of
the U.S.A.) has been an important factor in inducing manufacturers to take common
action in order to reap the full advantages of it. This is especially remarkable in the
history of the iron and steel industries. But there are plenty of others, in which the tariff
problem has been of little or no importance. The desire to avoid severe depression
resulting from overcompetition and to take full advantage of protective State measures
is no doubt a very strong incentive to industrial combination. Yet it must be
remembered that the more or less pronounced willingness to combine merely represents
a subjective element in the whole problem. Wolfers has rightly called it the “subjektive
Kartellfahigkeit,” that is to say, that part of the conditions responsible for the formation
of combination which are vested in the personal attitude of manufacturers towards
combination. No doubt this attitude does not depend exclusively upon certain facts,
which may attract the profit-making instincts of manufacturers and satisfy them that
a rise in prices or a check to their further drop may be best effected by mutual
agreement. There are other circumstances besides these “motives,” which constitute
subjective “ Kartellfahigkeit.” These circumstances may be accidental and they may
also differ from country to country. The War period, which brought about big schemes
for relief measures as regards the supply of raw materials and manufactured goods,
has certainly brought the manufacturers of single branches of industry into closerHermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 108
contact, as the semi-public corporations (Kriegsrohstoffgesellschaften and others)
formed at that time were in many cases a starting-point for private industrial
cooperation. In many cases of industrial combination the most difficult step was to
“bring the people together” and to destroy by some preliminary negotiations their
individual suspicion. Dr Hans SchaefFer, a former director of the Ministry of Economic
Affairs, states expressly in his treatise on German “Cartels and Concerns” that from
the first days of the War the leaders of cartels were considered as the persons best
qualified to deal with the listing and distribution of existing goods of all kinds and
that the new emergency organisation thus created was soon expanded into branches
of industry which had not as yet known any sort of cartelisation and which were now
brought into touch with a system of mutual understanding. Again, there can be no doubt
that German manufacturers are by their very nature in some sort of sympathy with a
system of mutual consent. It was H. v. Beckerath who was anxious to point out that
there has always been latent in the German manufacturer the co-operative (guild) spirit
and also his military education leading to a certain willingness to subordinate himself,
which has in many cases facilitated the formation of industrial combination.
But “subjective” Kartellfahigkeit would be quite powerless, if the “objective”
circumstances favouring monopolist organisation were lacking. This does not mean
that one should underrate the psychological influence in the matter of industrial
combination. There might in fact be cases where the necessary conditions for
monopolisation existed, whereas the manufacturers were unwilling to make use of
them. There were times, when English coal commanded a monopolist position in many
overseas markets, yet a British coal cartel with the object of taking advantage of the
possibility of raising the price by common action, though considered by men like Sir
George Elliot and others, was never formed, one of the causes being the insuperable
reluctance of the mine owners to combine on a broad national scale. While it would
be impossible to start or at any rate to keep up an industrial combination by a mere
sentiment of the people interested in the particular industry that it was desirable to
have some sort of monopolist organisation, where material conditions of quasi-mono-
poly were non-existent,
10 it is quite as certain on the other hand that these conditions,
given their practical value to the manufacturers, will greatly depend upon the existenceHermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 109
of an attitude of mind favourable or unfavourable to the principle of industrial
combination.
But what then are these material conditions? In reviewing industrial combination
in the various most important branches of German industry we have discovered so
many circumstances to which monopolist combination may be attributable, that at first
it would seem hardly possible to get at a single root of the causes of industrial
combination. We have seen that a good many, and perhaps sometimes the most
prominent, German cartels and syndicates were connected with and based upon the
monopolisation of raw material, such as those in the coal, iron ore and potash industries.
Yet Dr Vogelstein’s theory, propounded long ago, that the essential cause of industrial
quasi-monopolies was based upon domination over production, which could not be
augmented at decreasing or equal costs, has been long dismissed as providing no
definitive explanation of the problem, as indeed there are plenty of monopolistic
organisations which show that a monopoly of the supply of raw material is by no means
a necessary condition for a monopoly in the finishing branches. Our own description
of industrial combination in dye-stuffs or electric manufacturing or rayon or electric
lamps prove the hopelessness of a theory which was plausible in times when the cartels
chiefly discussed were those in the coal and iron industries.
There are other, what may be called “partial” explanations of the forces leading to
industrial combination. Curiously enough the progress of time and experiments in
combination, while augmenting these explanations, have not brought to light any
tendency towards “concentration,” but have rather increased their number and diversity.
We have found out that patents had a good deal to do with modern monopoly
organisation, almost reminding one of the times of James I and Charles I, when the
granting of patents of monopoly to courtiers and projectors was one of the conditions
leading to monopolies. We have also seen how agreements entered into with regard
to the common utilisation of patents and to the exchange of experiences resulting from
patented inventions of recent years have — as for instance in the case of liquefaction
or electric lamps — facilitated and strengthened industrial combination in the
international sphere. But there can be no doubt that the overwhelming number of
patents issued, especially in the finishing and highly differentiated lines of industry,Hermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 110
has in no way been an essential factor in the growth of monopolisation. In fact the
history of modern industries, based or partly based on special patented processes and
methods, dates much farther back than that of cartels and trusts. The same holds true
with regard to the so-called “old “ and “new” industries. One may easily say that
industrial combination has been strongest in the so-called “new” industries. We may
quote as examples the chemical industries, electricity, rayon, electric manufacturing,
and linoleum, which have shown from their very beginning a tendency towards
concentration as compared with the already existing manufactures which were
differentiated, and scattered into a much greater diversity of many relatively small units.
This also applies to English industrial development, where the example of the big oil
companies may be added to that of the industries already mentioned. While it cannot
be denied that it is the “new” and “newest” industries which have shown a singular
“Kartellfahigkeit,” vested in their special technical exigencies, it does not matter very
greatly with regard to the general explanation of the monopolist tendency in modern
industry whether certain conditions of cartelisation or trustification have been “born”
with the industries themselves or whether, as in many other cases, they have developed
by a slow but successful process of integration and amalgamation.
The difficulty of finding an explanation of the development of industrial combination
is applicable to all of its phenomena and prototypes and is thereby entitled to be
considered as being of general and final value; but it is also encountered, in examining
special phases or sides of this development. Thus one has been trying to draw certain
general conclusions from the fact that industrial combination has been much more
prominent in the raw material and semi-finishing branches of industry than in those
of high-grade finished goods. It is true that up to the most recent times it was extremely
difficult to achieve an effective combination among manufacturers of such produce.
It is for instance rather significant that in the highly cartelised German iron and steel
industry the branches connected with all sorts of wire manufacturing have not been
able to follow in the footsteps of the Rohstahlgemeinschaft or the pig-iron syndicates.
Indeed a compulsory organisation had to be ordered in the autumn of 1933, embracing
the lines of highly finished wire manufacturers, and forcing all those outside the
existing cartel to join an organisation called the “Vereinigung der freien DrahtwerkeHermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 111
und Drahtstiftwerke” in Liidenscheid. But an agreement between the two existing
bodies could not even then be effected and disagreement continued. The same
difficulties were encountered with regard to cigarette making. The whole historic
development of industrial organisation testifies to the much greater difficulties
encountered in effecting combination among the much more numerous and
differentiated competitors in the finishing trades and high-grade productions than in
those lines of production which supply goods of a more or less uniform and simple
quality, as is the case in the preliminary stages of production. A good many writers
formerly laid stress on that point, such as Kleinwachter, Schonlank, Liefmann, Pohle
and also Dr Schacht in a treatise on the subject (cp. Wolfers, p. 49, see literary
appendix). But this structural tendency of industrial combination, though certainly
of some importance, can by no means be regarded as generally applicable. We have
plenty of examples showing the difficulties of combination in the most primitive
branches of industry, as for instance in English coal mining, or in the later development
of German potash cartels. We have on the other hand the English experiences in the
textile group of industries. Here we find industrial combination in the “finishing” and
“high-grade quality” trades, such as fine cotton spinning, sewing cotton, calico printing,
bleaching and dyeing, while there is none in the spinning and weaving branches in
spite of the many earnest endeavours in that direction (Manchester Cotton Corporation).
As regards fine cotton spinning in England, Fitzgerald expressly alluded to the fact
that this branch is “in the most exclusive section at least” dominated by a single
combine. This is the very reverse of the theory that there is no room for cartelisation
or trustification in the high-grade quality productions. Yet one may argue that this
contention still holds true, where in the finishing lines of production concentration
into bigger units with more uniform production has been possible, as in fact was the
case in the English instances already quoted. But even this explanation is of no general
validity. H. v. Beckerath, in a study of the German silk manufacture, was able to prove
as early as in 1911 that many peculiarities of the finishing lines of production which
hitherto had been considered as checking industrial combination might under given
circumstances be very advantageous to it. The specialisation and great diversity in the
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clauses of the syndicate, because in fact outsiders are not in a position to supply even
a part of the desired goods. It is worth while quoting the words of Dr Schaeffer, who
wrote in 1928:
It was in those very branches of production where in contrast with some
others there was no uniformity of production, and no uniform products,
but on the contrary highly differentiated goods, where there were no
big units of production, but a great number of small units, that it was
possible by cleverly coordinating through a uniform sales agency the
undertakings which were complementary in their manufacture, to
qualify for cartelisation branches of production which up to that time
had not been considered fit for it. I am thinking of the silk and velvet
industries, in which it was possible to create what may be called a
“combined association” of many differentiated undertakings, the
immunity of which in regard to outside competition consisted in its
intrinsic diversity, as new competition could not arise by the creation
of a new undertaking, but only by the formation of a similar combina-
tion of as wide and differentiated a character.
We are far from underrating the fact that industrial combination is more likely to
succeed in the primitive stages of production and its half-finished branches, where
uniformity of production and the circumstances connected with it technically and
commercially favour combination or amalgamation. But it will be seen from the
foregoing examples than any analysis relying exclusively on this distinction would
be no less “partial” and uncomprehensive a solution than the other explanations we
have mentioned with regard to the conditions leading to monopoly organisation in
modern industry.
What then is the explanation of the development and rapid growth of industrial
combination? Even the very best modern writers on the subject, like Dr Alfred Plummer
in his study on International Combines in Modern Industry (cp. pp. 54–5), do not
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are zealously enumerating and therefore are unable to state the “Gesetzmässigkeit”
of the cartel and trust movement in modern economic development. We must reject
the idea that “a number” of different circumstances was responsible for it. Eclectic
explanation is of no use in this case. We cannot imagine that after a long period of
free competition in industries, whose essential capitalist structure did not differ
essentially from that of our days — or differed at any rate more in its dimensions than
in its basic elements — a series of very different circumstances would have arisen to
bring about that new form of organisation which we call industrial combination. In
fact, we have been able to state that these very circumstances — for instance certain
factors which have influenced the attitude towards combination and have been a
stimulus of it, such as the desire to avoid depression or to reap the highest possible
benefit from tariffs, or those non-psychological circumstances such as monopolisation
of raw material, patents, the special qualifications for combination possessed by the
preliminary stages of production, the development of “new” industries with special
technical peculiarities — certainly each make some valid contribution to the
explanation of the combined phenomena, but that in fact they do not give a clue to
its primary root.
The final and definitive explanation of the movement must be sought in the
development of concentration in industry. In fact all the numerous components, which
we have been able to observe in describing monopoly organisation in different groups
of industry, lead back to this. It is, however, necessary to consider the meaning of
“concentration” other than in the usual and traditional way. For the purpose in question
the use of the word simply to designate a supply of goods by increasing units of
production, i.e., an increased unit of undertaking, would be much too narrow. For we
want not only to explain the conditions leading to trusts or amalgamations, but also
those leading to cartelisation. In fact cartels or syndicates are a concentration as well.
Everywhere where a given demand is being satisfied by manufacturers unified into
larger or smaller units instead of by a great number of dispersed undertakings, each
one separated from the other in its distributive function, the term of concentration may
be applicable in a wider sense. This state of conditions is by no means limited to the
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be applied to local or territorial conditions of concentration. The successful position
of the Newcastle Vend was undoubtedly due to the fact that in its days the London
and South English markets were forced to buy coal from the northern districts as “sea
coal,” giving to these districts a position of concentration of supply, which vanished
when railway traffic changed the whole structure of the distribution of coal in England.
The Ruhr coal or the minette ores of Lorraine enjoyed a similar concentrative position,
from a territorial point of view, which of course became a stimulus to monopoly
organisation, while extractive industries scattered over a wide and economically
differentiated area are not able to offer this incentive. Again, concentration is not
necessarily bound to the large unit of production, although this will be the most
dominant type of it. We have a concentration in the huge butter manufacturing industry
of Denmark. This has not been brought about by increasing the size of farms, on the
contrary the co-operative owners of the big dairies are the small farmers united by their
associations. The concentrative feature of the industry does not lie in the production
of milk, but in that of butter, and it has not been at all necessary to form giant
agricultural units to concentrate the industry. The same applies to the German
manufacture of gelatine from bone. The small firms manufacturing glue have combined
in the assembling of the raw material by collecting it on a co-operative basis. It is said
that they have since then been capable of producing gelatine from bone cheaper than
their largest competitor, the Scheidemandel concern, which has to buy its material
on the market. Thus concentration may be of a very different character indeed, although
it must be admitted that the enlargement of the technical unit of production plays the
leading role.
The question remains, what circumstances are responsible for the fact that it is just
during the last fifty years that industrial development has witnessed the growing force
of concentration. When Liefmann declares that “the deepest root of cartelisation is
that of the large industrial unit,” one is tempted to ask, what then is the specific cause
of the development of the large unit to such dimensions that it has made industrial
combination possible? Was not the large unit in industry developing long before the
modern phase of quasi-monopoly organisation and was not the unit of production in
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large” and constantly increasing from 1830 to 1870 or 1880? Why then no
concentration? And again, is it not true that cartels and syndicates, most of which have
been composed of a rather large number of partners, are formed without any
trustification at first, proving that the huge unit, which to-day predominates in so many
explanations of monopoly organisation, is not necessarily identical with “concentra-
tion”?
What then can be adduced as an explanation embracing all kinds of concentration
in modern industrial development? Certainly no other cause than that which has led
to every increase in productive units from the beginning of modern capitalism.
Technical inventions leading to an enlargement in the size of plant are not made without
due regard to economic conditions. And if they are the mere outcome of chance it may
happen that for a long time they will not be put into practical use. It was the change
in the conditions of distribution, from local to national or even international markets,
which led to the necessity of larger units of production or capitalist control over small
masters in order to concentrate the sale of their produce, when the handicrafts system
of local distribution vanished. The “factory” is not a sudden technical invention but
an organisational adaptation of the technical unit of production to the need for selling
large and uniform quantities of goods to non-local markets. Exactly the same applies
to modern “concentration.” Wherever an opportunity arises to supply concentrative
markets, instead of spreading the sale of produce over a wide field of scattered demand,
there is the primary opportunity for concentration. If it had not been for the supply
of the huge and uniform demand of foreign — especially English and German —
markets, the Danish dairy factories with their co-operative form of concentration would
hardly have come into existence, and the development of beef and canning factories
in the U.S.A. points to exactly the same cause. The beef industry of the Middle West
with its huge units was founded in contrast to the system of the smaller butchers which
supplied the local demands of the big industrial and urban centres in the East in a
decentralised way. It was here as elsewhere the revolutionary progress in the means
and technique of transport facilities which made it possible to concentrate the
production of meat in those areas of the American economic “empire” which, though
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production. In fact every progress in transport by widening the radius of centralised
distribution has been active in transferring production to or concentrating it in those
places, which, regardless of the cost of transport, allowed the most uniform sort of
mass production. This tendency can best be studied in industries which still possess
the old as well as the new forms of production and distribution, as for instance in flour
milling and paper making. It was when cheap maritime transport made it profitable
to transport grain from far distances in large cargoes to concentrated places of
consumption that modern flour milling factories were founded, either on the sea coast
or, as in Germany, along the big rivers, displacing the old-fashioned smaller inland
mills, including even the great number of windmills, which existed in Germany up
to fairly recent times. As regards paper making the possibility of drawing large supplies
of the raw material — now consisting of wood pulp or cellulose — from distant centres
of production, i.e., the concentrative form of the supply of raw material, as contrasted
with the decentralised ways of collecting rags in former days, has naturally reacted
on the structure and location of the paper industry. A cartel of rag collectors was never
heard of. Cartelisation in the paper trade as well as in the manufacture of pulp has been
quite common, the last important combination of that kind in Germany being a cartel
of soda pulp manufacturers and workers-up. The cartel aimed among other points at
a new organisation of the raw material supplies on national lines and a reduction in
imports of cellulose especially from Sweden. In the old decentralised state of raw
material supply this would not have been possible.
The tendency towards concentration, then, is the perfectly clear result of the progress
in transport facilities, the cheapening of freight over long distances by land and by
sea and the consequent opportunities for mass transport and mass distribution of goods.
In order to exhaust to its utmost these opportunities industry had to concentrate its
production, if possible from the assembling of material to the finished article, and to
make the organisation of its distribution as uniform as possible, a task including a
regulation not only of quantities and qualities but also of prices. This concentration
was brought about in many different ways, giving rise to almost as many different
explanations, though in fact the root of the whole tendency could have been easily
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groups of German industries cartelised or trustified, or both, almost all the different
types and aspects of concentration. We shall now try to enumerate them in a general
way. There was:
1. Geographical integration, giving a support to productive concentration. This was
the case in the extractive industries. It is quite evident that a natural support of
concentrative organisation is given where a supply of raw material in a country is
located in a certain well defined economic area and not scattered over many different
districts. This is most prominently the case with German coal and potash and with
the formerly German minette ores. Such “natural” integration may react on the location
of other industries dependent on the raw material, as for instance the concentration
of German coal supplies has certainly assisted the concentrative tendencies of other
industries such as of iron and steel
11 or electric power supply.
2. In the international sphere geographical integration is represented mainly in two
ways (we except the special case of an industry possessing a patent, the utilisation of
which is confined to one country):
(a) A tariff wall separating the one country from others and thereby leading to national
integration up to a certain limit. It is quite clear that under free trade quasi-monopolies
may flourish in many branches of industry as well as under protection (compare my
book on Monopolies, Cartels and Trusts in England, 1927), and it is just as possible
that, in spite of protection, cartelisation or trustification may be weak, as in the German
textile trades, or even non-existent. But where a tariff coincides with other conditions
necessary to the formation of industrial combination, especially the possibility of
eliminating national competition, a tariff, viewed from the sphere of international
competition, must certainly be regarded as an integrative factor in the organisation
of national industries. One can justify the attitude of the economists of the eighteenth
century who spoke of protection as giving a “monopoly” to home industries, even when
this monopoly was not exploited by a ring of those interested in the trade. We have
stated before that it has been the successful endeavour of German industries to make
use through combination of the integrative conditions afforded by the tariff. In
discussing the price policy of cartels in a later chapter we shall have something more
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(b) A second possibility of industrial integration in the international sphere may exist
where national industries enjoy a monopolist or quasi-monopolist position in the
international markets. While the tariff may afford the integrative condition as regards
the “import” side of the problem, a dominating position of national industries in
international markets will act in the same way as regards the “export” side. This
domination is rather frequent as regards the supply of internationally consumed raw
materials. There are many countries which do possess at least one of such products
characterised by monopolist or at least quasi-monopolist features. The control of
German (and now German and French) potash over world markets affords a prominent
example of it, but there may be mentioned, as a parallel, copper and oil in the U.S.A.,
nickel in Canada, tin in the Straits, sulphur in Sicily or saltpetre in Chile. Whether
these “geographical” conditions of concentration in international supply are practically
exploited by the producers through industrial combination remains another question,
as certainly this condition may be only one of others necessary to the formation of
combines. The case of the English coal trade, ruling many foreign markets between
1850 and 1900 without attempting to exploit the monopolist position by effective
mutual understanding, may be cited in that respect. But on the other hand the general
movement towards concentration, the root cause of which we have been trying to
explain, found, when once it began, a very favourable field of action in those cases
of geographical integration afforded by the monopolist location of important
international raw materials. In the sphere of finished goods such conditions will only
arise where an industry has by special circumstances acquired a dominating position
in foreign markets. This, we have seen, has been the case with the German trade in
dyes and pharmaceutical materials of a special kind from almost the beginning of the
German chemical “Gross-Industrie.” Parallels are found in the position of Coats or
the wnisky distillers in England. Patents of a world-wide importance may play the same
role with regard to an industry nationally integrated and dominating international
markets or also branches of production abroad. The history of the early American and
later German patents in electric lamps can be quoted as an illustration to this. Again,
national integration within the worldeconomic production may arise through other
circumstances leading to a dominant international position of a national manufacture.Hermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 119
The position of the toy-making industry in Germany affords an example of this; before
the War German toys made of wood held a monopoly of the foreign markets; this
domination was due to the special traditional workmanship in the making of wooden
toys exercised by thousands of small families of craftsmen in the Saxon Erzgebirge
and in Thuringia (Sonneberg district). Another example is afforded by the tin plate
industry of Wales, which enjoyed, for the same reason of having an unparalleled
experience in production and a traditionally skilled class of workmen, a dominant
position in the world markets, against which continental and American makers fought
for a long time in vain. Both industries, however, while illustrating a condition of
geographical integration of international importance, have not proved successful as
regards industrial combination, as other conditions necessary to make combination
successful were missing. In general, conditions of national or international integration
in the finishing lines of manufactures will be much rarer than in those of the extractive
industries or in the half-finishing groups, since the latter are as a rule connected directly
or indirectly with the domination over instruments of production limited geographically
and in its extent by natural circumstances which can hardly be overcome (except by
replacement through other materials, as in the case of coal and lignite or phosphate
and nitrogen), while in the working-up lines a greater ubiquity predominates. This
is one of the causes which have facilitated industrial combination in the extractive
groups of industry and in those connected with them, in contrast to the finishing
branches of manufacture.
(c) A third factor of integration, reserving to industries their respective local or
national markets, might ensue from the very nature of the industries themselves. This
relates to the so-called sheltered trades, which, however, are more frequent in transport
and the small crafts than in big manufactures. Competition from abroad is excluded
here by the fact that there are no foreign goods to compete. It is quite impossible to
have foreign competition in German books or newspapers. While this, of course, has
always been the case the latest movement towards concentration in the newspaper
business, represented by the three big Berlin firms, Mosse, Ullstein and Scheri, which
have to a great extent invaded the provincial newspaper business, seems likely to show
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the capital as a news distributing centre and a centre of cultural and political life which
concentrated the interest of provincial readers on the Berlin papers, thus creating a
market for a vastly greater daily edition than any local press could possibly supply.
Indeed the provincial papers characteristic of Germany, and numbering some thousands
of independent papers, were to a great extent (the Frankfurter Zeitung, the Kölnische
Zeitung, some papers in Hamburg, etc., were remarkable exceptions) reduced to merely
“local” importance, as, of course, will necessarily always happen in a country
possessing a relatively great number of small and medium cities with a local press.
Moreover, the increasing entanglement of German economic and public life with
international life has also helped to widen the mass-market for German centralised
newspapers. Another example of industrial integration resulting from the nature of
the industry itself is represented by the supply of electricity by power works. This
industry has first been integrated locally by “districts” and although to-day, as we have
seen, the largest works have greatly increased their radius of distribution the supply
will always be reserved (perhaps some border plant excepted) to the national sphere
by the very nature of the industry.
Integration, geographical, internal and external, has been one of the conditions
underlying all modem industrial concentrative tendencies in some way or other. The
means of making this condition practically effective by the manufacturers or
industrialists interested in the respective groups of industry has been industrial
combination. It is evident that wherever integration of industry becomes conspicuous,
inasmuch as it is identical with concentration of industry, it becomes a stimulus to
monopolist forms of organisation. It is, of course, quite another question whether the
motive as such will suffice to bring about monopoly. In fact the formation of any
industrial combination, claiming any permanence, depends on the specific facts
allowing for the concentrative exploitation of integration by the producers concerned.
This applies to national as well as to international industrial combination. We have
been able to show that national concentrative organisation has been the starting point
for all international industrial combination. This does not, however, imply that
integrated national industries organised into cartels or trusts will in every case associate
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of rayon or its products.
The simplest and most “ideal” form of concentration, qualified to exploit the
monopolist domination inherent in integration, would be the existence of one single
undertaking, the trust, controlling 100 % of the production in the particular group of
industry. The American development of industrial combination was expected to lead
that way, but it has never got much further than the formation of more or less dominant
“quasi” -monopolies. For cartelisation as well as for trustification a very essential
condition will always be the number of existing and the possibility of would-be
competitors. Concentrative organisation may find a strong support from the mere
existence of this condition, i.e., the paucity of competitors, or else manufacturers or
leaders of industry may try to accelerate a tendency of that sort by amalgamation or
fusion. In fact, cartelisation should be considered as a means of organising producers
concentratively in cases where a relatively great number of competitors nullifies the
hope of trustification. Even if trustification in the U.S.A. had not been due to certain
legal conditions it is very probable that the trust-form of monopoly organisation would
have superseded that of mere associations, as American industry from the ‘eighties
onwards was rapidly advancing towards large units of production.
The conditions leading to a concentration of the units of production appear to be
very numerous and of a rather differentiated character, but it must be repeated over
and over again
12 that they all emanate from the necessity of producing goods in
increasing quantities and uniform qualities for markets of growing and, one may add,
concentrative capacity of consumption. We have been able to display a good many
of these conditions in the different groups of German industry and we have also been
able to show that many of such conditions have simultaneously been active in single
industries. We shall now enumerate them in a more systematic way.
1. Concentration of units of production in German industry has in many cases been
due to more or less technical conditions. Germany was industrialised a good deal later
than England, the classic nation of modern industrialism. Units of production have
for this very reason — as for instance in the iron industry as regards blast furnaces
or in the steel manufacture as regards steel works and rolling mills — been larger from
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and official investigations (cp. Report on Commercial and Industrial Policy after the
War, 1918, Cd. 9035). As regards the iron and steel industry, which is the most
conspicuous example in this respect, the Balfour Report on Industry and Trade of 1929
said in a final statement: “British practice in the manufacture of iron and steel tended
over a period of years before the War to fall behind continental practice. The problem
of keeping up to date was no doubt in some respects more difficult in a country where
the iron and steel industry had grown to full stature in an earlier generation than in
countries which were establishing the industry for the first time on a large scale, since
the latter had not to contemplate the demolition of existing plant and naturally built
their own new plant to the most modern designs.” These words may be applied to a
good many other of the so-called “old” industries of Germany.
2. The post-War period did not, however, interrupt this development, on the contrary
it increased its strength. The work of “reconstruction,” which began after the War in
German industry, largely backed by foreign credits for dominant German concerns,
was guided by a desire for technical improvements which naturally led to bigger units
of production. There were other factors moving in the same direction. In Germany,
we were told by the British Commercial Attache in Berlin, in a report on economic
and financial conditions in Germany in 1926, “the stimulus during inflation of
mechanising, renovating and re-equipping has become a habit and a complete change
has taken place in the ideas governing the application of new and more efficient
mechanical equipment.” The rationalisation movement, which we shall have to discuss
in more detail in a later chapter, became another incentive to the enlarging of technical
units. It was to a great extent assisted by the desire to increase export in the fastest
way possible by the application of more efficient machinery, while at the same time
the shortening of the hours of labour was forcing the producer to install more
laboursaving appliances. All this was quite in line with a rapid expansion of the large
size of the industrial unit. In fact one may date from 1918 to 1929, when the tide turned,
a new era of industrial progress in Germany, which by specific conditions precipitated
the tendency towards concentration of units inherent in the big industries.
3. Then there is the technical structure of the “new” industries, which from their
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by several examples that Germany has been a keen pioneer in developing industries,
whose progress was dependent on costly research work and large and risky outlay of
capital. It is a curious fact that industries, not developing directly from existing
manufactures, have always been marked by “relatively” large units of production. We
may go back to the beginning of modem industrial capitalism to state this, since, for
instance, “new” industries were the very playground of monopolist financiers in the
seventeenth century in England and again in the later period of the “industrial
revolution” the plant of the “new” productions differed in size at the outset from that
of the small craftsman. New industries in the capitalist era have always been based
on costly technical innovations, making it possible to produce more value per unit than
in the traditional sphere of manufacture, in which the tendency towards bigger units,
though existing, seemed to be subject to a more evolutionary process. The larger
technical unit of pig-iron furnaces or of spinning mills has slowly developed out of
existing generations of very numerous smaller units, while, as we have seen, in the
German rayon industry, in electrical manufacturing and engineering, in the production
of nitrogen and nitrogen fertilisers, in power supply, liquid fuel or in linoleum, plant
controlling from the beginning a relatively large percentage of the national production
has been a characteristic feature. This is certainly not accidental. In fact the supply
of new goods or services replacing older ones, by their kind as well as by greater
cheapness, is generally based on a demand wider and greater than before; which allows
and even necessitates the development of a larger size in the unit of production.
4. Besides technical concentration of units we are accustomed to speak of horizontal
and vertical combination in industry, which are essentially of an economic and
organisational character. Of course it will not be overlooked that both kinds of
combination may evolve “technical” changes as well; thus as regards vertical
combination we have seen that a combination of blast furnaces and steel works and
rolling mills with coking ovens becomes a technical necessity of modern fuel economy,
the hot metal from the furnace being converted into steel and then rolled without being
allowed to get cold. Vertical combination had become here a direct condition of
technical progress. But this seems exceptional. The main advantages of horizontal
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grouping of competing (horizontal) plant or companies into one undertaking diminishes
wasteful competition and increases the possibilities of economy in many sectors of
producing and distributing costs. As regards horizontal combination a unification and
standardisation of production and an organisation of production programmes becomes
possible, which will be especially suited to the concentrative demands of large-scale
sale. Such advantages of horizontal combination can be well observed, as we have
been able to show, in the history of the German manufacture of electric lamps. As
regards vertical combination the advantages of “mixed” works are manifold. We must
distinguish two motives for the formation of vertically combined undertakings. One
is to effect economies by drawing raw material and half-finished products from one’s
own companies, thus avoiding the higher prices charged by intermediate stages of
production. While there has been as a rule no vertical combination in the German
spinning and weaving branches, a huge combination of that kind has existed for a long
time in another branch of the textile industry, represented by the Blumenstein concern.
This huge undertaking has combined the trade in sacks with the spinning and weaving
of jute, through the formation of a horizontal combination in the jute industry
(Vereinigte Jute A.G., in Hamburg), and a similar step was taken as regards the
manufacture of hemp (Hanfunion A.G., Berlin-Schopfheim). This combination was
followed by successful attempts to enter into the business of the users of sacks, the
Blumenstein concern acquiring important interests in flour milling works, which had
been their customers. A further enlargement of this vertical combination was effected
by acquiring share majorities or interests in numerous important companies of the
cotton and linen branches and a bank was formed (Bank fur Textilindustrie A.G. in
Berlin) with a capital of 12 million R.M., which holds the financial control over
undertakings federated to the concern numbering as many as 70–75. From this kind
of vertical combination, which is mainly due to the desire to increase gains by
eliminating the profits of several intermediaries (besides some other “accidental”
influences such as the turn-over tax which has acted in Germany as an encouragement
to vertical combination, since the latter offered a way of avoiding the sale of goods
at each stage of production), we must distinguish, though its effect will be the same,
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in buying or in selling. In England the latter kind of vertical combination seems to
be rare; in fact Fitzgerald expressly states that “the only trusts which have considered
it necessary to adopt this form of integration are the alkali, soap and tyre combines.”
Thus vertical combination in England (especially in the heavy iron and steel industry)
was mainly due to considerations of more purely economic organisation and not found
“necessary” in order to avoid being strangled by other interests. It is probably from
this viewpoint that Fitzgerald underrates the importance of vertical combination, which
in his opinion “is not always the cheapest method of obtaining supplies.” In the
principal instances of vertical combination in Germany, i.e., in the coal, iron ore, lignite
and the iron and steel industries, the “necessity” has been very conspicuous. As we
have explained before, the monopolisation of raw materials on the one side, with its
possible consequence of dangerously increasing the costs of supply to industrial users,
and the concentration of the halffinishing and finishing industries on the other, by
weakening the position of the sellers of raw material, brought about a movement
towards vertical combination from two flanks: the finishing groups being anxious to
acquire mines to get greater independence, the mining interests invading the field of
iron and steel manufactures to safeguard their previous sales of raw material. That
this movement was not confined to Germany — although absent in England  — and
was therefore not accidental, could be shown by the fact that similar tendencies were
active before the formation of the steel trust in the U.S.A.
Geographical integration (local, national, and international) on the one hand,
concentration of the size of the industrial unit on the other, effected by technical means
and by organisation, must be considered as the two leading forces making industrial
combination possible. But it must be added that these conditions are largely
interconnected. Horizontal combination in the extractive industries leading to monopoly
has directly acted as an incentive to vertical combination in the iron and steel industry,
thereby indirectly preparing the way for cartelisation and trustification in that group
of industry. The same may be true with regard to fuel supply and electricity. Again,
it must be emphasised that cartelisation or amalgamation, once effected, will further
accentuate the tendency towards bigger units. Thus, while the increasing size of the
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numbers of competitors always mean a facilitating of mutual understanding, and the
paucity of undertakings a greater guarantee of its duration — industrial combination,
once effected, may strengthen the conditions of its existence by leading to a further
reduction of units. This will be the case when cartels or huge amalgamated concerns
are willing to follow a policy of active concentration. We have explained how members
of the coal cartels from the very beginning were anxious to acquire less efficient mines
in order to shut them down and increase their own quota in the syndicate. In the case
of big amalgamations the process is still less complicated. It is usually one of the
avowed objects of amalgamation to do away with redundant plant; a typical example
of this has been the policy of the Stahlverein, the result of which we shall state on a
later page. The Enqueteausschuss has called this kind of policy “Negative Rationalisie-
rung” (passive rationalisation), making a distinction between those measures of
rationalisation aimed at greater efficiency by technical progress, which might be called
“active” rationalisation, and those aimed at greater efficiency by concentrating on the
most efficient plant and eliminating weaker works. At any rate, it becomes evident
that the process of concentration of industry will in many cases not be terminated by
the formation of cartels or trust-like concerns. This also relates to geographical
integration, not to concentration of units alone. Thus in 1930 important parts of the
Siegerland iron industry became idle, the production quotas having been transferred
to more efficient works in the Ruhr district.
This leads us to another aspect of the problem. Cartels and trusts do not appear to
be the mere “forms” of industrial combination. They may be active in strengthening
as well as weakening the very conditions of organised industrial monopoly. We have
observed that in potash and coal mining, cartelisation did not lead to the expected end
of monopoly organisation; on the contrary the number of competitors and the stress
of competition increased under the shelter of the syndicate. In coal mining, too, cartels
did not in the long run succeed in co-ordinating competing interests. In both cases the
State had to “protect” the cartel. The lack of success or the instability of monopoly
organisation might be due to two facts. There is no doubt that, in most recent times,
the movement towards cartelisation, becoming a sort of industrial slogan, has induced
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not exist. Schaeffer is certainly right in stating that the “penetration of the cartel
problem by legal considerations,” that is by the opinion that industrial combination
might be effected through a clever use of certain legal clauses and arrangements, “has
transferred cartelisation to fields of industry, hitherto quite alien to such organisation.”
He adds that a great number of such cartels were practically ineffective, as those very
legal enactments left a good many loopholes for escape. On the other hand the objective
conditions, or some of them, which we have been discussing may in fact exist, although
cartelisation does not seem to be the proper means of realising an effective state of
industrial combination. It is well known that the cartel agreement may, far from
attempting to concentrate production in the most efficient undertakings, contain clauses
for the protection of plant which would be better destroyed. It was interesting to observe
that the difficulties encountered in the English steel industry as regards the formation
of a cartel were rather increased by the fact, alluded to by Sir W. Firth in a speech
before the London Iron and Steel Exchange on 30 January 1934, that the only prices
voluntarily agreed to would have been those that showed a profit to the least efficient
plants. If this were the policy of cartels, one would be induced to argue that they were
rather slowing down the tendencies towards monopoly than accelerating it, and this
paradoxical view will probably be verified in such cases, after such a combination
has lingered for a few years. If therefore cartels and syndicates do not intend to follow
a policy of rationalisation of undertakings by shutting down redundant plant, the process
towards concentration will be carried on by other forces. We have been able to show
that amalgamation within the cartel or amalgamations of several undertakings linked
together by agreements or by a framework of conventions has become an indisputable
tendency of the latest development of industrial combination in Germany. This again
has been especially conspicuous in the iron and steel industries, but also in potash
mining, in electrical manufacturing, coal and lignite mining and many other groups
of industry. Amalgamations or fusions create a concentrative nucleus of interests within
the cartel or convention. While cartelisation alone frequently tries to anticipate a
development not yet ripe for final organisational solution, by instigating manufacturers
to combine, concentration of units of production, horizontal or vertical, may directly
or indirectly strengthen the development of concentration in the whole group ofHermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 128
industry. In this way it may be argued that the form of industrial combination itself
may present another condition assisting the final chance and the stability of
quasimonopoly. The problem of the form of industrial combination on the other hand
will not any longer be vested in the alternative “cartel” or “trust,” as indeed, as the
German example is likely to show, both forms of organisation have become largely
interconnected with each other. It may therefore be worth while to consider both forms








Although the “trust-movement” within German cartelisation, as considered in the
foregoing chapters, may be taken as a proof that the “trust” -form of monopoly
organisation, as chosen in the U.S.A., is not exclusively due to the structure of
American law, and although the predominance of cartels and syndicates in Germany
is by no means to be attributed exclusively to the structure of German company law,
there can be not the slightest doubt that legal enactments as well as the whole attitude
of law towards industrial combination has been largely responsible for certain
developments in the forms of its organisation.
In England the doctrine of the English common law that agreements in restraint of
trade are void and unenforceable at law has certainly influenced the organisational
type of quasimonopoly, although the courts have shown great reluctance in the
application of this principle during the last century; they have tended to recognise the
principle of free contract and, generally speaking, to find a contract good, if it appeared
in all the circumstances of the case reasonable and if it appeared to be made upon a
good or adequate consideration so as to make it a proper and useful contract, even
though some of the provisions might be technically in restraint of trade. This
development in the practical use of the old English law has led an official English
Report (Factors in Industrial and Commercial Efficiency, 1927, S. 73) to the conclusion
that the state of the law after the beginning of the nineteenth century was not a factor
of direct importance in controlling any tendency to combination in industry and trade,
although a power of control was embodied in the common law and doubtless would
have been exercised had the movement become so widespread as to arouse general
apprehension. We cannot quite agree with this view. The question left open seems
to be whether, if such latent “ power of control” had not existed, the forms as well
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same as they actually were owing to the ever active “danger” of monopolistic
agreements being nullified or even prosecuted under the existing legal conditions.
Fitzgerald has very aptly hinted at these circumstances in his book, when he says:
It is only in such highly concentrated industries that tacit understandings
— or “gentlemen’s” agreements, as they are sometimes called — can
be really effective. In other industries they have necessarily to give way
to formal associations duly constituted and registered, but precarious
in that any member can violate his agreement or break away and
re-enter into competition whenever he chooses....
And again:
The defect inherent in all associations, even in those which are
registered companies, is instability. Their members are united merely
by a temporary agreement, and that agreement, being “in restraint of
trade,” is not enforceable. Consequently, resort is often had to
amalgamation, which, however monopolistic, is perfectly legal. The
combine may liquidate the associated firms and take over their assets,
or — as it is nowmore usual — acquire their ordinary capital and allow
them to retain a separate legal existence.
If this view is taken as correct — and we have no reason to doubt it — the influence
of the law against restraint of trade on the “forms,” which industrial combination had
to choose in England, cannot be contested, even if this influence did not exhibit itself
in strong anti-monopolistic measures, because manufacturers were clever enough to
preclude such measures by avoiding the “cartel” -form of industrial combination in
favour of the amalgamative type of quasi-monopoly. On the other hand, it may well
be argued that had these impediments to the formation of associations in restraint of
trade not existed, a good many English “cartels” would have been formed before the
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realised, just as in Germany the “Kartell” has been in many cases the forerunner of
later concentrative movements in industry. At any rate, far from being of no actual
importance, English legal conditions as regards monopolies have had a very distinct
influence on the form of English industrial combination.
In Germany, on the contrary, quasi-monopolistic combination was never affected
by such considerations or apprehensions as regards its legal form. An association of
manufacturers could choose whatever legal form it wanted. The German law merely
contained two limitations to the lawfulness and enforceability of quasi-monopolistic
combination of any sort, either of cartels or of trusts:
1. So-called “ Knebelverträge,” that is agreements containing certain restrictive
clauses, may be against “guten Sitten” — contra bonos mores — against good morals,
as laid down in the German Civil Code. They may be contested by §138 of the
Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch (B.G.B.).
2. Cartel agreements, which are likely to damage the national economic development
or the public interest, can be declared void by the cartel law of 1923.
The above-mentioned paragraph of the B.G.B. has had hardly any influence on the
actual powers of the cartel. The German courts have in numerous cases acknowledged
the legality of the most stringent cartel agreements. It has become evident that the term
of “good morals” is much too vague to be used as a basis or starting point of any cartel
policy of the State. Either the law considers all monopolies as contra bonos mores,
a view which would lead automatically to the dissolution of all industrial combinations
of a monopolist character, or else one tries to judge the lawfulness of monopolies by
their economic behaviour. This would lead to problems, which by their economic
differentiation and complexity, are far outside the sphere of any practical jurisdiction.
That being the case it was early recognised that modern industrial organisation of a
monopolist type would need sooner or later special legal enactments to deal with its
special effects on economic life. But neither the cartel commission, which sat from
14 November 1902 to 21 January 1905, nor the numerous suggestions and proposals
made in the Reichstag or by such important bodies as the Deutsche Juristentag or the
Verein fur Sozialpolitik led to anything like a preliminary shaping of a cartel law. On
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industry by 1910 seemed to be more in favour of than against the principles of industrial
combination. The supervision of cartel practice was limited to the mere theoretical
collection by official bodies of statistics and facts relating to problems of industrial
conditions as revealed by economists or by associations connected with economic
research. During the War the dearth of raw materials and semi-manufactures of all
kinds necessitated at an early date the formation of corporations entrusted with the
collection, supervision and distribution of goods of all kinds (Kriegsrohstoffgesellschaf-
ten and others); it was only natural that these bodies should seek the actual support
of cartels and syndicates as being the best able to advise and assist the adaptation of
industrial production to war emergency measures of all kinds. While in that period
the State actually favoured the development of concentrated bodies of manufacturers
there was certainly, on the other hand, some apprehension as to the possible price policy
of the highly protected monopoly organisations. Sometimes there was a tendency to
apply the price-usury acts, which had been found necessary in face of the disturbed
equilibrium of demand and supply, to the cartels. But it was only in rare cases that
cartels were actually fined for unduly putting up prices. The post-War period showed
almost from its beginning — except for some of the first years of the so-called
“Übergangswirtschaft,” which was partly filled with fruitless plans for socialisation
— a desire from many sides and parties to arrive at a comprehensive and decisive cartel
law of some sort, a desire increasingly fostered by the price revolution of the inflation
period on the one side and by the agitation of friendly societies and co-operative
societies, which were opposing exclusive clauses and rebates of cartels and syndicates,
on the other. The Government of the Reich seemed reluctant, while the Reichstag was
pressing for legislation. It was on the initiative of the new chancellor Stresemann (6
October 1923) that the long discussed enactment of a cartel law became at last a reality.
This act bears the title of “Verordnung gegen Missbrauch wirtschaftlicher
Machtsstellungen vom 3. November 1923,” “Decree against the abuse of economic
power,” but is generally spoken of as “das Kartellgesetz” or “die Kartellverordnung.”
It was amended, though not materially, by a decree of 15 July 1933. Although born
in the very last hour of that most disastrous monetary period of inflation, which had
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law of 1923 cannot be regarded as being solely constructed to alleviate the difficulties
of price regulation in that period; on the contrary we may agree with Lehnich, when
he asserts that this decree has indeed “grasped the most essential general problems
of German cartelisation.” The main points are the following:
(a) A Kartell Court is established with exclusive and final authority in regard to the
matters entrusted to it, and consisting of a judge appointed by the President of the
Reich, and four assistant judges.
(b) The decree laid down that every agreement controlling supplies or prices must
be in writing.
(c) If any such agreement is detrimental to the public interest the Minister of
Economic Affairs may apply to the Kartell Court to have the agreement declared void
or may issue an order to the effect that any party to the agreement may terminate it
(§ 4). Such offences against public interest are, mainly: if supply or demand are
restricted in a manner not economically justifiable, if prices are raised or kept too high,
or economic freedom is unreasonably restricted by boycott in buying or selling or by
discrimination. In the event of an agreement being declared void, the Minister may
require all future agreements to be submitted to him for approval.
If the Kartell Court, on an application from the Minister of Economic Affairs,
considers that the public interest is being injured by an exercise of economic power,
it may make a general order allowing withdrawal from all contracts included under
the condition in question. The Court was further empowered to hear applications from
members of cartels for permission to resign from a cartel without giving notice.
The Kartellgesetz, which we have outlined only in its principal features, must be
regarded as a turning point in the handling of the matter of quasi-monopoly organisation
by the German law. There is no doubt that it gave far-reaching powers to jurisdiction
over and State supervision of cartels and syndicates, but it might be concluded from
the English example (as in fact German legislation had for the first time approached
a condition very similar to that of countries prohibiting unreasonable restraint of trade
by law), that one of the main effects of the law consisted in deterring cartels from
exercising their power ruthlessly, in order to avoid the interference of the Kartell Court.
This “passive” though very important consequence of the decree may be deduced fromHermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 135
the fact that the activity of the Court has been relatively small. There has been no
sensational cartel “case” reminiscent of the action taken by the U.S.A. Government
against certain trusts and leading to the dissolution of cartels of importance. Yet the
activity of the Court has manifested itself in many ways. The Kartell Court has dealt
with a large number of cases in which members of cartels have sought to resign, and
the conditions which must exist before permission is granted may be regarded as to
a certain extent defined. Withdrawal has been permitted in cases where it has been
shown that the cartel is dominated by and run in the interests of a powerful concern
or where a cartel has endangered the existence of smaller members by failing to make
an attempt to meet changes in the business situation by altering its terms or conditions
of contract. It has also been held that a change in the business situation does not in
itself provide an adequate reason for resigning from a cartel. But in general the German
Government itself has shown great caution in making use of the powers granted by
the decree of 1923. It refrained generally from taking action in the Kartell Court and
confined itself to unofficial intervention under the section of the decree which provides
that the Minister of Economic Affairs may in suitable cases take proceedings in the
first instance before approved courts of arbitration established in connection with trade
organisations. Such courts had been established at the Central Associations of Industry,
Wholesale and Retail Trade and the Co-operative Societies. The decree, having been
prepared at the climax of the inflation period and largely with regard to the price
problems of that period, was immediately followed by the stabilisation of the mark
and therefore by a period less liable to unsound fluctuations of prices. However, the
years following the introduction of the first German cartel law were faced by another
difficulty as regards prices, i.e., the adjustment of the general price level to the new
standard of money. There can be no doubt that this process was a very slow one and
it soon became the general opinion that the level of prices was artificially kept high
by industrial combination. In August 1925, the German Government, as part of a
scheme for bringing about a reduction of prices, announced its intention of making
a more vigorous use of its powers, under the Decree, and in particular of taking
proceedings in the Kartell Court against cartels which seemed to have the effect of
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that it would regard various conditions imposed by cartels as detrimental to the public
interest within the meaning of the decree. In the event of the decision of the Kartell
Court not being sufficiently favourable to its point of view, the Government announced
its intention of even proposing an amendment of the Decree. But while the Kartellgesetz
was certainly considered as an efficient instrument for guarding the public and trade
against certain abuses of cartels, especially in the sphere of price policy, boycotting
clauses and exclusive agreements, it has never been used as a means of attack against
industrial combinations as such. Moreover, since the general tendency of prices since
1929 has been downward and the fear of any scarcity of goods and of a restriction of
competition has given way to apprehensions of rather too “low” prices and oversupply
of goods by too many competitors, the original aims of the Decree seemed to have
dropped into the background. This manifested itself, as we shall see later on, in the
fact that cartels, far from being considered liable to create economic mischief, were
being safeguarded by measures leading to compulsory cartelisation.
The Decree of 1923, which still forms the basis of all German cartel law, has been
criticised in some quarters for not having embodied two proposals, which had been
frequently put forward when after the War the cartel discussion had reached a new
stage. One was the creation of a Cartel Board, as a central body to supervise cartels
and to administer the existing cartel legislation, the other the creation of a Cartel
Register. Both suggestions have been especially pressed by the former socialist parties.
On 1 July 1926 there was even a resolution passed in the Reichstag urging the
Government to introduce a bill, at an early date, concerning these two demands (cp.
Reichstagsdrucksachen, 1924–26, Nr. 2062). In spite of this resolution the Government
was reluctant to approach the subject seriously, being evidently anxious not to forestall
the pending findings of the Enqueteausschuss on the subject. The majority of this
Commission, however, was not favourable to either of the two proposals. The creation
of a special institution connected exclusively with cartel matters seemed to be rather
a “concurrence déloyale” to the Ministry of Economic Affairs, while it would have
meant a new burden to the financial costs of the administration. On the other hand,
stress was laid on the argument that cartel administration or supervision had to be done
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was a matter in which the Minister of Economic Affairs was primarily concerned, and
it could never be the task of a specialised board, as a Kartellamt would be, a view which
was shared by most of the witnesses heard before the Enqueteausschuss. As regards
the Cartel Register there was almost the same unanimous consent; while it was stated
(cf. a very interesting article on the subject by Dr Oskar Klug, in Deutsche
Wirtschaftsseitung, 28 May 1931) that theoretically a Register would be a good thing
to have, it was generally agreed that it was doubtful whether a really exhaustive and
comprehensive record of all associations could be instituted — apart from the question
of the very heavy costs incurred — and it was rightly argued that this would not even
cover the most important field of individual combines, trusts and concerns. On the
other hand it was pointed out that voluntary publicity was in no way contrary to the
interests of cartels but that on the contrary
the majority of the witnesses of all groups of industry were in favour
of publicity as they agreed that publicity generally represented an
effective means of economic policy. In regard to cartel policy this was
all the more the case as in the future cartel legislation and supervision
would in all probability deal more with associations controlling market
conditions than with individual, though quasi-monopolistic, concerns.
It was therefore in the interest of cartels to prevent any misuse of their
power by supporting publicity, in order to avoid further action by the
State.
This attitude of the Committee, coupled with the fact that the Decree of 1923 gives
the Minister of Economic Affairs far-reaching powers to require all cartels to furnish
particulars of their constitution, membership, prices, etc., and to scrutinise their
activities, has induced the Government not to take any further steps towards the much
discussed plan of the Register.
As regards the general effects of cartel legislation as laid down by the Decree of 1923
it must be emphasised again that these will not consist primarily in the dissolution
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there are cases of that kind. But the main importance of the legislation will consist
in the pressure brought on cartels, mainly by § 4 of the Decree, to refrain from abuses
in order to avoid legal steps. This also corresponds to the explicit aims of the Decree,
as it was stated in its official recommendation that it is not the purpose of the Decree
“to abolish cartel organisation, as this would in the long run not favour the freedom
of markets, but on the contrary the process of transformation involved by any such
drastic action would probably leave the small and medium-sized firms under the
domination of the big concerns.” It has been sometimes argued that German cartel
legislation in no way interfered with industrial combination as represented by powerful
trusts and concerns. Thus the English Report on Factors in Industrial and Commercial
Efficiency expresses the view,
while the Government is thus taking vigorous action with regard to
cartels, it is to be noted that the Cartel Decree provided practically no
basis for action against trusts. It seems likely that the recent swing of
German industry in the direction of the trust form of organisation is
not wholly unrelated to the relative freedom of action which the trust
enjoys in comparison with the cartel.
We do not believe that this view is quite correct. We have been able to show that
the movement of amalgamation within German industry and especially within cartelised
industries is far older than recent cartel legislation. If doubtless a desire for greater
freedom of action — apart from much more important commercial and technical
considerations — has strengthened this tendency it has been certainly not so much
the fear of being hampered by cartel legislation as that of being disturbed by the
divergent interests of many small and medium-sized firms adhering to the cartel or
syndicate. On the other hand the argument overlooks one very important fact. We have
seen that all big concerns, also of a trust-like character, are closely linked up with not
one, but indeed a great number of different cartels. Whatever the part may be which
the dominant firm or the dominant firms may play within the cartels they are associated
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cartelisation. It would be a great error to assume that the “trust movement in German
industry” would displace the existence of cartels. On the contrary, the big concerns
will show a great anxiety to support cartelisation in order to strengthen the monopolist
organisation of industry as a whole, apart from their own dominant position. It can
therefore hardly be pretended that cartel legislation has had any practical effect as
regards the fostering of trustification in the different groups of German industry, though
theoretically it would seem plausible, if cartels and amalgamations had to be considered
as two forms of industrial combination excluding each other. This, however, has never
been the case in the actual development of German industrial organisation.
It has frequently been overlooked by German writers on the subject that general
jurisdiction as mainly practised by the Reichsgericht, the Supreme Court at Leipzig,
may lead to the formulation of certain legal rules, which are likely to influence the
organisation of cartels. The Reichsgericht is certainly not in a position to create “cartel
law.” But as the question of cartels is largely mixed up with the problems of company
law —  especially where the interlocking of companies comes in — any decision of
the Reichsgericht may react on the formal conditions favouring or counteracting the
formation of cartels or their business rules. Thus it is of interest to note that the
Reichsgericht has pointed out in a decision concerning a company in the tar utilisation
branch (Gesellschaft für Teerverwertung), that as regards the effect on market
conditions it did not matter whether the company possessed any sort of a monopolist
or dominant position but that the essential fact was whether it could “influence” market
conditions at all (Marktbeeinflussung). Another case seems not less important as
regards the jurisdiction of the Reichsgericht: if any association or cartel has made any
exclusive agreements — if for instance the said company in the tar utilisation branch
was making agreements with its members to deliver all tar to the Association for
utilisation and sale — the question arises what would happen if an outside firm,
supplying tar to the open market, became fused with another firm belonging to the
cartel. Are the exclusive agreements relating to the latter binding for the amalgamated
companies or not? The Reichsgericht has decided that they are not. The new company
therefore would partly belong to the syndicate, partly not. The Reichsgericht takes the
view that such exclusive agreements are meant to be more or less elastic and areHermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 140
therefore terminated whenever a new organisation is created by the way of merger
or fusion. We have mentioned these cases not for their importance to the general legal
aspect of the cartel problem, but merely to show how deeply decisions of that kind
may influence organisational problems connected with industrial combination. Just
as in England the Nordenfelt case of 1894 or the Mogul case of 1892 has become of
classic importance with regard to the jurisprudence of industrial combination, so in
all probability decisions of the Reichsgericht will be largely used in the future as “the”
authoritative interpretation of the many points yet left open or only vaguely dealt with
by the cartel law. Yet, as regards these functions of the highest and most authoritative
German Court there always remains the alternative:
whether the Court shall be limited to decide on general principles how
far in every case brought before it the conditions of fair or unfair
economic dealing seem to be violated or not,
or
whether it will be possible to create a sort of objective and specified
measure of judgment applicable to the actual development of industrial
combination and its problems, as for instance in the question of “fair”
prices a comparison of prices with costs schedules.
Here it may be said that as regards the “legal” position in Germany the same point
of view holds good as was very aptly put some time ago by Lord Justice Fry in the
Mogul case: “To draw a line between fair and unfair competition, between what is
reasonable or unreasonable, passes the power of the Courts.” But it must not be
overlooked that this view is decidedly that of a lawyer, while the difficulty as regards
the cartel jurisdiction consists in the fact that this problem is just as eminently
surrounded by the necessities of law as by those of economic welfare. With regard
to the latter the difficulties of forming a so-called “objective” view are almost
insurmountable, as in fact the problem of industrial combination is just as liable toHermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 141
subjective views and political bias as any other question of economic “policy.” The
German Kartell Court has therefore been endowed with far-reaching powers to make
decisions following general economic and social opinions as regards “fair” or “unfair
“ actions of industrial quasi-monopolies. But here lies indeed the most difficult problem
of all cartel jurisdiction. Fritz Koch, writing on English cartel law and comparing in
a special paragraph of his book English and German legal conditions, comes to the
conclusion:
The fact that the English judge has to decide without the help of trained
economists and without any special investigation into the conditions
of the specific branch involved, because he is only allowed to use the
evidence concerning the economic status of the industrial combination
at the date of its agreement, has led to the consequence that this
problem, being in general economic and most complicated, is dealt with
and a decision is reached by merely taking into consideration the
stereotyped aspects of monopoly.
This in fact remains up to our time the most conspicuous difference in the attitude
of German and English cartel jurisdiction. The legal bodies destined to decide about
the legality of cartel agreements and the legal practice by which they arrive at such
decisions differ entirely in both countries. The English ordinary courts, contrary to
the German Kartell Court, consider the questions of “reasonableness” and “public
policy “ not from the economic but from the legal point of view, and have but little
regard for any clauses of an agreement which might seem hurtful to national
“economic” welfare.
13
As to the term “national economic welfare,” its meaning is partly denned in §§4,
8 and 9 of the Decree of 1923. These sections of the law also deal with what has been
called “ Organisationszwang” and what in fact represents one of the most important
topics of cartel jurisdiction. By” Organisationszwang “ there must be understood any
action on the side of the cartel consisting of coercive measures either as regards its
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matter, on the principle of protecting the “general welfare” if it becomes endangered
by the restriction of “economic freedom” through cartels. The first of the three
paragraphs mentions among other facts boycotting in purchase or sale or discrimination
in prices or otherwise. The other paragraphs are more definite, §8 granting the right
of terminating the agreement without giving notice in the case of a stringent reason,
§9 protecting outsiders from unfair coercion through boycotting. A “stringent reason”
might be defined as “if the economic freedom of action of the firm wishing to terminate
the agreement is restricted in an unjustifiable manner, especially as regards production,
sale or price regulation.” In §9 it is stated that neither deposits safeguarding the
maintenance of agreements may be used, nor boycotting or other disadvantageous
actions be brought about without special consent of the chairman of the Kartell Court.
The meaning and interpretation of § 8 has been the subject of much discussion. On
the one side it was recognised that the so-called “Exclusiv-Verträge,” exclusive
agreements binding the members of a cartel or syndicate to buy exclusively from certain
firms or to deal exclusively with members (ausschliesslicher Verbandsverkehr) may
lead to very oppressive conditions, which would certainly entail the loss of the last
remnant of individual liberty among the members of such agreements. On the other
hand it has been argued by many economic writers, such as v. Beckerath and others,
that the above-mentioned paragraphs meant rather too much weakening of the power
of the cartel, which in fact had to be based on some sort of coercion of its members.
The term of “unfair” coercion or of certain “reasons” which may be regarded as
“justifying” disruption remains vague and entirely liable to relative interpretation. There
can be no doubt that much of this interpretation will depend on the whole attitude of
economic policy towards industrial combination, and this attitude will certainly be
different in different periods of economic development. It is most significant that the
Enqueteausschuss has emphasised more than once (cp. for instance Generalbericht,
Part IV, erster Abschnitt, 1930, pp. 16-17) that the Decree of 1923 was not to be
considered in any way as opposed to cartels or syndicates, but that it considered the
“monopolisation of goods by their proprietors not caused by cartels, but rather by the
decay of the value of money (inflation) and the disorganisation of economic
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against economic exploitation.” How farreaching exclusive agreements may be, has
been illustrated by Liefmann, who quotes the very drastic case of the Deutsche
Tuchkonvention. This association in the German cloth trade, together with some cartels
in the weaving branch, had arranged in 1921 an agreement relating to exclusive dealing
with some associations in the men’s clothing manufacture. These latter were asking
for the boycotting of no fewer than seventy-two factories in twenty-six different places
in the country from the sale of the raw material, because these had bought some
material from factories outside of the weavers’ cartels at a cheaper rate. While Liefmann
urges the Government not to shut its eyes to such tactics and while oppressive coercion
might certainly be mitigated under the Decree of 1923 and with the assistance of the
Kartell Court and the Reichsgericht, German jurisprudence is not opposed in principle
to the system of “exclusive agreements.” On the contrary, the Reichsgericht has in
a number of cases acknowledged the lawfulness of coercive measures of cartels and
syndicates. In other cases German jurisprudence has gone so far as to back the methods
of exclusive agreement.
A very prominent case of this kind is to be found in the rayon industry. It is worth
while quoting in extenso an official announcement of the Kunstseideverkaufsbüro
(German Viscose Rayon Syndicate), made in early November 1933, as it throws some
light on the practice of exclusive dealing and its legalisation by German courts. It runs
as follows:
The German Viscose Rayon Syndicate is distributing the products of
the firms, German and foreign, affiliated to it, excluding any individual
selling by such firms. It is well known that almost all German and
foreign firms, selling rayon on the German market, belong to the
Syndicate. The Syndicate has already stated in the spring in several
announcements in the press, that it is not allowed to sell outside the
Syndicate any artificial silk, which has been manufactured by one of
its members. It has emphasised expressly that anyone acquiring such
produce outside of the Syndicate is making himself liable to prosecu-
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another’s breach of contract. To disperse all doubts which might still
exist the German Viscose Rayon Syndicate emphasises once more that
it sells rayon in the German Empire under the express condition, that
such rayon shall not be re-distributed in an unmanufactured state, the
infringement of this condition being placed under penalty. In so far as
rayon goes to dealers these are under the obligation to sell it exclusively
to the manufacturers in the following stages of production and by no
means to other dealers. In so far therefore as rayon is bought from
dealers buyers have to assure themselves, that these sales are authorised
by the Sales Bureau. The foreign member firms of the Bureau have
entered into an obligation, to insert a condition into all agreements
concerning the sale of rayon outside Germany, that this is not to be
transported into Germany. The Bureau may claim damages in cases
where this obligation has been neglected. The Bureau also watches
constantly to see that this obligation is actually kept up. Every buyer
therefore, outside the Bureau, who buys rayon from a spinner belonging
to the Sales Bureau, must be aware that the above-mentioned
obligations have been broken and that the goods originate from a breach
of contract. According to the legal ruling of the Reichsgericht such
buyers would make themselves liable to damages, if they acquired
goods which had been formerly acquired by violation of the agreed
obligations.
This case shows that the law has been far from opposing exclusive agreements as
such. On the contrary, it has been willing to lend its powers to the backing of such
agreements, if it was satisfied that exclusive clauses were not violating the rules of
fairness nor being hurtful to the “general economic welfare.” In this sense the Decree
of 1923 cannot be taken as being “Kartell-feindlich,” that is, aiming at a policy directed
against cartelisation. The meaning of this law merely consisted in granting a necessary
protection to the public against abuses of quasi-monopolies on the one side and in
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action. But just here, as Lehnich rightly states, the difficulty arises, a difficulty which
confronts the Kartell Court as well as the Reichsgericht. It has been frequently
emphasised that cartels are not in a position to fulfil their organisational tasks and
therefore their possible economic service to the community, if they are not entitled
to press effectively upon the divergent interests in their group of industry. This power
of the cartel or the would-be cartel may be decidedly weakened by legal measures
granting absolute freedom of action to the individual manufacturer, even if he has
entered contracts of a binding character; while on the other hand legislation is called
upon to protect the individual manufacturer against the abuse of quasi-monopolist
power. Here is indeed a Scylla and Charybdis for all cartel law and all cartel
jurisdiction. Moreover, this conflict is not restricted to the position of members within
a cartel or syndicate, but it may greatly influence the very formation of quasi-monopoly.
It is just as difficult to draw the legal limits of monopolist power as regards outsiders
not willing to join the cartel or syndicate as to draw definite rules for coercive measures
within the combine. While on the one hand the law may find it proper to protect the
freedom of action of independent firms and to oppose any attempt on the side of
industrial monopolist organisations to force individual manufacturers to join, general
economic conditions and what might be called the disorganised state of trade may make
it highly desirable to strengthen by State interference and legal enactments the
formation of cartels or similar organisations. It is of interest to quote the following
case cited by Liefmann: an association of coal dealers in Pomerania had been refusing
to allow some dealers to become members of their association, although these had
signed the rules of the EastElbe Lignite Syndicate. The association defended its action
before the Kartell Court by emphasising that the trade was overstocked and an increase
in the number of merchant-dealers would lead to a waste of economic costs, the existing
dealers being quite sufficient and in the best position to comply with the demand. The
Kartell Court, by a decision dated 22 April 1926, though probably recognising the
“economic” argument, refrained from permitting the exclusion of the outside firms,
arguing that while coercive measures of organisation as such were not against the law,
it could not be allowed that measures of that kind could be used against outsiders
wishing to join the association. To this Liefmann adds:Hermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 146
Viewed from the economic side this decision would at first seem
unsatisfactory, because in fact by the boycotting action of the
association an overstocking of the trade and thereby an increase of
commercial costs to the public could be prevented. But viewing the
matter more closely one might arrive at another conclusion. If once
monopolist associations are declared to be legal, the obligation to take
in all possible producers who sign the agreed conditions means much
more a weakening of such organisations, much more a fostering of free
competition than its prevention. For, if the number of partners becomes
too large, the association will probably be dissolved, inasmuch as even
the producers’ cartel is not interested to damage the sale of its products
by too heavy general costs of distribution. The obligation to take in
willing outsiders is generally more favourable to new competition and
especially to technical and economic progress than the creation of a
“numerus clausus” would be.
This view, taken logically, seems at first somewhat paradoxical, as in fact, if the
argument were right, the cartel movement would appear to strengthen free competition
rather than monopoly, and the legal obligation to take everybody in in compliance with
the rules would lead to overproduction rather than to restriction, and finally result in
a free market. Yet in fact the development in some branches, for instance coal and
potash, would, as we have described, have been in that direction, as indeed cartelisation
may mean an incentive to would-be producers to start business by taking advantage
of the price policy created by the quasimonopoly as an outsider or by joining the cartel
and placing themselves under its protection. In the one as in the other case the
development of cartels may indeed lead eventually to renewed overproduction and
to a sudden breakdown of quasimonopolist associations. Where such development
has been considered undesirable the State has tried to prevent that ultima ratio of
competition by having recourse to compulsory cartelisation, and at the same time
forbidding new competition. Compulsory cartelisation may be enacted in two ways:
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of cartel organisation, while it is left to the parties in question to work out a scheme
leading to this end. In this case the Government generally makes it clear that in the
case of a failure to form an effective cartel or syndicate the formation of a compulsory
cartel would be ordered by the Government.
2. A compulsory cartel may be constituted by legislation. In this case no freedom
is left to the firms in question to put forward particular schemes, but an existing
association will generally be used as the basis of the compulsory cartelisation. It is
also possible that the Government may issue an order acknowledging an existing cartel
as being the exclusive organisation of the trade, and ordering any outsiders to join it.
The first important step towards compulsory cartelisation was taken, as already
mentioned, in the potash industry, by a decree dated 25 May 1910, which, as Passow
remarks, cannot strictly be regarded as compulsory cartelisation, since only quotas
and prices were fixed by the State, but de facto this regulation amounted to compulsion,
as the very elements which had endangered the continuance of the quasi-monopoly,
quotas and prices, were now regulated by the Government, which thereby eliminated
any further possibility of uncontrolled competition.
After the War the most prominent sphere of compulsory organisation was again coal
and potash. The very important acts, which led to compulsory cartelisation in both
industries, were not merely caused by trade disorganisation and overcompetition, but,
in contrast to former attempts to compel the mining interests to combine, to some extent
by non-economic reasons. Compulsory cartelisation was in fact meant to be a measure
of a socialistic nature, not leading exactly to the “socialisation” of mines, which had
been the slogan of socialist parties, but to a sort of administration in the “common
interest,” that is on a meinwirtschaftliche” basis. This was the idea of the Socialisation
Law of 23 March 1919, and of the law regulating coal economy, which was its offspring
and was published at the same date but revised and brought to a final shape on 24
August 1919. In this case as in that of potash and other attempts to set up compulsory
cartelisation it became pretty clear that organisations of that kind were in need of some
control and supervision by the State. Inasmuch as coercive measures are used against
all members of a particular branch of industry, and also against wouldbe competitors,
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of such monopolies, as in fact the beneficial pressure of competitors and outsiders of
the cartel, acting as a deterrent of the misuse of its powers, has been eliminated by
the State. State control therefore becomes a necessary and most important complement
to compulsory cartelisation. This has been amply recognised in German legislation,
and it is well to remember that the organs of control and supervision which we are
going to describe are by no means to be considered as a sort of return to paternal
bureaucracy, but as a necessary adjustment to compulsory monopoly organisation.
The organisation of the German coal mining industry, according to the compulsory
action taken since 1919, has been mainly built up upon the following facts:
1. The proprietors of coal mines in eleven especially named districts had to group
themselves into syndicates (cartels). If the association needed for that purpose had
not been formed by a certain date the Minister of Economic Affairs was entitled to
form such associations by decree. Following these regulations ten coal cartels have
been formed, though not all by the prescribed date: the Rhenish-Westphalian Coal
Syndicate (now Ruhrkohle A.G.), the Aachener Steinkohlensyndikat, the Niedersächs-
ische Kohiensyndikat, the Oberschlesische Steinkohlensyndikat, the Niederschlesische
Steinkohiensyndikat, the Sächsische Steinkohlensyndikat, the Mitteldeutsche
Braunkohlensyndikat, the Ostelbische Braunkohlensyndikat (which we have just
mentioned with regard to a suit before the Kartell Court), the Rheinische
Braunkohlensyndikat and the Kohiensyndikat für das rechtsrheinische Bayern. (As
to the Saar territory no compulsory organisation has yet been enacted, as the
administration of that district was not exercised by the Government of the Reich.)
Besides these a compulsory cartel has been formed in the gas-coking industry, the
owners of gas works producing coke being called upon to form a syndicate. The
movement towards co-ordination through compulsory cartelisation has not yet reached
its final stage. As there is no “Reichs” -Kohlensyndikat the overlapping of different
districts  — in so far as they were competing on the same markets — has not been
stopped by compulsory group-cartelisation, although, as stated before, it must always
be borne in mind that the RhenishWestphalian interests (Ruhrkohle A.G.) have a
dominant position in German coal mining organisation. A further strengthening of
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has been effected by the federation of the mines of the Aachener Revier (Aachener
Steinkohlensyndikat) to the RuhrkohleA.G. in Spring 1934. This co-ordination, which
was doubtless supported though not enforced by the Government, has done away with
wasteful competition and price cutting of both districts in several markets, especially
in South-German markets, and was considered as a primary step towards general
centralisation of coal mining cartels.
2.  The coal syndicates as well as those of gas coke and those German States, which
by owning coal mines belong to coal cartels, are obliged to federate themselves into
a “Reichskohlenverband,” a supreme and centralised association of the coal trade of
the Reich. In the governing body of this central association representatives of miners
and of coal consumers must have a seat. The association supervises the organisation,
sale and own consumption of coal as decided upon by the syndicates, it has also to
give its consent to the general conditions of delivery and fixes and publishes the prices
of fuel having regard to the proposal made by the syndicates and to the interests of
the consumers.
3. As a supreme body of the whole German coal trade a corporation with the name
of “Reichskohlenrat” has been created, a National Coal Council, consisting of not less
than sixty members, including representatives of the States, of producers and workers,
of gas works, of coal merchants, of consumers and of technical experts. This council
is expected to guide the coal mining business according to principles of general
economic welfare under the supreme supervision of the Reich. This also includes the
regulation of coal exports. The Coal Council has to give its consent to the company
agreements of the Reichskohlenverband and the syndicates. It is entitled to draw up
the general lines on which fuel economy is to be conducted, especially with regard
to the elimination of redundant plant and also to the protection of consumers. It has
to form committees of experts to deal with all questions concerning coal and fuel
economy, and also a committee of experts on questions of social policy.
4. The supreme control over coal mining, however, is vested in the Minister of
Economic Affairs of the Reich. He is entitled to participate in all meetings and
committees of the abovementioned National Associations, the individual syndicates,
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of organisation, and on the decisions of the before-mentioned bodies is paramount,
when the necessity arises for him to interfere.
While in general the practical working of the coal trade organisation, as represented
by the above-mentioned bodies, has not met with any relevant public criticism — even
the Enqueteausschuss refrained from scrutinising the practical results achieved as
regards the different problems in question — criticism has not been lacking on the
part of academic writers on the subject. Prof. Passow for instance belongs to those
who declare their dissatisfaction with the existing organisation. He points out, that
in spite of all the newly created bodies, the preponderance of control is still in the hands
of the cartels, which in general refrain from any genuine policy of “common interest,”
while the admission of workmen’s representatives has not been able to change the
character of the cartel. While recognising the importance of the fact that prices are
no longer fixed arbitrarily by quasi-monopolist organisations Passow is in doubt
whether this result could not have been achieved by merely giving the necessary powers
to the Minister of Economic Affairs instead of building up a rather “complicated
organisation.” To this might be answered that it may be regarded as very doubtful
whether it would have been and would still be possible to direct the very complex
problems and exigencies of branches of industry so widespread and differentiated as
those of coal mining and coal distribution for a Ministry not solely connected with
them, while in fact it has been by no means and not even primarily questions of price
policy alone which made compulsory cartelisation necessary. It would be rather risky
to guide all kinds of quasi-monopolist organisations created under compulsory action,
and therefore in need of some sort of State supervision, from a Ministry which in the
main would be occupied in framing and supervising general conditions of cartel
organisation and its policy. There is certainly some need for decentralisation. And the
bodies now connected with it can hardly be criticised for not having used their powers
for extreme acts of interference, but having rather shown some reluctance with regard
to drastic interferences, although such an attitude may have made them seem lacking
in the activity expected in some quarters.
14
The organisation of compulsory cartelisation in the potash industry is very similar
to that in coal mining. However, the structure of the organisation is somewhat simpler.Hermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 151
There was one single compulsory cartel prescribed by the law regulating the Potash
Trade of 24 April 1919 and the executive order of 19 July 1919. There is no central
association as in coal mining. But a supreme official body, the Potash Council, with
various “Kalistellen “ — local branches — corresponds to the national organisation
in the coal trade. Besides these two prominent examples of compulsory cartelisations
there have been some other attempts of short duration. One of these was a compulsory
organisation in the sugar manufacture which was enacted in 1922–23 after the lapse
of the cartel which had been organised a year before. The cartel lasted only one year.
In the match trade, which as we have stated was organised in a monopolistic way
through transactions with the Swedish match concern, a compulsory cartel was
constituted under the name of Deutsche Zündwarenmonopolgesellschaft, in 1930. This
for some time seemed to be the last attempt to cartelise on a compulsory plan. General
experience as well as the tendencies of economic policy did not seem to have been
in favour of wholesale compulsory cartelisation. The Report of the Enqueteausschuss
on Cartel Policy issued in 1930 did not express a very definite judgment on the subject
but seemed rather to refrain from anything which would look like recommending
further extension of compulsory organisation. “The majority of witnesses,” so it stated,
“were inclined to the view that compulsory cartels, in spite of being under the special
supervision of the State, have neither prevented the disadvantages of cartelistic
association nor brought about all the advantages expected from voluntary cartelisation.”
As Passow points out, even the social sections of the law constituting National Councils
for Coal and Potash have not met with general satisfaction as the workmen’s
representatives have hardly any chance to influence decisions on really essential topics.
In spite of these facts the tendency favouring the extension of compulsory cartelisation
has of late increased. There can be no doubt that from the manufacturer’s point of view
cartel legislation as represented by the Cartel Decree of 1923 and the policy of the
Kartell Court meant rather a loosening of cartel organisation — generally spoken of
as “Auflockerung.” The legal handling of rebates, of boycotting and exclusive
agreements all tended that way, by bestowing on the members of the cartel a hitherto
unknown liberty to withdraw from their obligations or to contest their validity. The
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Industrie, have in general criticised this tendency and among other arguments they
have contended that such anti-cartelistic measures were rather strengthening the
economic powers of the great concerns, driving them to replace the weakened position
of the cartel by increasing concentration. As stated before, we do not quite agree with
the view that German cartel legislation of the past has had a decisive influence on
trustification, as we consider the tendency towards increasing units as due primarily
to economic considerations, but doubtless the argument put forward against the
weakening effects of legislation on the enforceability of cartels was very impressive
in a time when economic policy became desirous of strengthening the tendency of
associative organisation rather than of allowing greater individual freedom. One of
the leading figures in German industry and a member of the Committee on Cartels
constituted in June 1933 by the Reichsstand der Deutschen Industrie, Generaldirektor
Erwin Junghans, explained in a much discussed article in the Arbeitgeber, the organ
of the industrial Employers’ Associations (1 November 1933) the reasons which had
led industrialists to urge the Government to enact a law entrusting the Government
with a general power to enforce compulsory legislation.
The old law [says Herr Junghans], which was expected to bring about
a loosening of market organisation, had the effect in general of
strengthening concentration, especially capitalistic concentration. Thus
the strong was made even stronger and the weak became weaker. The
finishing trade especially suffered under these conditions as in fact
every outsider was able to prevent coordination in this section of
industry [cp. our former statement about finishing industries being more
split up than the foregoing stages of production], and among the
finishing industries this applied most to the exporting branches, since
nations had begun to bombard each other by the exchange instead of
by cannon.
It is interesting to note that the cry for compulsory measures now came from the big
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been displaced by their interest in amalgamation. Yet it was emphasised by
Generaldirektor Junghans in his article on “Cartel Policy” (Kartellpolitik), that
compulsory powers were not meant in any way to be applied everywhere. On the
contrary: .... . while we had found it necessary that the Committee should demand
compulsory legislation, we were quite aware, that in the case of its being approved
by the State, we had to give warning before applying the law, as it is hardly in the
interest of manufacturers to be driven to agreements by compulsion.”
When in fact the new law was enacted on 15 July 1933 (Gesetz über die Errichtung
von Zwangskartellen, Reichsgesetzblatt Nr. 81, 17 July 1933) it gave merely facultative
powers to the Minister of Economic Affairs, enabling him to “federate enterprises into
syndicates, cartels, conventions or similar agreements or affiliate them to already
existing organisations of this kind in order to regulate market conditions, if such
combination seems desirable with regard to the exigencies of the enterprises in
question” (§1). The Minister of Economic Affairs is also entitled to prevent the increase
of new competitors (§5). If the special conditions of a certain group of industry make
it desirable with regard to the demands of the common interest and economic welfare,
the Minister may order that during a certain period the formation of new enterprises
or an increase in the efficiency or the commercial expansion of existing firms shall
for a certain time not take place. In such cases he may also limit the actual amount
of production of undertakings.
The new law is the first of its kind empowering the Government to enact compulsory
organisation, wherever it seems expedient, while before such enactments had to be
framed for individual industries by special law. In the first year of its existence the
new law has not been used to any great extent. It seems, indeed, to be the economic
policy to regard the law as giving the power to act where voluntary efforts fail. In
Spring 1934 the Minister of Economic Affairs ordered all cigarettemaking firms to
form a cartel. A cigarette cartel was frequently mooted in this industry and it had been
declared to be desir able by many parties concerned, but owing to the great diversity
of interests in this industry and the many existing firms of small and medium size,
all attempts at cartelisation had hitherto failed. Under the new order 120 firms were
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working without machinery (Handarbeitsbetriebe) as well as the very big firms of
Muratti and Garbaty and the works belonging to the Reemtsa and Neuerburg concerns.
When in the summer of 1934 the German trade balance showed a further tendency
to passivity and the exchange situation became more difficult, restrictions with regard
to the import and distribution of certain raw materials were enacted, which were
accompanied by a wider application of the Government’s power to order compulsory
cartelisation. The explicit aim of this step was to prevent new competition and any
reckless increase of production, which would have led to an undesirable increase in
the demand for raw materials. Compulsory cartelisation has been in force since 20
July for all manufacturers of pneumatic motor-car tyres; then followed compulsory
cartelisation for margarine, for the manufacture of chalk products, for precious stones
and for the chocolate manufacture. Also a further step towards the complete
centralisation of the coal trade was reached by a general agreement between the Central
Association of Coal Dealers, compulsorily comprising all wholesale and retail traders,
and the Reichs Coal Association comprising all German coal and lignite syndicates.
This agreement regulating all questions of prices, rebates and general terms is to be
applied by the dealers’ associations also to the few coal mines which are outside the
syndicates, in this way bringing about indirectly some coercive unification. It will of
course depend upon the general trend of German economic conditions whether the
new movement of compulsory cartelisation will be of a lasting character. The tendency
to back cartels in their endeavour to use coercion in the way of blacklisting, boycotting,
etc., lately became more pronounced, when in September 1934 an amendment of the
cartel law § 9,1 was ordered, empowering the cartel to enact such measures before
the consent of the Kartell Court had been obtained. As a measure of safety the cartel
must make a deposit in case the Court should at a later date not agree to such action
and members be entitled to damages. This very important step was interpreted by the
commentators as being the logical result of applying the principles of “leadership”
to cartel policy, as it should be impossible for a few opposing members or firms of
the trade to combat by their opposition or by lengthy proceedings before a court
measures which, from the point of view of unification, might be considered necessary
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In looking over the legal enactments surrounding German industrial combination
one is led to the conclusion that there has been nothing in the way of “constructive
cartel legislation.” Indeed Government has been more eager to enact preventive
measures than to construct a definite plan by which industrial combination and its
policy should be officially guided. There has been a great deal of reluctance as regards
any decisive interference with cartels or syndicates and the sphere of amalgamations
or trusts has been almost entirely neglected. Legislation, even when leading to
compulsory monopolist organisation, has been in the main directed against any possible
abuse of monopolist power, but it is hard to discover, among the many decrees and
orders or from the action of supervising councils, any clearcut opinion as to whether
cartels are “good” or “evil.” This the economist can only approve, for judgments of
this kind would be as unscientific here as everywhere, but it explains why the whole
development of legal enactments as regards German industrial combination has been
more or less subjected to the changing attitude of political parties and Government
leaders. The political attitude of socialists and trade-union leaders with regard to
industrial combination had always been based on the demand for central administration
and the taking over of cartel control by an ad hoc administrative body instead of leaving
it to the judgment of the Kartell Court. In fact this demand was reflected in an
emergency order of the Brüning Government of July 1930, when price problems
became very urgent in connection with the beginning of the deflation crisis. The
decisions as to the validity of cartel agreements and the right to withdraw without
notice, in the case of agreements being detrimental to the public interest, were to be
vested solely in the Ministry of Economic Affairs and were made independent of the
decisions of the Kartell Court. But the favourite plan of the social-democratic party,
of creating a special Ministry or Department which would be solely engaged to deal
with problems of industrial combination and replace the alleged inertia of the Ministry
of Economic Affairs in the matter by the work of specially trained cartel commissioners
as well as representatives of the central associations of employers, workmen and
friendly societies, a plan laid down in an “Entwurf eines Kartellund Monopolgesetzes”
of December 1930 (cp. Reichstagsdrucksache, Nr. 439, 5 Wahiperiode), was not
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While in times of unstable price tendencies and rising apprehensions on the part of
consumers the attitude of the Government has rather been in favour of diminishing
the power of cartels (1923 and 1929–30) and allowing greater freedom to withdraw
from tying agreements, the reverse seems to be the case, whenever industrial
combination is to be considered from the viewpoint of industrial co-ordination and
co-operation. Then the very object of legislation, as we have seen in the matter of
compulsory cartelisation, becomes a further strengthening of monopolist organisation,
cartels or syndicates being then viewed rather as the means of preventing further trade
disorganisation and undesirable overcompetition. Thus indeed cartel legislation and
control seems to be of a highly alternative character. “There is a wide gap between
the fighting of those monopolist actions of cartels, which must be considered misuses
of their power, and simultaneously a policy of toleration and even support of monopoly
organisation by the State,” writes Arnold Wolfers, and he infers from this statement
that, if it can be shown that controlled monopoly is not much less obnoxious than
uncontrolled, a policy of preventing monopolies ought to replace a policy of control.
But while this view will hardly find much appreciation under present conditions of
economic policy, everyone will agree that up to now no definite policy as regards
industrial combination has been followed. The Enqueteausschuss has also hinted at
the difficulties of relying on a constructive cartel policy while recognising on the other
hand the principles of private enterprise. If one is of the opinion that the State should
be entitled to bolster up certain groups of industry by cartelisation in the interest of
their own progress while in other instances cartels should be discouraged — an opinion
put forward before the Committee — one would arrive at a sort of “concessioning of
cartels” (Konzessionierung von Kartellbildungen). The Committee, being itself unable
to form a definite opinion upon the finally desirable form and limitation of State control
and cartel legislation, has recourse to a remedy frequently adopted in such doubtful
cases, in recommending some sort of “co-operation” between the Government and
private interests with regard to certain actions of industrial monopoly organisation,
which might be mitigated or limited by the friendly advice of public and administrative
bodies invested with authoritative influence. One may, however, argue that to reach
such a vague recommendation a commission with so elaborate a programme, sittingHermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 157
for several years and going carefully into the details of almost all important combines,
would hardly have seemed necessary, as in fact its proposals do not in any way bridge






As we said before, the forms of monopoly organisation may distinctly influence the
power of monopoly itself. Where associative forms of monopoly organisation are
discouraged by the law or even made illegal the amalgamative form of monopoly
organisation may even become decidedly stronger than any cartel or syndicate would
have been. It can hardly be inferred from all that we have been able to say about the
legal aspect of the question in Germany that there has been anything like a campaign
against monopolist associations. If in the last period of development — since 1923
— there have been measures for greater supervision of cartels and a somewhat reluctant
tendency to make the withdrawal from tying agreements easier, this has been partly
offset by the growing tendency to compulsory cartelisation and by placing cartels under
the protection of the State. For it can be hardly doubted that control — as in coal or
potash — has meant in many ways protection to the parties seeking monopolist
organisation. If the growing tendency to amalgamation, which we have been describing
at length, is adduced as the result of legal measures affecting cartelisation, this remains
a merely post hoc propter hoc contention, so long as it merely relies on “logical”
grounds, not taking into consideration that there have been a number of other and much
stronger facts supporting trustification within the cartel movement, as, for instance,
rationalisation, economic reasons leading to greater concentration of units or
undertakings, financial considerations, etc. One might go even a step further and
contend that the cartel and syndicate have been in many cases merely the forerunners
of trustification.
Political science has in general, and much to the confusion of the problem, regarded
both forms of industrial combination as representing more or less antagonistic features.
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essentially determined by the state of the law. But in the sphere of free economic
organisation it can hardly be argued that trusts are superior to or more efficient than
cartels or vice versa, or that the one form of organisation seems to be more advisable
in the interests of manufacturers than the other. In many cases a trust, faced by
numerous outsiders and the growing possibility of new competition, might be regarded
as much weaker from the monopolist point of view than a cartel consisting of a few
dominating partners. On the other hand, in just as many cases a sort of trustification
may appear to be the desirable end where a cartel is composed of a great many partners
with divergent interests.
The German development of cartels and syndicates may be taken as an example of
the working of the associative form of quasi-monopoly under conditions of law not
hampering their progress. The freedom to combine and the protection afforded by law
to combination has no doubt not only facilitated the development of the cartel form
of quasi-monopoly but even led to the formation of cartels where a trustification would
not have had any chance at that stage of industrial concentration. This is shown by
the fact that, as we were able to point out, a good many cartels and syndicates were
not able to hold their own, their formation being based more on the desire and
expectations of the manufacturers than on the material conditions of quasi-monopoly.
In such a case the State had to step in with measures of compulsion or a movement
leading by and by to greater concentration among manufacturers had to be started to
save quasimonopoly organisation. In such cases it can be hardly argued that
trustification had to replace cartelisation. On the contrary, viewing the matter from
the general standpoint of monopolist organisation, one would have to say that the
attempt to form industrial combination in spite of unfavourable monopoly conditions
could only be made when the cartel form of organisation was used. The cartel, so to
speak, anticipated the quasi-monopolist tendency not yet ripe for a final organisational
solution; it was merely preparing the road towards a more comprehensive form of
quasi-monopoly organisation. In other cases trouble of this kind might not arise with
regard to the cartel form of organisation. There are cases enough of smooth working
of this form of industrial combination, especially in branches of industry where units
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in number. We have been able to cite examples for such cases too. But even in these,
manufacturers or big concerns did not renounce the use of cartels or syndicates or
common sales agencies as instruments of common policy. In fact, only in the case of
an omnipotent trust dominating the whole of production and its distribution would
cartels or syndicates shrink to uselessness.
The organisational structure of cartels or syndicates, being associations formed with
the object of eliminating competition by controlling and allocating the production of
their members and regulating prices and distribution, does not present problems of
special importance to the economist. It is far more from the legal point of view that
the study of cartel statutes and forms, as being largely dependent on the attitude of
law and public administration, may prove necessary. Thus a specific type of cartel form
which has evolved of late has aroused a good deal of discussion among theorists. This
is the so-called “Doppelgesellschaft,” “twin” -company. The undertakings interested
in cartelisation federate themselves into a “company” or association designated by
the civil code (§§ 705–40 of the B.G.B.). The statute contains special arrangements
as regards the cartelistic obligations of the partners, including also those of quotas of
production. In order to carry out the measures envisaged by the cartel another company
is established simultaneously in the form of a limited company orjoint-stock company,
“Aktiengesellschaft.” The latter is entitled to own the property of the cartel, to be its
legal representative and also to be used as sales organisation. But, as we said before,
these and other forms of cartelistic company structure have had hardly any decisive
influence on the essential economic problems of cartelisation.
It is different in the case of trustification. The different types evolved with regard
to amalgamations and fusions have in many ways been responsible for the actual
formation of trust-like organisations, as there have been cases enough, where the
material conditions of amalgamation were in existence while it was difficult to find
the appropriate organisation for making use of them. On the other hand certain forms
of amalgamation have been tempting enough to foster a sort of trustification which
may not have been justified by the existing conditions of competition. Then a sort of
“Überorganisation,” an exaggerated kind of trust-like organisation, may have been
the result leading in the long run to a tendency towards the decentralising of what hadHermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 161
been carefully brought together. This was to some extent the case with the development
of the Vereinigte Stahlwerke, as will be shown on a later page.
Trusts or trust-like organisations, in contrast to cartelisation, may be defined as an
amalgamation or combination of undertakings (not of manufacturers) with the object
of eliminating competition between these undertakings and gaining control over
conditions of production and distribution in the respective groups of industry. This
amalgamation in its simplest form may be effected by fusing the companies in question.
But another and somewhat more complicated form of union, originally drawn up by
an American (S. C. T. Dodd) and greatly practised in the U.S.A., is that of the Holding
Company established for the purpose of controlling the undertakings forming the trust
or quasi-trust in question, without having recourse to the actual merging of these
undertakings into one new corporation. This Trust Company form of industrial
combination, represented by the Holding Company, has been developed with great
zeal within German industrial combination. The tendency to form big mergers on the
Holding Company plan has been greatly fostered by reasons of fiscal expediency, as
it is more economical to form a limited company with a small capital, taking over the
majority if not the whole of the shares of the companies to be amalgamated, for thus
the costly act of creating a new corporation is easily avoided. A typical example of
such organisation can be found in the German and international linoleum industry,
which we have already described. By such forms of trustification a peculiar condition
of organisation arises, which has been rightly called “Verschachtelung,” an interlocking
of companies. There is no doubt that such interlocking may give to the companies
concerned the somewhat dangerous opportunity of hiding their real relations. The
defects of these rather complicated forms of organisation with regard to the desired
publicity have been experienced in several of the famous “crashes” following the
prosperity period of 1924–9 not only in connection with trustlike companies alone
but also with big joint-stock companies which became entangled in commercial failures
like the “Nordwolle” of Bremen and others. Even outsiders could remark the difficulties
facing the judges in such cases of becoming thoroughly acquainted and conversant
with the financial structure of interlocked companies or directorates, with the tactics
of exchanging shares between companies or the interlocked domination of works. AHermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 162
rather complicated structural development has also been experienced by the second
greatest German “trust,” the Vereinigte Stahlwerke. Here, for many reasons, a simple
fusion of the big works seeking amalgamation seemed impossible. Some of the firms
interested in the amalgamation were not willing to throw all their property into the
merger. Moreover, the new corporation was planned to be established without taking
over the existing debts of the old companies. The regulation of these debts was to be
left to the old companies themselves. This could only be arranged by the formation
of a new company, which was to take over the works of those companies and pay for
them in preferred and common shares (Genuss-Scheine). The formation of the new
company, representing a capital of 800 millions, was facilitated by the
Steuermilderungsgesetz, reducing the tax placed upon the formation of new companies
in the case of certain kinds of amalgamation. The shares of the Stahlverein were at
first taken over almost entirely by the promoting companies, a smaller part was left
to the open market. In this way the promoting companies were still taking the position
of holding companies and there was a great deal of interlocking. In the latter part of
1933 a financial reorganisation of the Stahlverein took place. It had been decided to
give back to some of the federated companies their administrative independence, to
decentralise in some respects the whole concern and to do away as far as possible with
the Holding Company structure. As Dr Vögler, the chairman of the board of directors
of the Stahlverein, expressly pointed out in his speech of 29 November 1933
the system of interlocking, which indeed had become a characteristic feature of the
company, had been sharply criticised by the public. Dr Vögler explained in his speech
why “eine Entschachtelung,” a dis-locking, had been decided upon and why this had
not been done at an earlier date. The “roof company,” Dachgesellschaft, which had
had decisive functions from the time of the formation of the Stahlverein, will in future
have only to administer questions of common interest to all of the merged companies.
To these belong, besides all financial questions to be handled by the central authority,
research work of all kinds, tabulation of costs, statistics and scientific comparisons
of the working of the different works. Amongst “practical” matters the supply of iron
ore will have to be dealt with from a central administrative place, although special
wishes of the leaders of the single ore-using companies will be taken into considerationHermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 163
by the roof company. “ But,” Dr Vögler explained, “apart from these questions of
common interest to all companies of the Stahlverein concerned, which will remain
within the domain of the Holding Company, our Works-Companies
(Betriebsgesellschaften) will lead an absolutely independent life of their own.” In the
spring of 1934 the reorganisation, greeted by the press as the “end of concern-holding,”
was practically carried through, all concerned companies transferring their total
properties and assets by fusion to the Vereinigte Stahlwerke A.G., a transaction effected
in accordance with §306 of the B.G.B. (Civil Code) and practically carried through
by the exchange and permutation of shares. The interlocking of share capital between
the three big concerns, Alt-Gelsenkirchen, Phoenix and van der Zypen, which for their
part had promoted the Stahlverein and commonly controlled the majority of its shares,
was replaced by a complete merger, while some other important companies which
had been under the control of holding companies as well were also to be amalgamated
by fusion.
A new type of industrial combination, which has been much discussed as being a
strengthening factor in the quasi-monopoly development, is represented by the
“concern” (Konzern). Liefmann defines this sort of combination as follows: “A concern
is represented by a federation (Zusammenfassung) of firms, which retain their legal
independence, but work in common in matters of production, administration, commerce
and especially finance. Not all of these four purposes need apply in every case of the
formation of a concern.” The English Report on Factors of Commercial and Industrial
Efficiency, 1927, declares on p. 94: “The term Konzerne includes groups bound together
in various ways, e.g., by an Interessengemeinschaft (constituted when two or more
companies agree to pool their profits and distribute them in certain proportions), by
exchange of shares between companies, by interlocking directorates, or by leasing of
works by one company to another.” All such definitions —  which are also shared by
v. Beckerath and others — seem to be bound up with too many outside characteristics.
On the other hand Oskar Klug, in his able study on the development of Cartels, Trusts
and Concerns, states quite rightly that all definitions of concerns excel by a good deal
of vagueness. Unfortunately he himself has not been able to carry the matter much
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of Liefmann and others — while another writer on the subject of “Kartelle und
Konzerne,” Dr Hans Schaeffer, has not even ventured to give any definition at all.
There can be no doubt that a terminology of concerns offers some difficulty. The
reason seems to be clear enough. In fact, the word expresses a form of industrial
combination, which may be of a very differing character and therefore “vague” in itself.
But all definitions yet known seem to be based far too much on the legal side of this
form of association, emphasising that the single companies in question are to retain
a greater legal independence than is the custom when trust-like organisations are formed
by mergers, fusions or through holding companies. To lay stress on this point may
help the lawyer writing on the subject, but it hardly touches the centre of the economic
side of the question. The word “ Konzerne” has certainly been chosen to express that
in an industry or a group of industries certain undertakings have risen to a dominant
position not only (although this was in the first stage of the concern development an
undoubtedly important factor) by horizontal combination leading to enlarged units
of production, but also by invading all sorts of neighbouring fields of production and
commercial activity, though sometimes or at first rather distantly related to each other,
by mutual arrangements and financial measures, assuring eventually a greater strength
of the group of companies in question. This does not necessarily infer any monopolist
tendency and certainly concerns must not be taken for trust-like organisations, although
most trust-like companies will themselves be “concerns.” We may therefore, from
the economist’s point of view, give the following definition:
Concerns represent a form of industrial combination consisting of an
affiliation of undertakings, retaining their legal independence, but
economically of equal or similar character, or of undertakings which
are mutually interested in production and distribution with the object
of strengthening the influence of the so-formed “group” in a single
industry or in several industries, which may usefully work together.
A concern in the brewing industry for instance may be the result of a working
agreement of numerous breweries or of any agreements of that sort between a bigHermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 165
brewery and mailing factories; the dominant company may at the same time enter the
field of the catering business, by making contracts with inns not to sell any other beer
than its own or even acquire restaurants for that purpose, start expensive laboratories
and exhaustive schemes for acquiring, improving and utilising new inventions and
have its own banking facilities. The result of all this may be that the said company
or group of companies may be regarded as a dominant factor in the industry and indeed
become a “concern.” Such forms of combination will never be identical with “trusts,”
but they may certainly contain the germs of trustification. If there was some time ago
or even still is some talk of the “Farben- Konzern” the term is meant to express all
those technical, commercial and financial interests which are in some way or other
connected with the great chemical trust, in contrast to other groups or single firms in
the branch not representing the same degree of combined strength. But certainly the
formation of a concern under normal conditions will always result from certain
affinities existing between the firms to be “concerned.” When in the period of inflation
most heterogeneous undertakings were federated with each other, as for instance the
Stinnes group of undertakings comprising the manufacture of coal and steel, shipping
interests, hotels and newspapers, such a conglomeration, brought about merely by the
desire to escape the effects of a devaluation of money, certainly cannot be regarded
as a concern in the proper sense of the word.
A rather interesting example of a “concern” is represented by the so-called
“Hugenberg-Konzern.” It has been described in full by one of the intimate friends of
the able man whose name has been popularly connected with this singular undertaking
(cp. Prof. Ludwig Bernhard, Der Hugenberg-Konzern, Berlin, 1928). The interests
forming the nucleus and one may also say, considering the personal aims and abilities
of Hugenberg himself, the pivotal point of this huge concern are to be found in the
sphere of public and political propaganda. Hugenberg had recognised at an early date
the propagandist links existing between several branches of publicity, which had
hitherto not been in any comprehensive degree connected with each other. The fields
of his activity, directed to combine the mutual interests of these branches, have been:
the metropolitan press, the provincial press, commercial advertising and its propaganda,
international news service, films. These five fields of action connected with each otherHermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 166
in many ways are each of them controlled by one head company (Haupt-Gesellschaft).
In the case of the Berlin press this is the publishing firm of Scheri Ltd., owning such
well-known papers as Der Lokalansseiger, Die Woche, Der Tag, Sport im Bild, Die
Gartenlaube. The provincial Hugenberg press, which is of an outspokenly conservative
character, is controlled by the Vera-Verlagsanstalt in Berlin, advertising by the Ala
(Auslandsanzeigen), international news service by the Telegraphen-Union, which
controls besides its original telegraph service several publishing departments supplying
the provincial press with journalistic work of all sorts (Dammert-Verlag), and the
Internationaler Nachrichtendienst, while the film business is vested in the Ufa
(Universum Film Aktiengesellschaft, Berlin). The latter company is by far the leading
German film manufacturing company, possessing extensive studios in Neu-Babelsberg
and Tempelhof, the greatest leasing department existing in Germany (Ufa-Verleih)
— in fact film “producing” and “leasing” have to be developed into two quite distinct
branches of the pictures industry, a vast amount of Ufa-business being done by leasing
pictures made by other companies, German or foreign, or by leasing facilities, such
as studios, etc., to other makers — and has besides important financial arrangements
with American producers (Paramount), which however of late, owing to the depressed
state of business and for other reasons, have become somewhat shaken. The Ufa also
owns or controls the most important picture theatres all over Germany. Two facts have
been responsible for the linking up of the film business with Hugenberg’s undertakings:
firstly in 1927 the Ufa was endangered by a financial catastrophe; secondly Hugenberg
had already been interested through his propagandist activities in the film branch. He
had formed in 1920 a company called the “Deulig” (Deutsche Lichtbildgesellschaft),
which had been devoted at first to merely propagandist (Kultur) film work, but later
expanded its activities to the producing of pictures of the ordinary entertainment type.
Of course Hugenberg’s motives in entering into this transaction were largely influenced
by the fact that by possessing a stronghold in the German newspaperbusiness he
certainly enjoyed a propagandist advantage with regard to the popularising of films.
The central control is vested in an association (Verein), the form of which bears a
very unusual character. It is the so-called “Wirtschaftsvereinigung,” an association
based upon the principle of “common interest” (gemeinnützige Gesellschaft), that is,Hermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 167
an association not designed to yield any profit to its members, but to use any accruing
profits for the common welfare of the whole concern, either in enlarging its sphere
of economic activity or bestowing such profits on matters of social welfare, as indicated
in the statutes of the association. The association was formed in 1919, and reshaped
in 1921. The property of the association belongs to twelve members, but these are not
entitled to ask for a distribution or appropriation of it, just as they are not entitled to
draw any profit out of their investment, and even in the case of the liquidation of the
association the successor to its property is bound to use it in the same way, that is, for
purposes of common interest. Ludwig Bernhard reminds his readers of a certain
resemblance between the Hugenberg form of association and certain English plans
emanating from the concentration of the newspaper business, and which certainly found
their origin in the idea that this branch of business seems to be entitled to some, other
than a purely “commercial,” domination. The late Lord Northcliffe, owning the majority
of the shares in the Times, once put forward a plan to transfer his share property to
a “National Trust,” which would have to be represented by the Trustees of the British
Museum and other persons of high standing. There is, according to the writings of
F. Harcourt Kitchin, former assistant secretary to the Times (cp. Moberly Bell and his
Times, London, 1925, p. 277), no doubt that Lord Northcliffe was really in earnest
in making such a proposal. While the “ Wirtschaftsvereinigung” has taken the form
of a sort of benevolent society there can be no doubt that this huge undertaking has
been managed on strictly business lines. In fact, and in contradiction to the somewhat
prejudiced description by Bernhard, the Hugenberg form of industrial combination
seems to have more resemblance to a sort of industrial “entail” than to anything like
a genuine “ gemeinnutzige Gesellschaft,” or what would be called “Public Concern”
in England, if one keeps in mind, as the Report on Britain’s Industrial Future rightly
points out, that “the progression from purely individualistic enterprises to the Public
Concern is one of endless gradations and intermediate stages.” But it is necessary to
remember that whatever the form of a company or association may be, which claims
to be “gemeinntitzig,” that is, working for the “common interest,” the running of such
a company for any sort of “private profit” should be excluded. Even a so-called “semi-
public concern” would not come up to this condition, although it may be consideredHermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 168
as one of those “gradations and intermediate stages.” It is also doubtful whether the
Hugenberg concern can be called a trust. If Bemhard affirms this, he is like many others
confining himself to some characteristics of the legal domination of the Hugenberg
Association (Wirtschaftsvereinigung), which controls from 75 to 93 % of the federated
undertakings, but if we except the Ufa, certainly has no quasimonopolist position in
either the newspaper, the news-service or advertisement branch. But what it must
certainly be called is a “concern.” If the Hugenberg undertaking had been able or even
eager to swallow up the two other leading firms in the German publishing business,
the Rudolf Mosse Company and the Ullstein business with its widespread connections,
a real trust, in the economic sense, might have arisen. But owing to a great number
of circumstances, in the economic, political and financial sphere, this was not attempted
by Hugenberg.
Concerns have acquired an important place within the many forms of industrial
combination by evolving a “roof” organisation or a framework, connecting the many
interlocking and partly diverging interests of a great number of joint-stock or limited
companies brought into commercial or technical contact with each other. These “roof”
companies are invested with wide administrative powers. Being in general exclusively
occupied with organisational and not with controlling tasks, a small capital only is
needed for their formation. Examples of this kind, quoted by Liefmann, are the
Rhein-Elbe-Schuckert-Union G.m.b.H. with a capital of only 517,000 R.M. One of
the greatest brewing and liquor concerns, the Schultheiss-Patzenhofer-Kahlbaum
Ostwerke group, also possesses a “roof” company and so does the Stumm Konzern.
These “Dachgesellschaften” may be distinguished from those types of companies,
evolving out of the concern movement, which in fact control the firms so linked up
by mutual arrangements or combined interests through the possession of their share
capital, or of the majority of it. In contrast to the above-mentioned “roof” companies
such companies will have to be called’‘ Kontroll-Gesellschaften.”
As may be already gathered from the foregoing remarks a network of companies
co-ordinated with each other and probably headed by Kontrollor Dachgesellschaften
usually surrounds a trust-like combination. There is no doubt that this state of
organisation, ending in a conglomeration of interlocked and coordinated companies,Hermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 169
has had its origin in the tendency to use the joint-stock form of company organisation
as a means of promoting huge combines and avoiding the formation of new corporative
bodies by fusion. Indeed, taking into consideration German legal and organisational
conditions the easiest and most convenient way of creating partnerships in big concerns
or would-be combines is to form subsidiary companies, which in German are called
“Tochter” (daughter) Gesellschaften, while the term “parent company” would be best
translated by “Stammgesellschaften.” We have already mentioned the fiscal
consideration inducing promoters and financiers to form such companies instead of
creating a new one by fusion. Besides, a subsidiary company managing certain interests
of a combine is advantageous from the point of view of financial policy, as the parent
company by its participation merely shares its gains or losses, but does not bear any
responsibility for its debts. Moreover, connections can be easily dissolved, if they are
merely vested in such partnerships, and this may be a very tempting factor in the
formation of subsidiary companies, in cases where the commercial success of such
undertakings, as in that of new branches of production to be affiliated to old established
undertakings, seems to be somewhat risky or uncertain. It is characteristic of the
popularity of this form of organisation that the Reich itself has chosen it for its
undertakings. The “Vereinigte Industrieunternehmungen A.G.,” in Berlin (V.I.A.G.),
is indeed the German Government’s Holding Company. This company with a share
capital of 180 million RM. is the holding concern, by which the Reich controls its
property in banking and industrial undertakings. These undertakings comprise the
Reichskreditgesellschaft in Berlin, now one of the five big German banks, various
important electrical undertakings, which make the Reich the second largest producer
of electricity in Germany, the Vereinigte Aluminium Werke, one of the leading
producers of aluminium in the world, and a number of other concerns in the lines of
shipbuilding, nitrogen production, gun metal and other manufactures. The V.I.A.G.
is a holding concern of the Reich. Its subsidiaries are run on strictly commercial lines.
Subsidiary companies may, according to Liefmann’s lengthy description, serve a
good many purposes. They may (1) merely serve purposes of production, (a) in the
supply of raw material, (b) in the finishing branches, (c) in producing goods for
distribution by commercial undertakings; (2) they may serve purposes of distribution,Hermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 170
being merely organisations for selling and in some cases (glue industry) for buying;
(3) they may be concerned with financial tasks, such as the taking over of shares of
the concern or trust either as mere partnerships or as a matter of control; (4) they may
be used as the very instruments of financial organisation serving as promoters to
concerns or trusts; (5) they may just as well be connected with the financing of the
buying of goods and the supply of raw material to be bought (Waren-Einkaufs-Finanzie-
rung); and (6) they may be used to finance sales, a function to be distinguished from
the “sale of goods” itself (cp. (2)); (7) in some cases subsidiary companies may be
formed for the purpose of insurance, either working in harmony with the existing huge
insurance companies or being designated to serve the “self-insurance” of the members
of the respective industrial concerns.
It is only natural that as a consequence of the diversity of tasks of subsidiary
companies, coupled together by partnerships, there is a great deal of interlocking. While
theoretically it seems easy to enumerate them according to their different fields of
activity, in practical economic development a network of subsidiary companies
connected with each other through partnerships of a different kind must in the long
run prove a disturbing factor in the organisation of industrial combination. It will
certainly be one of the most urgent tasks of concerns and trusts in the near future to
get their organisational structure into a clear shape, especially with regard to the
co-ordination of subsidiary companies. In fact, Dr Vogler in presenting the new
Stahlverein to a wider public on 29 November 1933 was anxious to show that such
reconstruction had been attempted. He pointed out that the future structure of the
organisation of this trust would rest (1) on Works-companies (Betriebsgesellschaften)
comprising the big works from mining and steel making to the finishing stages, such
as structural steel, wire, bridge making, etc.; (2) Partnerships “in an organic way
connected” with the programmes of the works-companies and to be distinguished as
partnerships in mining, in the supply of raw material and in iron and steel making;
(3) Companies devoted to selling (a) coal, Kohlenhandelsgesellschaften, (b) iron,
Eisenhandelsgesellschaften; and lastly (4) other partnerships, as for instance companies
connected with housing and the wholesale supply of goods for workmen and different
industrial partnerships partly abroad, such as that of the Alpine Montan GesellschaftHermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 171
in Austria.
There can be no doubt that the wide acceptance of the system of partnership through
the medium of subsidiary companies has been largely due to the special role which
banking has played in German trust finance. In England amalgamations and fusions
have been mainly financed by the respective groups of firms themselves and in the
U.S.A. a special type of promoters has arisen in connection with the special demands
of trustification. The Macmillan Report of 1931, comparing continental and especially
German conditions with English, is quite justified in stating:
In Europe, particularly in Germany, there has been a different
relationship between banks and industries, and bankers have been
forced to associate themselves more closely with industrial develop-
ment. This is not because industrialists there were more ready than in
England to share the control of their businesses with bankers and
financiers or that bankers would not, conditions being otherwise, have
willingly adopted the attitude of their English confreres. It arose rather
out of necessities of the situation — from the scarcity of capital and
of independent investors. Industry started later in these countries than
with us. In order to compete with us, it required more help than it could
obtain from its own private resources or from the public, whose power
of investment was small, and the banks were driven to assist industry
to obtain permanent as well as short-dated capital. Accepting these
heavy responsibilities, they were obliged to keep in more intimate touch
with and maintain a more continuous watch over the industries with
which they had allied themselves than were English banks.
To this one may be inclined to reply that it is rather doubtful, whether the “youth”
of German industry was responsible for her requiring more capital, but in accordance
with the facts explained in former chapters it seems much more plausible that the
conditions favouring large-scale production and an early concentration of undertakings
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needs of company finance in Germany, while at the same time, in contrast to English
conditions, the formation of quasi-monopolies was in no way hampered by legal
requirements. It must also be taken into consideration that in England the “family”
business has survived much longer than in Germany and in many cases a distinct
antipathy to the “joint-stock” undertaking and its nonpersonal features has survived
in old-fashioned English business circles, a fact very aptly expressed in Prof. Clapham’s
famous book on the English “Woollen and Worsted Industries” by the statement that’‘
in all branches of the trade the promoters of a combination have to deal with special
obstacles, not the least of which is the strong local feeling and pronounced
individualism of the manufacturer.” While we have already expressed our view
regarding the danger of overrating sociological or psychological motives as being
responsible for the existence or non-existence of quasi-monopolies, there can be no
doubt that the reluctance of English manufacturers to give up their personal and
traditional family connections with the works in favour of a “non-personal”
“joint-stock” organisation, has prevented to some extent the co-operation of banking
capital with the financial needs of industry. On the other hand there is no proof of the
contention that the assistance of German banks to the financing of big works was due
to their desire to support these works in their competition with English industry; of
course it goes without saying that the financial aid of banks was bound to fortify the
competitive position of big industries inside and outside Germany, but it was never
given with the special purpose of combating certain foreign competitors. The
co-operation of banking with industrial combination in Germany has been in the main
the necessary outcome of the early movement towards big units in German industries,
due to the special conditions of production and distribution, which had been leading
to an earlier concentration than in England, and to the special facilities offered by the
German company law. Moreover, it has certainly been assisted by the rise of a good
many “new” industries, which from their beginning were in need of big capital
(although the history of electrical industries, federated with individual manufacturers
such as the Rathenau and Siemens families, may be quoted as an exception). On the
whole it can be said that financial assistance by the banks has greatly accelerated the
formation of combines in German industry, while on the other hand the conditionsHermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 173
favouring the formation of big combines have attracted and necessitated the assistance
of banking finance.
The “modus,” by which, in general, banks are carrying out their financial assistance
to big concerns has been described by Dr Jakob Goldschmidt, who has been regarded
for a long time as a champion of this policy. The bank first goes into an exhaustive
examination of the economic situation of the undertaking or of the undertakings to
be reorganised. If the bank, after examination, decides to found a new company or
to organise anything like an industrial combination it draws up a scheme of financing,
determines the amount and the type of capital to be issued, and then, in some cases,
itself takes a part of the shares into its security portfolio with the intention of issuing
them at a later date. In this way the founding bank becomes at the same time the issuing
bank, the latter function beginning, however, only with the introduction of the shares
to the stock exchange through the intermediary of the bank.
The facilitation of industrial credit-taking by the banks, and in general the assistance
given by the big banking concerns to the formation of industrial combines, have
certainly evoked the danger of overcapitalisation. One may say that the general
advantages of an easy-going credit machinery can turn to disaster when there is a danger
that the credit facilities are too lavishly offered or used. In general — and in sharp
contrast to the legal conditions in the early history of American trustification — German
stock-exchange regulation and company law prevented overcapitalisation to any great
extent, the publicity asked for by the “ Prospektzwang” (compulsory publication of
prospectuses), the “Zulassungsstelle” (stock-exchange regulations concerning the
admission and issue of shares), and the law relating to reserve funds having acted as
important safeguards against financial abuses of all kinds. Yet, the “boom” years
preceding the disastrous year of 1929 had brought about what may be called a sort
of “credit” inflation, largely backed by the inflow of American capital into German
industry; a great number of companies were formed, the production programmes of
which were hardly in harmony with the economic depression which increased after
1929; by the very system of participations and interlocking of holding concerns the
existing safeguards against hazardous and unsound financing, especially of companies
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“scandals” such as those mentioned above and throughout almost the whole of
industrial business the necessity sprang up of writing down the share capital to a larger
or smaller degree and of setting aside large sums for depreciation. There can be no
doubt that in the “good” years many competitors had been bought up at prices which
indeed meant “overcapitalisation” when prosperity rapidly turned into depression. But
it must remain doubtful whether this development, due to special circumstances
connected with overrating the “Konjunktur,” with special credit facilities and the
general policy of increasing exports by leaps and bounds in order to improve the
economic condition of the Reich, should be taken as a proof that industrial combination
necessarily leads to overcapitalisation.
A form of industrial combination not exactly bearing quasimonopolist features, but
at any rate belonging to those forms of industrial organisation which contain the germ
of a further concentration of units, is represented by the much discussed
“Interessengemeinschaft.” It may be translated by “community of interests,” although
the term “community” has a somewhat different meaning in English, embracing more
the general social character of the matter than the merely associative one as in German.
Perhaps the expression “union of interests” would come nearer to the original, but even
English official reports — such as that on Industrial and Commercial Efficiency of
1927, p. 72 — have preferred the verbal translation, while the Final Report of the
Committee on Industry and Trade of 1931, p. 178, used without special reference to
“Interessengemeinschaft” the expression “partial union and agreements,” which comes
very near the real significance of the German term. The first-mentioned Report calls
the I.G. an arrangement, by which “two or more companies agree for a period of years
(sometimes as many as fifty) to pool the whole of their profits and divide them up
between the companies in pre-arranged proportions.” This is somewhat too narrow
and the Report itself by affixing to the term the word “financial” (Financial Community
of Interests) and probably limiting its definition to this type of I.G. adds: “the companies
retain a separate existence, each with its own management, but they may work closely
together by means of joint committees.” In fact, the tasks of the I.G. will in most cases
be much wider than those of a merely financial agreement. “The I.G.,” so defines Prof.
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as regards the outward (‘nach aussen’) management of their businesses, while to a
certain extent the results are to be pooled.” Here again, too little attention is paid to
the fact that I.G. agreements may just as well embrace arrangements about the common
use of patents, the carrying out of rationalisation, the exchange of research work, etc.
Moreover, the I.G. does not represent a loose agreement, but it usually takes the form
of a company of the Civil Law (Gesellschaft des Bürgerlichen Rechts, §732). An I.G.
therefore may be defined as “a company for promoting certain mutual interests of
several independent undertakings and for concentrating and dividing profits according
to a special formula.” One of the earliest I.G.s, beginning in 1904, was that of the big
dye works which was indeed a merely “financial” community of interests, while the
combination of the several existing communities of interests in the chemical trade by
the newly formed I.G. in 1916, already widened its scope of common action. The
formation of the I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. in 1925, which was practically the German
dye trust, retaining even the term of Interessengemeinschaft in its name, shows how
much this type of industrial combination may be considered as the forerunner of
genuine trustification. The I.G. Farben still maintains agreements of the I.G. character
with the Dynamite A.G., formerly Alfred Nobel and Co. (the gunpowder and dynamite
industries were one of the earliest branches to adopt communities of interests, the
connections recently finding a parallel in those of Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd.
and Nobel Industries), the Deutsche Celluloid Fabrik in Eilenburg, the A. Riebeck’sche
Montanwerke in Halle and the Internationale Gesellschaft fur chemische Unternehm-
ungen in Basel, the Interessengemeinschaft guaranteeing to these companies a dividend
amounting to 50–100 % of the I.G. Farben dividend. Besides the chemical and
gunpowder industries, Interessengemeinschaften have been formed to a great extent
in the distilling and brewing group of industry, in the mining and iron and steel group,
the Siemens-Rhein-Elbe-Schuckert-Union Ltd. promoted by Hugo Stinnes in 1920
being a conspicuous example, in the beet-sugar industry and others.
Of late the Interessengemeinschaft seems to have lost some of its former popularity
as a form of industrial combination. When the Steuermilderungsgesetz of 31 March
1926 was carried through, cheapening the formation of amalgamations, the I.G. was
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by the big concerns using this form of agreement as a sort of “trust” surrogate. One
of the deficiencies of the Interessengemeinschaft is to be found in cases where its
purpose has been the carrying through of big schemes of rationalisation. These, when
once effected, cannot be undone, while the I.G. agreement can be dissolved without
notice according to the Civil Code, §723, whenever a stringent reason (triftiger Grund)
arises. This right to withdraw cannot be excluded by any agreement nor can it be limited
by any special clause. There is no doubt that this possibility greatly overshadows the
advantages of the Interessengemeinschaft. For some time, however, the existence of
this “deficiency” was hardly felt, as in practice there was little inclination on the part
of those who had formed an I.G. to withdraw, and it seemed doubtful what course the
courts would take with regard to the question of “stringent reason .” Latterly, however,
under the pressure of economic depression, things have somewhat changed. In the case
of the I.G. between the big brewing concern Schultheiss-Patzenhofer and the distillers
Kahlbaum, when the profits of the latter were declining, the brewers asked for a
considerable reduction of the Kahlbaum profit quota; otherwise they threatened a
withdrawal from the I.G. The same happened in the case of an I.G. between the
Humboldt-Deutzer-Gasmotoren I.G. When Humboldt was showing a profit, while
Deutz was showing a loss, the former company declined to keep up the pooling
arrangement. In both cases an agreement was reached after all, to the disadvantage
of the weaker partner. When a dissolution of the I.G. happens under such circumstances,
bringing the arrangement to a much earlier end than was originally anticipated, there
may be a considerable loss accruing to firms which under the shelter of the I.G.
agreement had consented to certain measures of rationalisation, as for instance the
closing of less economic plant. In order to prevent such consequences and to alleviate
the apprehensions of I.G. partners in that respect numerous expedients have been
sought, such as for instance the issue of deferred shares (Genussscheine), which may
be retained by the I.G. companies after dissolution, thus enabling them to continue
their participation in the profits of their former associates. In some cases the I.G.
agreement contains a clause entitling the one company, under certain conditions, to
take over the property of the others by paying down a certain sum, or by fusion. But
it remains doubtful whether such an arrangement would be in accordance with the legalHermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 177
conditions.
t remains interesting to note that while the I.G. movement has of late been in many
cases replaced by trustification, the formation of trusts has, as Flechtheim has pointed
out, come about in a somewhat different way than before. While we are generally
accustomed to assume that a trust or quasi-monopolist amalgamation is effected by
a dominant company or concern “buying out” others, in the case of the I.G. transformed
into a trust the new company is far more the outcome of a consent of a number of firms
to come into a closer associative connection. In fact, the Interessengemeinschaft
prepares the road for trustification, as it is necessarily represented by companies which
have already reached a certain “community of interests.” The state of concentration
of undertakings, which already combine their interests by partial agreements, must
certainly be distinguished from the former conditions of trustification presenting one
dominant firm with a great number of highly differentiated smaller competitors, to
be absorbed either by pressure or persuasion.
The forms of combination found in German industry are, as we have seen, of a great
variety. It is difficult to decide whether the “form” of combination has had a decisive
influence on the extent of quasi-monopoly itself. It must be recognised that, in spite
of growing tendencies to regulation, the quasi-monopolist movement in Germany has
not been obstructed to any considerable extent by legal enactments. Forms of industrial
combination could develop freely, and if of late the trustification form of combination
has been progressing, using the Interessengemeinschaft or forms of partnership as
preliminary stages, it seems much more likely that this evolution has been due to quite
natural tendencies to technical and commercial concentration than to any direct or
indirect influence of the law or state interference. Moreover, we have emphasised
before that the trust movement in German industry should not be regarded as being
in contrast to the cartel organisation; indeed the very biggest trusts or trust-like
combinations have not discontinued their membership of syndicates or cartels — for
instance the I.G. Farben or the Stahlverein — as they are of most decisive importance
to the very strength and economic policy of trusts, so long as these are not controlling
production and distribution by 100%.
A controversy as to whether the “cartel” or any form of amalgamative combinationHermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 178
— represented by fusion or merger —  should be considered as the “stronger” form
of industrial combination ought to be regarded as useless talk. The form of industrial
combination, if we leave the question of legal or state interference out of consideration,
will finally be decided by economic conditions, and not be a matter of organisational
wisdom or alternative. In industries where strong concentration and unification of units
is progressing for technical, economic or financial reasons, the fusion form of
combination will probably evolve quite naturally. In others, where there exists — as
especially in the older branches of production — a great diversity of conditions and
units which gives way but slowly to concentrative tendencies the cartel or any other
form of agreement will be chosen as a sort of experimental form of industrial
combination possibly leading itself to a development of amalgamation, or being
dissolved after some time as unable to co-ordinate competition.
15 At the same time
a cartel between few partners, equally strong in power, might be quite sufficient for
the economic or commercial aims of all parties concerned. Indeed there is no pattern
amongst the forms of industrial combination which could be regarded as being under
all circumstances of the greatest efficiency to the quasi-monopolist. The economic
structure of the respective industries and the degree of concentration of units or









Industrial combination of whatever form is based upon the aim of eliminating or
at least limiting competition. This is certainly not, as is frequently said, an object of
quasimonopoly. Limitation of competition as such would not be an aim to be pursued,
unless it were the means of attaining what is really the essential object of all
combination: an increase of profits to the combined companies. This may be effected
by different measures, but it will always centre in those two functions of combined
undertakings, i.e. diminishing costs or price policy or both. It matters little in principle
whether the reduction of costs is attempted by technical rationalisation, or by shutting
down redundant works or by limiting competition within the cartel or trust, or again
whether price policy is carried out directly by fixing or administering the price level
or indirectly by limiting production by quotas or production programmes or by
premiums or bounties. But of course the same action may have different results, as
the limitation of production may in some cases be regarded as a matter of reducing
costs, by closing down or reducing the production of the weaker works, just as much
as an indirect means to keep up or increase prices. In fact, the effects of industrial
combination are largely interconnected. But in general it will be useful and logically
right not to split up the analysis of the effects of quasi-monopolist combination into
too many distinct sections, but rather into these two: the first concerning the effects
related to the organisational structure, i.e., effects connected with the formation and
maintenance of quasimonopolist domination, the second relating to the economic aim
of increasing profits (a) by reducing costs, (b) by influencing the price level.
It might seem something of a paradox to talk about the results of industrial
combination at a time when that organisation is not yet even effected. Perhaps it would
be more logical to describe such actions as those of a would-be combine buying out
competitors or amalgamating firms, etc. But in fact such actions and aims of cartelsHermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 181
and trusts do not come to an end with their final formation. It will always and
perpetually remain the decisive aim of any industrial combination to strengthen its
position and to make safe what has been achieved or even to enlarge the basis of its
organisation. We have been able to state in a former chapter, that while concentration
of the units of production represents preparatory tendencies towards combination, the
combination once effected will on its part accelerate this tendency. Thus the attempt
to co-ordinate competitive forces will begin by being the starting point of the activities
of would-be or rising industrial combination, while, when once the combination has
been effected, it will remain an important part of its subsequent results.
In the co-ordination of competition three fields of action may be distinguished:
1. Competition within the industrial combination.
2. Competition outside the combine.
3. Competition in the further manufacturing stages and between wholesale traders.
We have already discussed some of the problems connected with competition 1 and
2 when we had to analyse the legal aspect of quasi-monopolist organisation, especially
that of coercive measures of organisation. The main activities and effects of industrial
combination, especially cartels, within its own borders will be the regulation of the
production of the partners or in the case of trusts the distribution of production over
the amalgamated works. This finds expression in the so-called “quota” system,
arranging the proportion of production of the different members of syndicates, or in
the actual closing down of inefficient or redundant plant.
It may be useful to note, that measures regulating production may be as well enacted
by cartels as “sellers” as in their position as buyers. It has happened that a cartel, being
harassed by the increasing prices of the raw material which its members were using,
decided to diminish production in order to effect a pressure on the price of the raw
material. But of course these so-called “Abnehmer” -Kartelle — Prof. Passow has dealt
with them exhaustively — are much less frequent than “Anbieter” -Kartelle, that is
cartels limiting production in order to influence the price of the produce to be sold.
The necessity of using the “quota” system as a means of regulating production has
led to results which may in not a few cases be called dangerous defects of the whole
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trade in quotas, “Quotenhandel,” may develop — may lead to a necessary and desired
concentration of production by those competitors who are best suited to hold on, it
may, on the other hand, lead to speculative “buying out” of competitors to get into
possession of their quota, and this again may increase overcapitalisation. On the other
hand we have in a former chapter — dealing with the potash industry — been able
to point out that weaker works were kept up by the hope of being protected by the cartel
through being endowed with a quota (however small), while it might have been much
more desirable from an economic point of view that they should have disappeared.
We have described at length, taking as examples coal and potash, that it becomes rather
hard for cartels and syndicates to resist the increase in the number of single producers,
wherever an industry, as was the case with potash, promises future gains and offers
at the same time the possibility of increased production. In such cases private and
voluntary co-ordination of competition will probably fail, and, as we have pointed
out, must be replaced by compulsory measures of the State, if any sort of cartelisation
is to be maintained. There was a time, when this very development was regarded by
theorists as most beneficial to national economy, as it proved that “competition” was
in the end stronger than “monopoly” and could not be suppressed. In the light of the
actual effects on market conditions, bringing about in many cases a state of cutthroat
competition with fatal results for all parties concerned, such development is viewed
to-day with more apprehension than approval. It is very significant that the General
Report of the Enqueteausschuss contains in its final conclusions on the Monopoly
Problem the passage:
The preferential position, enjoyed by trusts, cartels or cartel-like
associations or activities on markets, need not necessarily be
disadvantageous to the public economic interest nor should it justify
restriction. Apart from the fact that there are aims of cartelisation which
may be entitled to support or which do not concern economic policy,
the monopoly position as such should not be a reason for State
interference. Economic theorists also agree that the exploitation of a
dominant position — by keeping up prices above the level of freeHermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 183
competition — may have under certain circumstances beneficial effects.
One may compare this with some of the English views as sketched out recently in
the very interesting study of Prof. D. H. Macgregor on Enterprise, Purpose and Profit
(1934, pp. 161 ff.), in which he enumerates some evidence of still existing antipathies
against what are called “the ‘Black Tigers’ of capitalist combinations.” We have already
shown how far differences between the German and the English attitudes of mind may
account for the different legal aspect of the problem in the two countries and have its
effect on the actual development of quasi-monopoly. But it also follows that any
coercive organisation of industrial combination towards its partners may be viewed
quite differently, according to which attitude of mind prevails. Viewed from the point
of view of “cartelisation as a useful type of modern industrial organisation” the word
“coercion” will be likely to be replaced by that of co-ordination, and any struggle of
cartel partners trying to rid themselves of the tying clauses of quasimonopolist
organisation will be regarded much more as a lack of subordination than as a
demonstration of still existing individualistic feelings. It is from this viewpoint that
we must understand the following passage in Liefmann’s book:
There have always been a number of entrepreneurs, who, while
enjoying the benefits of cartels, were not willing to make the necessary
sacrifices. Sometimes one may be able to remain outside the cartel and
to cut its prices, thereby getting hold of big orders. But of course this
will only last a short time. If outside competition grows too strong, the
cartel must dissolve. But it also happens that members of the cartel are
trying secretly to gain private advantages and bigger sales by disloyal
means or genuine breach of the agreements.
It seems necessary on the part of the cartel to protect itself against such “weaker
characters.” This must lead to a very stringent and drastic co-ordination of interests
and an effective supervision by the cartel. We have mentioned the stringent rules of
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sales on the part of its members and claiming heavy damages in the case of any breach
of the respective clauses of its agreement from its partners as well as from those who
may have bought rayon from anyone not belonging to the syndicate. Inasmuch as
coercion leading to strict cartel discipline may seem important or even essential to
industrial combination the submission of the single manufacturer to a network of
unshakeable rules may act as a deterrent of any further individual enterprise. Sheltered
and ruled by syndicates many entrepreneurs may lose that ardent personal interest in
their works which has proved so great a benefit of individual activity. It may even lead,
as Liefmann contends, though this cannot be proved by any prominent examples, to
a greater inclination on the part of individual manufacturers to transform their business
into an “impersonal” joint-stock company. On the other hand, coercive measures of
organisation, called by Wolfers “der interne Organisationszwang ,” inside the cartel
or syndicate may differ greatly with the degree of strength of the quasi-monopoly.
Wolfers is probably right when he remarks that it is hardly to be wondered at that the
inside coercive organisation of cartels seems to be particularly strong where cartels
have little to offer to their partners, where therefore the monopolist power of
combination is not great. In these very cartels complaints about misuses of coercive
measures will be frequent. The preponderance of the big partners of the cartel may
manifest itself by such measures. Where the stronger partners are little interested in
raising prices to a great extent, coercive organisation may prove a weapon against the
weaker members who are urging drastic raising of the price level. This shows how
far the coordination of competition may be linked up with cartelistic price policy.
The next important task of industrial combination with regard to its competitive
position lies in its attitude towards outsiders. While “innerer Organisationszwang”
only affects cartels and syndicates, since trusts and amalgamations are not in need of
it, but are mostly formed to replace coercive measures by absolute unity, action against
outsiders lies in the sphere of both forms of industrial combination. Generally speaking
there are two methods of fighting outsiders to be distinguished. The one is direct and
simple. It consists in the undercutting of prices with the object of weakening the
position of outsiders until their surrender to the combination that is forcing them to
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there are other forms of such fighting. The potash syndicate for instance had formed
in the ‘nineties what was called “Schutzbohrgemeinschaft,” an association organised
as a protective measure against new borings. Wherever anybody began experimental
boring for potash the association itself started boring in the actual neighbourhood of
the newcomer, in order to get earlier possession of the mineral.
The other means of combating outside competition is indirect and certainly more
complicated. Cartels or trusts try by all sorts of tactics to make outside business
uncomfortable. It is a wellknown fact that many quasi-monopolies have based thfrir
position not, or not exclusively, on the domination of the primary branch of their
production, but on that of monopolisable stages of production, connected with their
own product, or on facilities of transport or distribution. We remember how the
monopolisation of German coal fields and iron ore mines was used as a means of
creating quasi-monopoly in iron and steel manufacture, which otherwise would have
offered no other opportunities for industrial combination than that of gradually evolving
larger units of production. To quote another example, the Standard Oil Company has
not created its monopoly by monopolising oil fields or oil wells, but by getting
domination over the pipe-line systems and thereby combating outsiders and would-be
competitors. The English tobacco trust was, as is generally known, much strengthened
in its position by taking over the large distributing firms of A. I. Jones and Son and
Salmon and Gluckstein, which gave it possession of a great and important number
of retail shops. The last-named firm alone had 170. In the same way the huge German
film corporation, the “Ufa,” owes much of its dominant position to the possession of
actually the best situated and most luxuriously equipped cinema theatres in Berlin and
in the German provinces. Another concern of this industry, the “Emelka,” once the
second largest producer in Germany, tried to gain similar advantages over competitors
by acquiring or erecting the largest theatres in the southern parts of Germany, especially
in Bavaria. While in fact it would seem difficult to monopolise film making, since
the raw material is not monopolised, a number of studios are always available to
outsiders of the great concerns, and actors, even stars, are numerous enough to make
competition with the great firms possible, the possession of the most popular theatres
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or trust over smaller outside competitors.
Another indirect way of undermining the activities of outsiders is represented by
attempts to monopolise the wholesale traders of the particular branch. If a cartel or
trust succeeds in binding wholesale traders not to buy from any other firm than the
cartel, syndicate or trust, it will make life very difficult for outside competition. This
is effected, as we have seen before, by exclusive agreements of different kinds. Here
also the organisation of the viscose syndicate, which we have described at length, may
be quoted as an example. The stringent rules binding dealers in rayon, federated by
agreement to the sales bureau, to trade exclusively in the produce of the syndicate
(Viscose Kunstseide Syndikat) and not to sell it to any other dealers, represent a sort
of monopolisation of the wholesale trade, which will make outside competition for
rayon producers rather awkward. Boycotting clauses, black-listing or selling at higher
prices to those dealers not willing to join the exclusive agreement, on the one side,
loyalty rebates and bonuses to those who have proved loyal, on the other, will work
in the same direction. In July 1934 an interesting agreement was reached by the
manufacturers of radio sets and loud-speakers. The factories concluding this agreement
have set up an elaborate code of rules, by which the radio trade will be dominated.
The agreement dating for at first one year is called the “Wirufa” -Jahr. As the parties
to the agreement have consented to sell only to traders or bodies qualified by the Wirufa
conditions to the trade a very stringent monopoly is set up. By the control of the
wholesale trade the radio manufacturers have indeed acquired a position making any
development of fresh competition from outsiders almost impossible and at any rate
very precarious.
This form of combating outside competition will become particularly effective where
it is practised between two or more associations, as in the case of coking syndicates
binding themselves to deliver their produce exclusively to members of pig iron
syndicates, or of the association of envelope-machine producers agreeing to sell
exclusively to the association of envelope makers, or in that of the soap cartel obliging
the syndicate supplying oils, fats and soda for the manufacture of soap not to sell to
anyone else (examples taken from Liefmann). In all these cases, although the agreement
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of view of the associated manufacturers in the primary stage, such as the coking plants,
the paper-machine makers or the sellers of fats and oils, such arrangements mean a
sort of monopolisation of the seller by the buyer, thereby diminishing the chances of
sale to outside suppliers. As a matter of fact it matters little whether the association
of “buyers” is a body of producers in the following stage or an association of wholesale
dealers. There is no doubt (compare also Schaeffer, p. 329) that of late the monopolist
connection between manufacturers’ industrial combinations and wholesale traders’
associations has become very general; in various cases such agreements have been
propagated by the representatives of wholesale trade associations themselves, in order
to prevent some factories in the branch from supplying directly to the retailers or
consumers.
This has brought us near the third group of effects relating to the co-ordination of
competition by cartels or trusts, that is coordinating competition as regards finishers
and wholesale traders buying cartelised or trustificated products. We have seen that
co-ordination of both by agreements, if possible by agreements with their respective
associations, will offer a weapon to fight outsiders or to force them to join the
combination. But this does not relate to the attitude of industrial combinations towards
finishers and traders themselves. It is all very well for cartels and trusts to enter into
combination with those buying their products in order to combat outsiders in their own
line of production — but the question remains, how to draw the buyers into this
combination and what to do, if difficulties arise in that respect. In the beginning
finishers and other buyers of quasi-monopolised products or raw materials are certainly
outspoken adversaries of the respective cartels or trusts. They are the people, who,
besides the last consumer, are the most endangered by monopolist price policy. For
them there are two expedients for escaping the most harmful effects of combination.
The one consists in entering by themselves the field of production dominated by cartels
or trust-like concerns. We have mentioned the successful attempts of finishers in the
iron and steel industry to acquire mining interests and to free themselves from the grip
of’‘ mixed “ works and combinations. Yet, there are, even in branches where this
process has been going on among finishers, numbers of undertakings not able or willing
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association. The position of these “pure” works will always remain difficult, when
their costs of production are compared with those of the mixed undertakings — except
in cases where the latter are suffering under the weight of overcapitalisation and
therefore are in a disadvantageous position as regards costs of production. But such
cases will be exceptional, the rule being that pure works, especially in the finishing
lines, have to encounter the effects of cartels or trusts as regards what may be called
the “intrinsic” price policy of combines. While the pure works, even those adhering
to a cartel or syndicate, must pay the cartel price for their raw material or half-finished
supplies, to the big mixed undertakings such prices may be purely “nominal,” as in
fact they are their own suppliers. While for mixed concerns it may not matter what
price they have to charge their subsidiaries for raw material or half-finished goods,
as the loss of the one may merely represent gain to the other, the case is the reverse
with pure works and their interest is directly opposite to that of the vertically combined
undertakings. In the iron and steel industry this problem has been acute up to most
recent times, and the same problems exist in the aluminium and brass industries. Early
in 1933 the manufacturers of iron and steel goods asked the Government that the whole
question of their relations with the iron and steel producers should be gone into. In
due course a Commissioner was appointed by the Government to deal with the matter
and the following were some results of his activities: All syndicated works must sell
their materials to their own finishing works at prices not below those paid by the free
finishing works and no offer should be made or order accepted below cost of
production. The syndicated works had to agree to keep separate accounts for their
finishing works and to close down those of them which showed considerable losses.
The President of the German State Railways was requested to issue an order to his
buying departments that the practice adhered to hitherto of accepting the cheapest
quotation should cease and that offers made at an economic price should be considered.
Among the concerns said to be chiefly affected by these measures are the Vereinigte
Stahlwerke and the Hoesch works, who had forced their way into the screw, rivet and
drop forging industries, offering goods at prices which lay below the costs of raw
material to the independent works.
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quite different where these have recourse to a second means of resistance. Just as
consumers can organise into Friendly Societies or co-operative purchase associations
(we may mention the “Grosseinkaufsgesellschaft deutscher Konsumvereine”), and
place themselves by such co-operation in a very different position with regard to
industrial producers, finishers or half-finishers may attempt to start a “counter”
organisation, “anti-cartels,” as they have been — not very happily — styled by some
writers; these “Abnehmer” -Kartelle formed to resist monopolist practices in selling
by organised “buying” are indeed a very important counterpart to producers’ monopolist
combinations. Of course, as examples quoted by Passow and Liefmann can show, such
cartels may have various other functions besides being directed against the “unfair”
practices of other cartels or syndicates. Every cartel or syndicate may be partly a buyers’
organisation as well as a sellers’. One of the most important organisations of this kind
is the “Arbeitsgemeinschaft der eisenverbrauchenden Industrie,” an association formed
to protect the interests of iron-using manufacturers. This organisation has been paying
special attention to the effects, which the price policy of cartels, in combination with
the duties on iron, would have on users of iron and steel, and by its organisational
strength it has succeeded in getting producers of iron into an agreement, by which
inland producers of finished and halffinished goods are to be protected against any
rise in cartel prices in so far as it would affect their competitive efficiency with regard
to exports; in other words the agreement represents a protection against the effects
of dumping of iron or steel to the disadvantage of the German finishers’ position in
the world market. The agreement was concluded in 1925 between the Roheisen-Ver-
band, the Pig Iron Syndicate, and the Raw Steel Syndicate, Rohstahlgemeinschaft,
on the one side, and the Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Eisen verarbeitenden Industrie (A.V.I.)
on the other. It comprises on the part of this association, as was explained before the
Enqueteausschuss, activities like bridge engineering, in which the percentage of the
costs of the iron consumed to the whole costs is 45 %, down to the making of
calculating machines, where the percentage of iron is not more than 1.8. The agreement
is called the “Avi” -Abkommen, and it is at any rate, however its effects may be judged,
an example of what can be achieved by concerted action on the part of buyers
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The position of trade, and to a certain extent transport, as regards the effects of cartels
and trusts is similar. Traders may attempt, in order to evade the monopolist domination
of producers’ cartels or syndicates, themselves to enter the field of production. This
has been the case with iron traders, who during the War were eager to acquire iron
works, as for instance the Otto Wolf-Phoenix concern. Liefmann states that during
the inflation period clever wholesale traders were quicker than manufacturers to
recognise the meaning of depreciated money and to try to invest their money or the
money credited to them in manufacturing businesses, which had been or would become
their customers’. On the other hand big manufacturers’ concerns and cartels have
formed wholesale trading associations or departments (Werkshandelsgesellschaften)
of their own, as for instance the Rhenish-Westphalian Coal Syndicate, by forming as
early as 1903 the so-called Kohlenkontor (Rheinische Kohlenhandelsund Reedergesell-
schaft G.m.b.H.), which combined river transport and trading.
Of late the Report of the Enqueteausschuss on the ironproducing industry has given
a very elaborate, though somewhat complex, picture of a second means used by
wholesale dealers to protect themselves against too strong a domination of cartels or
trusts, i.e., as in the case of the finishers — the formation of associations, trying to
embrace the largest part of the wholesale trade (cp. loc. cit. pp. 111, 335 and 361).
These associations, quasi-monopolistic in themselves, have generally entered into
agreements with the combines. Their members are called “Verbandshandler”; in the
iron trade associated wholesale traders are considered to represent the “wholesale trade
in iron .” By agreement with the Stahlverein the whole of the German sales territory
has been divided into certain districts allocated to groups of associated dealers. The
kind of arrangement of such agreements will naturally depend on the respective strength
of either the producers’ combination or the associated dealers’, but at any rate
co-ordination of competition of the wholesale buyers will be the result. In the case
of iron and steel the steelmakers seem to be the dominating force. At any rate the Report
of the Enqueteausschuss states that in January 1930, “when the sales associations were
reorganised, the Stahlwerksverband sketched out new rules relating to the affirmation
of the associated traders.” In fact, associated traders seem to be in many cases a sort
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co-ordinated by such agreements is clearly shown in the tube trade. Here there are in
existence three organisations of wholesale dealers: the Norddeutsche
Röhrengrosshandlervereinigung in Berlin, the Siiddeutsche Röhrengrosshandlervereini-
gung in Frankfurt a./M. and the Rheinisch-Westphalische Röhrengrosshandlerverein-
igung in Düsseldorf. With these organisations of the wholesale trade in tubes the
Stahlwerksverband and its subordinated associations have entered into agreements,
by which associated dealers (Verbandshändler) were bound or could be bound not to
sell any material to outsiders without permission of the Stahlwerksverband. Moreover,
the Stahlwerksverband secured for itself the right of veto in regard to the prices and
conditions fixed by the associations of wholesale traders for the further sale of products.
For certain products of the tube branch the Stahlwerksverband issued binding rules
as regards the prices and conditions of further sales by the dealers. On the other hand
the Stahlwerksverband agreed to sell the syndicated products, which could be sold
by it directly, to no others but associated dealers.
Although the works trade (Werkshandel) and wholesale dealers’ associations
(Verbandshandel) have greatly reduced the sphere of the so-called “freier Handel,”
the independent trader, the Enqueteausschuss has devoted a good deal of work to
investigations of what is left of it. In the Minutes of Evidence on the iron industry a
whole section is devoted to “freier Handel.” But it appears that, at any rate in this
industry, which may be considered as typically organised on quasi-monopoly lines,
a really’‘ freier Handel” no longer exists. There are of course still “independent traders”
in contrast to the associated ones. But the Report states on p. 113, that, although the
former are not admitted into the selling organisation of the iron industries, they have
become affiliated to it by special agreements with the wholesale dealers’ associations.
In South Germany, it was stated, all traders, associated or not, are members of the
Siiddeutsche Eisenzentrale, and thereby obliged to respect fixed prices and conditions
and to boycott outside products.
Considering the position of industrial combinations with regard to their own
members, with regard to outsiders and would-be competitors and to finishers and the
wholesale trade, one is led to the conclusion that the work of combination by no means
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necessity of co-ordinating competition remains. It represents the heaviest, the most
complicated and the most important task of existing industrial combinations.	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The activity of industrial combination, in so far as it does not consist of action relating
to the vigilant safeguarding of its own quasi-monopolist existence and all kinds of
organisational work connected with this end, must be mainly and necessarily directed
towards an increase of profits of the respective undertakings or amalgamated works.
This, as we have said before, can be achieved by reducing costs or by increasing prices
or both.
t is well known that from the very beginning of the cartel and trust movement in
industry the formation of the new form of industrial monopolies was vindicated by
its leaders as well as by many economists as embracing new possibilities of diminishing
costs of production and thereby justifying its existence to the public. A very able
account of such aims has been given by the English Report on Trusts (1919 and 1924).
The Report emphasised the great possibilities of industrial and commercial
improvement lying “beyond the confines of free competition” and which “are only(!)
to be realised by combination in one or other of its several forms.” It then gave a
detailed account of what could be effected in the way of economies in the different
spheres of such combination, i.e., in buying materials, plant, stores, etc., in making,
selling and knowledge. Its conclusions to this effect were certainly largely influenced
by taking into account German and American experiences; it is indeed a rather long
chain of facts, which may be cited in that respect, as any efficient industrial combination
may exert its endeavours to achieve a greater economy in very many directions. This
especially applies to a better and steadier supply of material, unification of buying
departments and staffs, bulk instead of detail purchase, greater opportunity for
comparison and selection, cheaper credit and better discounts, standardisation of
materials, standardisation of product, specialisation of product, improvement in plant,
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unification of selling departments and staffs, extension of export trade, collective
advertising, lower costs of distribution, fewer middlemen, interchange of data and
experiences, standardisation and interchange of costings, collection and dissemination
of trade statistics, promotion of scientific and technical research, concerted action and
common representation in legal matters, collective promotion of problems, which may
be affected by the economic policy of the State, improved opportunities of acquiring
patents and of entering into new processes of production at first hand, etc., etc. There
is hardly one of these many matters and functions connected with the economic policy
of industrial combination of which in the course of this treatise we have not been able
to give examples, especially as regards the chemical industry, electrical trades and
the steel industry.
Since the end of the War and in the course of the prolonged economic depression
the possible effects of industrial combination with regard to better “economy” have
been a much discussed topic in connection with which there has been much talk of
“rationalisation.” It is not the business of this book to deal with “rationalisation,” but
the author may take the liberty of saying that it seems to him that this “movement”
has been in many ways theoretically over-interpreted by economists. One is glad to
find that an English economist, Prof. Macgregor of Oxford, while certainly not
refraining from treating the matter with great theoretical zeal (cp. his book Enterprise,
Purpose, and Profit, 1934, Chapters II and v) emphasises — especially with regard
to the development in Germany — that rationalisation “had an accidental and temporary
meaning.” It is certainly far from being a phenomenon of revolutionary economic
importance, and again we may quote Prof. Macgregor, when, instead of giving
deep-sounding and complicated definitions of it, he simply states that “to rationalise
industry is to remove all the duplication and overlap which can be avoided, and
introduce as much unity of purpose as is practicable without loss of economy.” We
can also agree with him, when he affirms that “the Trust and the Cartel furnished the
ideas of rationalisation in a completer degree than otherwise would have obtained,
when post-War measures had to be considered.”
Indeed, rationalisation, as practised in post-War Germany, was on the one hand
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unprofitable prices coupled with certain immobile factors in the costing schedule of
production suggested the idea of attempting drastic measures to bring costs down, by
the elimination of weaker works, standardisation of production, more efficient
application of machinery, etc. On the other hand we may remember here what was
explained in a former chapter, that industrial combination may be itself largely
supported by rationalisation, inasmuch as it reduces the units of production and the
number of undertakings and leads to a greater unification of work which in every
circumstance must be favourable to industrial combination. Again cartels and trusts
may be regarded as effective instruments in carrying through rationalisation, as in fact
collective bodies of manufacturers or amalgamated firms may be better able to carry
the costs of expensive technical changes in industry than single manufacturers. Thus
industrial combination may as well lead to rationalisation, as rationalisation may
strengthen or even create a development of industrial combination.
The Enqueteausschuss has paid much attention to these conditions; the following
passages of the general Report of this Committee seem of particular interest, as they
reveal the principal conclusions drawn from a great number of witnesses on the subject.
The Report states:
The problem of rationalisation was (after 1925) invading the mind of
cartels and gave a new and particular impulse to the discussion of the
relationship of productivity and profits to industrial combination. This
meant that the discussion about cartels, within their own sphere as also
in regard to the outer world interested in cartel problems, became drawn
into a wider range of thought, which may possibly lead to further
important lines of development. A most important factor in this
development has been the expansion of Commercial Sciences
(Betriebswirtschaftslehre), which directed its attention especially to
the penetration of the inner life of works, to a scientific tabulation and
valuation of the single costing factors and factors of management,
thereby aiming at the attainment of a system of works management
based upon scientific principles....Hermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 196
Although the Report does not deny that these new tendencies of economic thought
have in many cases found a very fertile ground, where cartels were in existence, and
that, wherever rationalisation was leading to a closing of efficient plant, to the
transplantation of parts of production by a process of concentration or to a
reorganisation of management, the “very mechanism of cartels was immediately
concerned,” he is of the opinion that “in general” a scientific system of tabulating costs
and organising works accordingly has not been attempted by cartels or associations.
Moreover, the Report was anxious to state that for sociological reasons cartels were
frequently bound not to support a movement of greater centralisation of works or
undertakings. It has frequently happened that cartels laid stress on the argument that
they were protecting the interests of the smaller and less efficient undertakings against
powerful partners, thereby acting more in a spirit of “co-operation” and backing what
might be called “gewerblicher Mittelstand” (industrial middle class) than making their
aim the utmost possible realisation of economic principles.
This brings us to a much discussed problem. There can be no doubt that the trust
form of quasi-monopoly must be regarded to-day as much more in line with the
bringing about of measures of rationalisation than the form of cartelisation. There is
certainly one very important fact to be kept in mind as regards cartels and rationalis-
ation: the possibility of “buying” out weaker competitors by acquiring their quotas
in the cartel. This certainly means “rationalisation,” although in the first twenty years
of German cartel development it was hardly considered from that point of view. While
on the one hand the cartel seems to be destined to protect and keep alive the less
efficient it may on the other become an instrument of further concentration. Of course
this very much depends upon the whole structure of the group of industry in question,
it depends on the progress of concentration already achieved and on the number of
single undertakings federated into an association. It may also depend on the
“sociological” policy of the cartel as mentioned before.
But taking all that into due consideration one may believe that by such “indirect”
measures concentration and thereby a reduction of costs has been accelerated by
cartelisation. Of course one has to keep in mind, on the other hand, that the price policy
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fresh competition of a rather “uneconomic” character, if one considers the
profitableness of the whole group of industry, was the direct outcome of cartelisation.
In view of such different possibilities, which counteract each other, it is not surprising
to find that German cartel literature is by no means in agreement on this point. Wolfers,
quoting a great number of authors, who have dealt more or less lengthily with this
problem — from Brentano and Schaeffle in the ‘nineties to Wiedenfeld, Beckerath,
Liefmann, Baumgarten-Meszleny, Flechtheim, Reith and others of our days —
expressly states that there is hardly any unanimity about this question. The explanation
seems to lie much more in the great diversity of conditions of industry than in any lack
of academic theory. It also seems possible that a cartel may act on a direct policy of
rationalisation as well as by indirect means of concentration by way of reducing costs,
as it may happen that by a policy of protection of the less efficient it is counteracting
the tendencies of the “survival of the fittest.” We have examples enough of the first
mentioned possibilities, as for instance cases, in the German glass-bottle manufacture
or in the jute industry, where new patents have been secured by the cartel in order to
prevent their exclusive exploitation by individual firms, it is reported that in branches
of the textile and paper industries cartels have inaugurated studies with the purpose
of unifying the accounting systems of their members and of finding an “objective”
basis for their price policy. It is of interest to note that plans for collective rationalis-
ation have found their way even into international cartel agreements. This is, as can
be seen from Mr William Meinhard’s book, the case in the electrical lamp business,
where international agreements about the use of patents, the exchange of technical
experience and technical standardisation have been concluded. The latter is particularly
taken care of by a “standardisation Committee” of the Phoebus (Geneva) S.A., which
represents an administrative body for all firms belonging to the international lamp
cartel. Mr Meinhard is anxious to refute, as an expert, the argument that an exchange
of practical experiences and the common use of patents may relax individual activity.
“Just the reverse,” so he writes, “is the case. Where scientists remain in mutual touch
with each other, there is a constant possibility of suggestions and a certainty that one
will not be obliged to sit for years on an invention, only perhaps to learn that another
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as an incentive and is leading the scientific work in industry from the beginning to
unfilled fields promising success.”
It must also be remembered, as Schaeffer emphasises, that cartels feel themselves
in many cases bound to be responsible for a certain standard of quality. In many cases
the cartel presses its members for punctual delivery, it may intervene where
unsatisfactory goods have been delivered by some of its members and it may induce
members producing at high costs to compare their cost of production with more
efficient undertakings. All this is in the line of education and rationalisation. Of course
there may be quite other cases: when cartels or syndicates merely take the costs of their
most inefficient members as a basis for prices, without paying any regard to the
question of drastically reducing costs. But according to Schaeffer, “the recognition,
that a syndicate should have the effect of improving the status of its works, has been
gaining more and more ground and is mostly acknowledged as an object of
cartelisation.” Even so sceptical a student as Wolfers cannot refrain from stating that
while the improvement of the methods of production is regarded by him as merely
a “side” activity of cartels, it “has been apparently of late more intensively developed
in several places and is attracting an increasing amount of attention.”
All this ought to be kept carefully in mind, before one tries to reach any general and
rash conclusions that “cartels,” in contrast to trusts or amalgamations, are the mere
protectors or life preservers of the weak elements in industry. On the other hand, it
must be admitted that concentrative bodies of industrial combination, such as trusts
or concerns, will be in general in an easier position to carry out schemes of purposeful
planning or rationalisation. They are not hampered by any obstacles accruing from
a great number and possibly a great diversity of partners. In the many volumes of the
Enqueteausschuss, students of the problem of rationalisation will find a great many
examples of what has been done by big amalgamated firms in the way of reducing
costs through the many before-mentioned means which rationalisation can offer. A
very conspicuous case was that of the Vereinigte Stahlwerke.
The process of rationalisation, which has been undergone by this amalgamation, has
been described by the chairman of the Board of Directors of the Stahlverein, Dr Vögler,
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of the organisational policy of this trust-like undertaking was to reach a most complete
unification and he laid stress on the fact that such all-round rationalisation of its
production could hardly be reached within ten years. Then probably it would be possible
to speak of what he called “eine absolute Betriebseinheit” (an absolute unification of
works). The story of what has been planned and achieved in the Stahlverein seems
to be a noteworthy illustration of the giant task awaiting those who wish to construct
a clear and indeed “rationalised” body out of an elaborate mass of amalgamations and
interconnections grown up in the course of the rather uncontrolled process of
trustification. The story of the rationalisation of the Vereinigte Stahlwerke may also
prove of importance to those interested in the reorganisation of the English steel
industry, for it shows that it is hardly possible to reconstruct the organisation of an
industry like this within anything like a given period of a few years. As Dr Vögler
explained from first-hand knowledge the foremost task of reorganisation arose at the
beginning of the trust, in concentrating production on the original branches of
production of the combined works, eliminating so far as possible all those branches
which had been occasionally or accidentally federated to some of the amalgamated
undertakings, such as engineering or the production of refined steel. A great number
of plants of the six promoting concerns of the Stahlverein, “which did not seem to
be technically first-rate or which did not fit geographically into the combination,” were
closed down. We have already referred in other parts of this book to the exhaustive
description of rationalisation, which Dr Vögler gave about six years later, in November
1933, before a meeting of shareholders. Dr Vögler laid stress on the fact that the
realisation of the rationalisation programme, as projected in its broad outline in the
foundation year of the trust 1926, was greatly hampered by the very adverse trade
conditions which followed the “sham” -prosperity of 1937–29, culminating in a
catastrophic drop of production figures in 1931 and 1932. He also emphasised that
the technical reorganisation of the huge undertaking would not have been possible
if it were not for “the programme of production of the original promoting works having
been in many fields of a similar character.” In spite of adverse economic conditions
rationalisation in the form of concentrating production on the most efficient plant has
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In the iron making field there are to-day 66 instead of 145 works. The number of
furnaces has been reduced since 1926 from 23 to 9, the Siemens Martin plant from
20 to 8, the hoop iron works from 7 to 3, the number of bar iron and shaped iron works
from 17 to 10, the tube works from 8 to 3, the wire finishing works from 9 to 4. It must
be confessed that under the regime of mere cartelisation such drastic reductions have
never been heard of.
While probably German industrial combination can hardly be criticised for not having
made use of the existing possibilities of rationalisation, doubts have arisen with regard
to the practical economic advantages derived from it. This has been particularly the
case with regard to the purely technical parts of “rationalisation,” as enacted by the
big firms, such as the installation of new labour-saving machinery, the introduction
of the conveyor system, simplification and standardisation so far as it was leading to
a greater elimination of manual labour and bigger production per unit of plant. It is
of interest to note that doubts of that kind (probably not wholly unrelated to experiences
in Germany, and also in the U.S.A.) have found their way into English economic
thought, as may be seen from the Final Report of the Balfour Committee on Industry
and Trade published in 1929 (cp. pp. 1782–9). While this Report lays stress on the
fact, that “the more perfect the unification of interest” the more completely certain
kinds of economy may be realised, it quotes a passage from a speech made by Sir Josiah
Stamp, in which he alludes to “a general tendency in popular discussion to exaggerate
the simple economies of straight run standard lines possible through concentration
and underestimate the costs of bringing them about.” The Report continues: “Such
savings are not usually effected without incurring expense, which in some cases may
nullify them. Thus a factory is rarely ready to take over the output of another, or to
concentrate on making few types of articles only, without considerable changes in
layout; and the necessity of providing in some way for the personnel of displaced
factories also adds to the cost of transformation.”
The problem of the advantages or disadvantages of rationalisation, as it is to be
practised by big concerns and cartels, can hardly be solved by such considerations.
Indeed the economic and financial results of rationalisation will entirely depend on
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“principle” of rationalisation. The story of rationalisation in German industry after
the War is likely to show that, while for some years rationalisation was regarded as
the most promising means of reconstructing industry, a few years later — indeed from
1929 onward — it was discredited as having been disastrous in many ways. The popular
slogan of “rationalisation” was soon drowned by an outburst against “over-rationalisa-
tion” of an almost equal fervour. What had happened was this.
After the War the financial obligations with which German economic life was
burdened, led to the desire to increase at all costs the efficiency of plant and the output
of production per technical unit and per working man. This tendency, leading to the
installation of more efficient and more labour-saving machinery, to the concentration
of production upon the most up-to-date plant and in short to the concentration of all
energies upon the promotion of the utmost industrial and commercial efficiency, was
largely fostered during the inflation period by the “flight from the mark,” which made
almost any new investment by the manufacturer more tempting than the piling up of
money reserves which vanished through the irresistible process of money depreciation;
when in 1924 inflation came to an end, the aim of reconstructing industry on more
stable lines brought a new impulse towards the elimination of weaker elements from
production and further progress of rationalisation. This tendency was not only supported
by the industrialists, but also by the representative bodies of labour. We may quote
the speech of Herr Leymann, representing German labour before the International
Labour Conference in Geneva in 1924, in which he asserted that the reparations to
which Germany had obliged herself could only be paid by an increase of industrial
production and this again was dependent upon a “higher efficiency of the technical
installation of plant.” In the Dawes plan too the question of technique was alluded
to as one of the factors enabling Germany to fulfil its future obligations.
16 Technical
progress bringing about increasing and cheapened production had become the topic
of all economic wisdom up to 1929. A semi-official acknowledgment of this doctrine
was given by the formation of such bodies as the “Kuratorium fur Wirtschaftlichkeit”
and other institutions dealing scientifically with all questions of rationalisation and
all possible devices leading to greater output and a reduction of costs. In those days
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introduction of new machinery and processes of rationalisation and it was from the
labour side that such criticism could mostly be heard. Particularly in those years, when
the reduction in the working hours (eight-hour day) was hotly discussed it was argued
from the labour ranks that manufacturers and especially big firms, which were not
lacking in capital and credit, could easily compensate any losses incurred by the
shortening of the working day by installing more efficient plant or by further
rationalisation. In a pamphlet edited in 1926 by the Federation of German Trade
Unions, entitled Present problems of German economic policy, it was expressly stated
that: “Rationalisation is necessary. In accordance with the Memorandum of the National
Association we conceive rationalisation, i.e., the application of all technical and
organisational means, which are likely to increase the productivity of labour and
machinery in industry, as the most important condition for improving prosperity.” There
was another trend of opinion favouring the utmost exertion of the rationalising spirit
in industry. Industrial development in the U.S.A., which has frequently been considered
in modem German industrial history as an admonition to accelerate technical progress
(books like The Land of the Future by von Polenz or The Land of Unlimited
Possibilities by L. M. Goldberger stirred up economic opinion for some time at the
beginning of the century), was watched carefully by German economic observers and
when the great technical boom in the U.S.A., fostered by unscrupulous credit
expansion, was reached between 1925 and 1929, many economic writers exhorted
the State and industrialists not to lag behind and to do their utmost to retain competitive
strength in face of the new rival in third markets. In a much read pamphlet Why be
poor? written in 1928, Herr Fritz Tarnow, a then well-known social writer, exclaimed:
“We shall have to arrange our plans having regard to the fact that, so far as American
competition is concerned, German economic development must not be temporarily,
but permanently, enabled to meet it! The speed necessary to attain this end will
probably have to be increased at a much greater rate than we are now dreaming of.”
Besides political and social writers there were a number of academic observers of great
standing who were propounding the American “ideal.” Thus Prof. W. Miiller, in a
book entitled Soziale und technische Wirtschaftsführung in Amerika (1926), came to
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law to the world ,” and others like Prof. Julius Hirsch and Prof. Moritz Bonn did their
best to glorify American rationalisation and technical expansion as the
“Wirtschaftswunder,” the economic miracle, which was leading not only to an
enormous material welfare in the U.S.A. but also to better distribution of the “social
product.” Thus arose a psychological atmosphere laden with an almost unlimited
enthusiasm for technical “progress” and it was only natural that cartels and big concerns
were urged to grasp the situation, as in fact they were the very instruments to carry
out big and ambitious technical schemes. It may be well to remember that tendencies
of this kind were not quite unfamiliar to English industrial development too in those
years. In 1926 for instance a very learned book was published by Bertram Austin,
M.B.E., M.A., and W. Francis Lloyd, M.A., A.M.I.E.E., to which Sir Walter T. Layton
wrote a very persuasive preface. The book was entitled The Secret of High Wages and
was, though a little more cautiously written, very much in the line of the German
opinions just described. Comparing American with English conditions the authors
“endeavoured to explain to industrialists and workers alike the reasons for the American
economic wonder and have also attempted to show that, although the conditions may
be somewhat different, no unsurmountable obstacle presents itself to the attainment
of a ‘British economic wonder’.” On page 105 the authors declared: “Our aim should
be to raise wages. This cannot be accomplished unless means are provided for
increasing workers’ productivity.” Although we do not intend in any way to deny that
English industry is in many parts in need of schemes and programmes of rationalisation
(we have been able to allude in former chapters to special cases), it may safely be stated
that it was a piece of luck for British industry that the American example was not so
swiftly copied as was here suggested. British conservatism has, without intending it,
saved its industry from what would have had most disastrous results on its economic
life. When after 1929 the American “wonder” broke down and left the U.S.A. in an
almost desperate position of overproduction and overcapitalisation the “secrets” of
high wages, of rationalisation and prosperity were discovered to have been no normal
device at all and a most dangerous recipe for others; in fact industrial development
in the U.S.A. had undergone a development of “inflation” similar to that which
European countries like Germany had experienced in the field of monetary conditions.
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Curiously enough, however, the arguments put forward with regard to rationalisation
were soon forgotten by those who had been most eager to pronounce them. In fact the
very economic and social circles, which had been most enthusiastic about American
rationalisation in Germany, began to denounce manufacturers and especially cartels
and trusts for having wilfully brought about what was now called “over-rationalisa-
tion.”A regular literary campaign was started against “technical progress,” as may be
gathered from Prof. Lederer’s writings, a sort of one-sidedness which may be rightly
compared with the early “Luddite” agitation in England.
It seems to us that it would be completely wrong to denounce the rationalisation
policy of industrial combination by taking these unfortunate experiences as a basis
of argument. In fact, circumstances which were in no way related to the regular
economics of “rationalisation” were responsible and it would be erroneous to discredit
the system, when the conditions necessary for its probation were lacking or
disappointing. As with every technical advance economic conditions, i.e., the possibility
of disposing profitably of increased production, will be the finally determining factor
of any commercial result of rationalisation. German manufacturers in the past have
certainly, for many causes and reasons, been driven to overestimate these conditions.
But this error, besides being explainable and excusable, does in no way nullify
conclusions regarding the undeniable advantages, which schemes of rationalisation
may derive from the existence of purposefully guided cartels and trusts.	%)
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There was a period when the possible functions of industrial combination with regard
to the diminution of costs were not taken very seriously. Cartels and other industrial
combinations were merely regarded from the point of view of monopoly, and any
argument tending to show that their activities might lead to greater efficiency by
reducing costs was dismissed as being an attempt to veil the real and fundamental aims
of combination, which were to be considered as having their centre in a policy of fixing
prices. To-day the possibilities latent in industrial combination with regard to the better
organisation of production will no longer be disputed. On the contrary, industrial
combination has come to be regarded as one of the principal means of realising
organisational progress; this conviction is now so deep rooted that in 1934 the English
Government made the further grant of protection to the steel industry dependent on
the formation of some sort of combination, while the most recent steps taken by the
German Government towards compulsory cartelisation are tending in the same
direction. Elimination of uncontrolled competition coupled with schemes for better
organisation by the collective reducing of costs seems to have become the acknowl-
edged function of combination. On the other hand discussion on price policy, formerly
the main issue of all cartel and trust problems, seems to be rather neglected. The reason
for this will probably lie in the fact, that for some time no acute fear has been felt as
to the development of arbitrarily increased prices. Between 1929 and 1934 the whole
world suffered from deflation in a greater or smaller degree and, while formerly the
aims of economic policy were in almost every country directed towards an abatement
of prices, and private price agreements were carefully watched or even scrutinised by
public administration, to-day a price development leading to a slowly rising level would
by no means be regarded as in itself of a dangerous character. Moreover, in Germany
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of all kinds that a popular fear of an undue and abrupt rise in prices through industrial
combination seems to be more or less unjustified. Wolfers reflects the trend of general
economic opinion in Germany when he declares: “That cartels aim at a policy which
is directed towards an increase of prices or the keeping up of prices at a higher level
than would be attainable without cartelisation cannot be denied. This policy is indeed
the very justification of private agreements of a cartel-like character....” In face of this,
cartels or trusts will be no longer “morally” obliged to prove that they have not raised
prices or do not intend to do so. Wherever cartels or other forms of industrial
combination are to be recognised as economically harmless or even useful it will be
implicitly admitted that the old idea that they ought to be opposed merely because they
are monopolistic and able to influence prices will have to disappear. It must also be
borne in mind that the influence of industrial combination on prices will not be solely
reflected in what may be called price policy. I have endeavoured to show in my book
on English industrial monopoly organisation that the mere enlargement of industrial
units in a group of industry may act as a deterrent to new would-be competitors thereby
leaving to the existing works a margin within which a rise of prices would hardly
stimulate new competition. If anybody ventured to-day to erect works equal in size,
efficiency and output to those of the I.G. Farben or the Osram works or those of the
big electrical concerns, he would depress prices to such an extent that he would make
his own works as well as those of the old firms hopelessly unprofitable. This situation
leaves automatically to the old monopolists a rather wide margin within which their
price policy may be entirely immune from new competition. But of course this situation
is limited to industries which have been built up under the development of large units,
few in number, and which yet satisfy a great part of the national or international
demand.
By acknowledging that the price policy of industrial combinations will be necessarily
run in the above-mentioned way and by taking this as an unavoidable consequence
of the admission of cartels and trusts into economic organisation one is relieved of
the task of “proving” that prices have been raised by the sole action of combination
or of criticising official statements by cartels that they have not. Endeavours of that
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have happened to prices if, instead of combinations, free competition had existed. It
is not the monopolist influence on prices which to-day remains to be discussed, but
rather the extent to which this influence has been used, and how far it was “justified.”
To state this does not mean that the problem has become less complex. In fact, there
is no possibility of deciding in an “objective” manner what kind of price level, as
regulated by industrial combination, must be considered “too high,” so long as cartels
and trusts refrain from price raising in quite exceptional and “brusque” manner. There
has been indeed no attempt in Germany to elucidate by an elaborate investigation of
an official or even semi-official character the bearing of industrial combination on
prices, and the Enqueteausschuss, while giving a good many sporadic examples of
the price policy of cartels within its special monographs, has not come to anything
like a definite judgment as to whether prices have been kept “too high” or not. Not
even the “Kartellstelle des Reichsverbandes der deutschen Industrie,” a body created
by the National Federation of German Industries during the inflation period, although
it was rather influential in trying to prevent conflicts arising out of cartelistic measures,
has attempted to publish definite conclusions on the subject.
In fact, all considerations regarding the price policy of cartels will remain “subjective”
and dependent on the viewpoint chosen. Perhaps the most uncomplicated case will
be that of cartels being protected and raising prices to the maximum level possible,
i.e., world market prices plus duty. We have given an example of this on p. 59. While
in the case of unregulated competition this maximum price would hardly be reached,
cartels are, at least at certain periods, able and indeed “entitled” by the State to attain
it; but, where at the same time production is internationally organised the question
arises, how far the inland price is “unduly” raised by an “artificial” raising of the world
market price level. The State, in granting protection to an industry, undoubtedly starts
from a certain level of prices to which the industry claims to be entitled. While the
duty (in general) is a fixed amount, world market prices may vary considerably and
even be influenced by the cartels themselves. When in July 1934, by the Tin Plate
Agreement between Great Britain, Germany, U.S.A. and France, the price of tin plate
was promptly raised from 17s. 3d. per standard to a minimum price of 18s. the question
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to reflect this change in its inland price policy. Therefore, even a price level sanctioned
by the State through the grant of tariff duties does not exclude the question of the “fair”
price.
The task is not alleviated by a mere comparison of inland and foreign (world market)
prices. On the contrary a really competent statistical comparison is hardly attainable.
In a memorandum, prepared in 1927 by Buchmann, Mathesius, Dr Petersen and Dr
Reichert for the Enqueteausschuss, entitled Zur Frage des internationalen
Eisenpreisansgleichs, the difficulties of comparing international prices of iron and
steel were expressly dealt with. It was laid down by these authors that, apart from purely
statistical discrepancies which are difficult to eliminate, it would not be correct to
compare German and foreign prices of iron unless an equality of conditions existed
as regards the following points: (a) quantities to be delivered, (b) measurement and
forms, (c) quality, (d) terms of delivery, (e) conditions of payment, (d) freight and (g)
exchange. It must also be remembered that for many products in some countries
“c.i.f.”prices are quoted, while in others cartel or syndicate arrangements regulate prices
according to a common “freight basis,” which necessarily means advantages of delivery
to some and disadvantages to other works, besides the concession of “Überpreise”
or “extras” in the case of certain qualities, forms or brands. All this forms a
considerable drawback, when comparisons are attempted between the prices of
cartelised German goods and those of foreign countries.
Then there remains the question of costs and prices. This opens another field of great
difficulty. There is no doubt that costs might be computed to-day with more chance
of exactness than twenty years ago, especially in those industries, which have adopted
modern and more complete systems of calculation. But even if this were done it is
doubtful whether figures of that kind would throw any decisive light on the relation
of prices and profits. Inasmuch as the formation of big concerns and of amalgamations
of a trust-like character has been carried out by some sort of overcapitalisation, brought
about by “high” charges paid for the taking over of less efficient works, the merely
“technical” costs, consisting in the cost of material, labour and normal interest and
depreciation of capital will not be sufficient to explain the higher price, which may
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show some profit to a small independent manufacturer while it will show a loss to a
big, technically most efficient, but overcapitalised concern. It is significant that the
Report on the iron and steel industry, as presented by the Enqueteausschuss, was not
able to arrive at anything like a clear picture of the costs of production. On the contrary,
the Report had to confess that “ owing to the differentiation of works, the lack of
uniformity in the distribution of costs and the varying principles of calculating
numerous costing elements the results showed discrepancies up to 100%.” It was also
expressly stated that it seemed doubtful whether the costs of closing redundant works
should be included in calculating “costs” of production, as the writing off of dead plant,
etc. would indeed mean an unbearable burden, if it were to be reflected in costs of
production. This may be quite reasonable from the accountant’s point of view, but
it will hardly make a difference in the discussion of costs and prices, as it will always
be argued by the producers that the outlay of rationalisation, however unprofitable
it may have proved after 1929, must in some way or other be compensated by prices
— and it would indeed be hardly possible to deny that such expenses as are incurred
by rationalisation or shutting down inefficient works should not be taken in account
to justify a certain level of prices. But, considering all this, the possibility of finding
out anything like ajustum pretium in the iron and steel trade seems to be as good as
non-existent. On the other hand, the case might happen that big amalgamated
undertakings, far from being burdened with costly financial charges, are enjoying a
sort of differential rent when compared with their weaker competitors and cartel
partners. This of course will seldom be openly recognised by the leading firms in
question. It was rather exceptional that in the summer of 1934, when trying to account
for a rather surprising drop in its shares, the greatest German rubber manufacturing
company, the Continental Gummi Werke A.G. in Hannover, pointed to the fact “that
cartelisation meant a considerable advantage to the big units of production with their
relatively low costs of production” (cp. Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 19 July 1934).
But even such truths, which in fact are rarely to be got at, would have but little influence
on price politics, as it could always be argued that for the sake of the conservation of
the whole of that industry a level of prices granting profits to the “marginal” producers
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The experience of the last ten years has shown that it is in times of a general nervous
fluctuation of the price level that industrial combination is most likely to get into
conflict. While it has been generally acknowledged that price stabilisation must be
regarded as one of the main functions of industrial combination (cp. Wolfers, pp. 63–5)
it seems to represent the main centre of attack in times of real price revolution. While
in the days of wild inflation and in the following first year of stabilisation (1924) the
policy of cartels, in trying to avoid the risks of exchange to its members, was sometimes
strongly criticised, not least by the “Reichsverband der Deutschen Industrie,” this period
of transition can hardly be taken as characteristic of the normal price fixing or price
stabilising functions of industrial combination. It is rather the period beginning with
the fatal year 1929 leading to a prolonged and chronic depression, which might be
considered as a sort of test of the limits and fairness of price regulation by industrial
combination. From the consumer’s point of view it was frequently argued during this
period that cartels and amalgamations were keeping prices at an unduly high level.
The Yearbook of the National Federation of Trade Unions (Allgemeinen Deutschen
Gewerkschaftsbundes) in 1932 alluded to the fact that the index figures relating to
“free prices” had been declining since 1926 by the ratio of 100 to 47.9, while “fixed
prices” of raw material and semi-manufactured goods had only declined to 84. Of
course so rough a comparison of prices applying to the most divergent productions
(food, agricultural produce, manufactured goods) can hardly be taken as a measurement
of price policy by industrial combination. The unparalleled drop of food prices in the
world markets, which of course reacted on protected German food prices as well, could
not be expected to have a corresponding effect on German industrial markets. In every
country deflation was progressing much faster in certain agricultural products than
in those of industry. In England for instance, English wheat went down from 11s. 6¾d.
per 112 lbs. on the average of 1927 to 5s. 2ed. in April 1931, while Cleveland pig iron
Nr. III declined from 73s. 3d. to only 58s. 6d. per 2210 lbs. in Middlesbrough. It seems
hardly possible to judge cartelistic activity by price comparison of such a primitive
character. On the other hand, even in the face of the lack of exact figures, there could
be no doubt that the existence of industrial combination was necessarily checking
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competitive prices. Beginning in 1931 the German Government had enacted measures,
which were styled a “Preissenkungsaktion” (action to reduce prices) and at first applied
to trade-mark goods (Markenartikel). By a special decree, dated 8 December 1931,
a reduction of prices was ordered, which was to apply to all goods controlled by cartels
and to trade-mark goods. This reduction was to be 10% on prices current on 30 June
1930. The measure was sharply criticised by representatives of the workmen’s
(consumers’) interest. It was argued that such schematic regulation of prices could
hardly do away with existing discrepancies and that special bodies composed of
officials and representatives of industry, labour and consumers should be entrusted
with decisions relating to cartelistic price policy. It is, however, very doubtful whether
such bodies would ever succeed in finding out what the price “fair” to all parties
concerned ought to be.
Besides the question of cartelistic price policy in face of commercial depression the
problem most discussed for some time was the effect of controlled prices on
manufacturers of the following stages of production and on exports. The keeping up
of prices of raw material and semi-finished material, even to a relatively small extent,
might greatly endanger the possibilities of export to manufacturers in general, as well
as especially to those not possessing their own supplies of such material. As the iron
and steel industries of Germany had frequently practised methods of dumping and of
granting bounties to exports or of differentiating between home and foreign sales, it
is just in this industry, so highly cartelised and trustificated, that this problem became
of singular importance. The disadvantages arising from a differentiation of this “dual”
price level to manufacturers of the following stages has been mitigated by the so-called
“Avi” agreement of 1925. The agreement, as already stated, was concluded between
the “Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Verbände der Eisen verarbeitenden Industrie” (as the
group representing the users of iron and steel) in Düsseldorf and the “Deutsche
Rohstahlgemeinschaft,” which we have described in a former chapter, as representative
of the German steel works and rolling mills. The latter have agreed to deliver iron and
steel to finishers, in so far as it is destined to be used for exporting purposes, at world
market prices, i.e., considerably cheaper than the German price would be. Since then
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basis” (Oberhausen) and the “Avi-Verrechnungs Ausfuhrpreis “ must be noticed, the
latter being calculated with regard to international price levels. In March 1927 for
instance the price of bar iron was 134 R.M. a ton freight basis Oberhausen, while the
Avi export price was only 106 R.M. a ton. In July 1932 the inland price for bar iron
was 112 R.M., while the special Avi export price amounted to only 62 R.M., the price
of the International Ingot Steel Export Federation in L. gold basis being 3 L.
During the last few years the German Government has not been faced by the necessity
of interfering by any drastic measures with the price policy of industrial combination.
Yet there have been occasional admonitions not to exploit monopolist power in an
unjustified manner or to raise prices unduly. The Minister of Economic Affairs for
instance strongly urged the leading associations of industry in August 1933 and again
even more precisely in November 1933 not to counteract the measures of the
Government directed to alleviate economic distress, especially those relating to the
schemes of provision of work (Arbeitsbeschaffungsprogramm), by increasing prices.
He even ordered the nullifying of certain actions which had been taken by some cartels
or syndicates in the direction of an increase of prices and he declared he would take
strong measures against such associations, if the former price level was not swiftly
restored. While it was agreed that the price level was in many cases much depressed,
it was emphasised that the necessary improvement of consumption could at the present
moment not be attained if prices were raised. Again, when in Summer 1934, in
connection with the difficulties of exchange, a number of compulsory cartels were
established and the erection of new works in such cases prohibited, it was expressly
stated in official communications of the Ministry of Economic Affairs that provision
had been made that no unjustified increase of prices would result from these conditions.
When in Spring 1934 the question of exchange became more embarrassing, the
Government, wishing probably to avert apprehensions of a possible rise in prices to
be followed by the reduction of certain imports, made several orders to restrict the
price policy of cartels and associations. By a decree of 16 May all cartelistic
associations were bound not to raise the minimum prices of certain goods or the
minimum trade margins (Handelsspannen) without the consent of the price-supervision
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industrial goods and services of all kinds. It remains to be seen whether this regulation
will be made permanent or be regarded as only an emergency measure.
In fact, there is little prospect of German industrial combination, as it has developed
of late, being able to use its price-fixing power in a way which would rouse serious
apprehensions on the part of either the consumer, the finisher or official circles. We
have seen in another chapter that a number of legal means have been created which
represent a safeguard against a policy which would fix prices without taking due regard
to the interests of those dependent on a “fair” price level and to the necessities of
general economic welfare. Bodies, like the Kartellstelle des Reichsverbandes der
Deutschen Industrie, which may have an important influence as arbiters in cases of
conflict, have recognised that where costs are not covered by the existing price level
and no means of abating them are at hand, an increase of prices will be justified, but
it ought to be applied in “small doses.” Again, it must be remembered that inasmuch
as cartels are coming to be regarded as a sort of “representative,” though private, body
of industries, a sort of moral responsibility will develop on the part of the “Kartelleiter,”
that is the leading brain in industrial combination, which will more and more have
regard to the exigencies not only of the cartel partners but also of national economic
development. As Schaeffer has put it: the important national associations of industries
are trying to develop a certain “Kartelsitte,” a moral code of cartel policy, which is
intended to limit any reckless use of power by single combines.
18 Inasmuch as by the
interlocking process of industrial organisation of to-day leaders of one industry have
become absorbed in the interests of a great many branches, and inasmuch as such
leaders are in general important factors in the central organisations of industries
(Spitzenverbande) and likely to be considered as bearing a good deal of public
responsibility with regard to the general welfare of national industry, another,
psychological, safeguard is arising against a price policy directed merely by the selfish
motives of a single monopoly. In this respect the more bureaucratic organisation of
German industry has influenced conditions of industrial monopoly in Germany in
contrast to the American trusts, which resemble much more the old type of industrial
monopolies,which used their powers to the utmost possible limit. 
The time is past when industrial combination could be regarded as a more or less
exceptional condition of industrial organisation. Cartels and trusts can no longer be
considered as being mainly devices of industrialists to utilise certain occasional and
accidental conditions, or conditions brought about by the “artificial” means of tariff
protection, to form monopolies. Industrial combination must be regarded as a form
of industrial organisation evolving through and adapted to certain conditions of
concentration, technical, geographical, economic, arising in many groups of industry,
national or international, and revolutionising the size of the industrial unit or of the
industrial undertaking. The main cause of such concentration lies, as we have tried
to explain at length, in the fact that the structure of industrial production has in the
last fifty years, in connection with the enormous progress of transport facilities,
undergone decisive changes. Distribution of industrial goods has in most groups of
industry taken a highly concentrative character, whereas in former days it had been
decentralised. Local markets were no longer supplied by local manufacturers nor
national markets by national suppliers alone. A much larger unit of production
supplying a considerable sector of the demand was now becoming profitable,
representing in itself a monopolist tendency, as new competitors in face of their
prospective efficiency had to make sure of their produce being still sold at prices which
would show a profit. Where this bigger unit of production evolving out of a technical
adaptation of production to the development of bulk transportation was coincident
with certain conditions of geographical concentration, of some natural monopoly, of
protective measures or other circumstances favouring concentration  — either with
regard to inland sales or to the supply of world markets — there existed the conditions
for industrial combination. This was the case in the U.S.A., where in many groups
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long-distance bulk supply of standardised goods was prevalent from almost the first
development in many modem American industries, besides the concentration of natural
resources and tariffs favouring monopolist organisation. In Europe conditions differed
from this in many respects. The movement towards concentrative distribution was
not developing so drastically as in the U.S.A. and the unit of production was not
increasing with such rapidity. The country, the industrial structure of which in many
respects resembled that of the U.S.A. and was to some extent, before the War as well
as later in the rationalisation period, purposely shaped after the American model, was
the German Empire. Besides possessing important instances of natural resources,
geographically concentrated, and an uninterrupted protection by tariffs, German
industry was concentrating its efficiency on “heavy” productions and on goods of
cheaper grade highly adapted to bulk and standardised supply. On the other hand, its
special and early success in applying scientific research to industry gave it a monopolist
position in certain high grade branches of industry. It is therefore not surprising to find
that the movement towards concentration and industrial monopoly was developed
earlier and more comprehensively than in England. Here centralised natural monopolies
were non-existent, industry had been for long accustomed and by increasing
international competition more and more forced to aim at a great diversity of highly
finished goods, to rely on quality production, which naturally did not necessitate an
expansion of bulk sales and thereby of units of production in such a degree as was
the case with raw material or heavy goods. Besides, German industry, being in its
infancy when the great technical progress of the ‘seventies and ‘eighties began, was
in a much better position to build up big industrial units than English industry, which
in almost every case had to overcome old traditions of technique and management
in order to remain “up to date.” Thus Germany became a much more prominent field
of industrial combination than England.
It is not from the merely historical point of view that the material conditions leading
to industrial monopoly should be studied. In revealing the concentrative forces
prevalent where cartels or trusts are flourishing one is in a position to prove that the
psychological attitude is of secondary importance. It is a curious fact that many English
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in the broader sense, were apparently of the opinion that the formation of some sort
of combination was merely dependent upon the insight and far-sightedness of
manufacturers and that where before the “absence” of monopolies (though without
reason) was frequently praised as resulting from the genuinely individualistic character
of British manufacturers, the latter were now criticised for not being willing to adapt
a new form of “collective” organisation. It will not be denied that the German people,
through being permeated with admiration for administration and associative
organisation, have from the sociological point of view offered better opportunities
for industrial combination than the English. In fact, at this very time German cartel
organisation comes in many cases very near the conception of a general organisation
of industry based upon principles of common action and associative agreement. This
may be very alien to English ideas of private enterprise and independence. Yet, such
socio-psychological observations should not be allowed to darken the real background
of the development of industrial combination. The German example itself, of which
we have been trying our best to give a number of prominent examples, shows that
certain decisive material conditions must necessarily be present to make cartels or
trustification possible and in the long run “successful.” They cannot be “made to order,”
where these conditions are lacking.
The legal conditions surrounding industrial combination will certainly have an
influence on their development and perhaps on their strength. German legislation in
this respect is of rather modem date and no impediments such as that of the English
or American law against restraint of trade had to be encountered or taken into account.
While in general no legal interference has been effective in paralysing modern industrial
monopolies, as the American example shows, it has been frequently argued that the
legal attitude was responsible for the specific form of organisation and that German
cartels, in contrast to trustification, are an illustration of it. We have paid due regard
to this question. Yet we cannot approve of such a deduction, in so far as German cartel
development is concerned. At any rate there is no proof that, wherever a freedom of
organising monopoly exists, the cartel is preferred to the trust. What in fact seems to
have put the cartel and syndicate in the forefront of German industrial combination,
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Where the conditions of monopolisation are in the stage of development, while the
movement towards a crystallisation of undertakings into very big units has not yet
reached its final climax, manufacturers may anticipate the coming development by
collective agreements of a monopolist character. That this in general means something
like a period of transition has been amply proved by the combination movement in
German industry, especially in the older industries such as iron and steel, which in
that respect we had to contrast with such modern groups as rayon or electricity or
chemicals where from the start monopoly organisation was fashioned in a trust-like
form. In fact cartels and syndicates seem in no way to be the antipodes of trustification.
Amalgamation may develop within the cartel, in fact in many cases be accelerated
by it, while, when once in progress, trust-like organisations may find it very useful
to retain the advantages of associative combination offered by cartelisation in their
relations to the remaining outsiders or new competitors.
There is much in the development of German cartel organisation and in that of huge
concerns which may be regarded as due to more or less accidental factors or to
developments caused by the very turbulent character of German economic development
since the end of the War. Inflation, stabilisation, the overrating of rationalisation, credit
schemes of a dangerous kind, the overestimating of the advantages of huge concerns
and the financial methods sometimes pursued which led to a complicated interlocking
of companies and a rather irrational network of interconnections have blemished in
many respects the picture we had to draw of the organisation of industrial combination.
The future only can show what remains as the solid foundation of a sometimes too
hasty development. The reorganisation of the Stahlverein is an instance of a thoughtful
endeavour to attain a clearer and more homogeneous structure of a trust. At any rate
it would be wrong to attribute certain defects and deficiencies in the German cartel
movement to the system of monopolist combination without paying due regard to a
good many exceptional circumstances prevailing from 1918 to 1929.
A study of the results of German industrial combination will certainly dispose of
the idea that modern industrial quasimonopolies are mainly occupied with the aim
of raising prices. Even where industrial combination has not yet taken the final form
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that of regulating prices. It is the big concern which will be in the best position to carry
through costly inventions and to realise rationalisation, to do away with redundant
plant and to simplify production. But, as we have seen, cartel policy of recent times
is moving in the same direction. This tendency will in all probability still increase,
inasmuch as cartels are more and more considered by their leaders (Kartellleiter) as
a sort of organisation called upon to take care of the general interests of the respective
industries. Of course there will be always a latent tendency to regard cartelisation as
a means of protecting and upholding the weaker elements of competition. But this
tendency will be constantly and increasingly counteracted by the further development
of concentration within cartels themselves as well as by the widening radius of their
organisational tasks. It is perhaps as yet going too far to speak, as has become the
fashion in England, about “coordination,” “co-operation,” etc., as being the main issues
of cartelisation. Such friendly and suggestive terms seem to originate more from a
desire to embellish the picture of quasimonopoly organisation than in an exact
knowledge of their true activities. These are full of conflicts and divergent interests.
It seems, when one considers the German experience, much more the force and pressure
of economic necessity than that of the gentle spirit of co-operation which is finally
leading to unification. We have been able to show that the road towards effective
combination is sometimes beset by bitter fights and long struggles between the weaker
and the stronger elements, between “pure” and “mixed” works, between those reaping
advantages from natural monopolies and those not in a position to do so. Cartels can
hardly be expected to result from a mere collective spirit and when they are once
formed conflicting interests are not eradicated, although they may be overshadowed
by agreement on many points of common economic interest. The development of
trust-like amalgamations within the cartel sphere is showing that in many cases
cartelisation is not the final solution of industrial combination.
There can be no doubt that the rise of industrial combination will confront the State
and its legislation with many new and essential tasks. When cartels and trusts first
began it seemed that the State would have to give most of its attention to their possible
price policy. In Europe apprehensions of the effect of quasi-monopoly on prices have
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other forms of industrial combination has shown that, although the aims of fixing and
possibly raising prices cannot be denied by quasi-monopolists, there are a good many
checks and limits to their actual price “policy.” In a time of laissez faire the prevalent
idea, that everything was to be eventually corrected by the hidden hand of unlimited
competition, resulted in a rather general carelessness in regard to the movement of
prices. This is no longer the case. The public and consumers are in general much more
aware of the “ups” and “downs” of prices than formerly and the economic depression
has resulted in a far greater interest being taken in even relatively small variations.
The mere existence of industrial combination has resulted in a higher attentiveness
to market conditions and a demand for publicity in many respects. Cartels and trusts
which overstrained their monopolist position would soon be reprimanded by the public,
by trade organisations, organisations of consumers and others and an agitation arising
against them under such conditions would certainly cause them grave inconveniences.
While we have been trying to show that there exists in fact no “objective”  measurement
of price policy, there may be at any time a sort of instinctive judgment of “unduly”
raised prices. Cartels and trusts will be careful not to arouse public feeling, and
inasmuch as they are represented by companies or corporations of a more or less
representative character, expected to abstain from measures not conforming with the
public interest, they will be limited in their action in quite a different way than was
the “private” manufacturer of former days.
This of course will not make constant supervision, if not control, of prices regulated
by cartels and trusts, unnecessary. But perhaps it may be inferred from the German
experiences that even then the task of the state is less urgent with regard to the price
policy of quasi-monopolies than with regard to other of their activities. We have
discussed at length the position cartels or trusts may take up with regard to outsiders
or wouldbe competitors, to those dependent on them for their own manufacture, to
traders, dealers and middlemen. In discussing exclusive agreements and other features
of the monopolist policy we have alluded to the coercive effects of such a position.
Here lies a problem of probably much greater importance to State action than that of
price supervision, a problem which contains questions of administrative and legal
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character, such as the interference with raised prices, but also decisions on matters
of principle. We have seen that in Germany the attitude towards industrial combination
has fluctuated from a desire to uphold certain conditions of free competition to the
extreme of compulsory cartelisation. Much of this attitude has been and will be
dependent on general economic conditions — as for instance in times of depression,
overproduction or specific economic difficulties, it might seem opportune to close
the ranks of manufacturers, and to assist existing works in their aim of preventing new
competition. But apart from these accidental conditions the State will have to decide
before long what its attitude towards industrial combination ought to be. Words like
“interference” or “non-interference” will hardly touch the root of the problem. In fact,
in face of the dominating position which cartels and trusts to-day possess in the
organisation of German industry, State action with the object of restoring greater
freedom to the single manufacturer might be considered as leading merely to
“compulsory competition,” which under such circumstances would appear to be as
far away from the former “freedom” of trade as compulsory cartelisation. For there
can be no doubt that industrial combination represents to-day a development which
has grown up in an organic way out of economic conditions not less “natural” than
were those of free competition. The best which the State and administration can do
will probably consist in their constant endeavour to reconcile the specific aims of this
new industrial organisation with the necessities of “general economic welfare.” But
inasmuch as this very term will always have a relative meaning it will hardly be
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European Railmakers’ Association (E.R.M.A.).
International Railmakers’. Association (I.R.M.A.).
International Rohstahlgemeinschaft (I.R.G.).
International Tube Syndicate.
International Hoop Iron Syndicate.
International Wire Rod Syndicate.
Internationale Rohstahl Exportgemeinschaft (I.R.E.G.).
International Tin Plate Agreement.
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Rhein-Elbe-Schuckert-Union.
Stumm-Konzern.







Siemens und Halske, Siemens-Schuckert.
Gesellschaft für elektrische Unternehmungen (Gesfürel)-Ludw.
Loewe A.G.
Rheinisch-Westphälische Elektrizitätsgesellschaft.
Thüringer Gas und Elektrizitätsgesellschaft.
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The author does not intend to give a complete account of what has been written on
German cartels and trusts. Besides a great number of books and papers dealing
specifically with the problem, there is an enormous amount of material on the subject
dispersed in trade papers and in publications not dealing exclusively with the subject
but treating it in connection with other or adjacent fields of research such as capitalism,
rationalisation, industrial finance, etc. Of the great number of monographs which have
been published on particular industries or groups of industry there is hardly one which
does not devote some space to the problem and position of industrial combination.
Besides this the annual reports of commercial and industrial institutions of all kinds
furnish year by year an interesting survey of the subject. We may therefore limit our
task here to enumerating those books and works which have been of special advantage
to the author, and which contain quotations from a great number of other publications
useful to students of the subject.
As for official material of modern date the publications of the “Enqueteausschuss”
will be of foremost importance. The lengthy title of these publications, consisting of
reports, monographs and minutes of evidence of the most important German Committee
on economic matters that has yet existed, is:
Ausschuss zur Untersuchung der Erzeugungs- und Absatzbedingungen
der Deutschen Wirtschaft, Verhandlungen und Berichte (Enqueteaus-
schuss).
This Committee has issued a number of volumes dealing with the specific problems
of industrial combination, all printed between 1929 and 1930. A special sub-committee
has dealt with “changes in the organisational forms of economic conditions,”Hermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 227
“Wandlungen in den wirtschaftlichen Organisationsformen.” These reports are of
particular interest to students of industrial combination. They consist of the following
volumes:
1. Wandlungen in den Rechtsformen der Einzelunternehmungen und Konzerne (1
vol.).
2. Entwicklungslinien der industriellen und gewerblichen Kartellierung:
(1) Arbeitsplan, Maschinenbau (1 vol.).
(2) Bauund Baustoffindustrie (1 vol.).
(3) Textilindustrie (2 vols.).
3. Wandlungen in der aktienrechtlichen Gestaltung der Einzeiunternehmungen und
Konzerne (1 vol.).
4. Kartellpolitik:
(1) Generalbericht (1 vol.).
(2) Vernehmungen (1 vol.).
Of these No. 4 (1) and (2), which represent some sort of “final report” with minutes
of evidence, have been of special service to this book. Besides this there are not less
than 20 volumes dealing with commercial policy in connection with certain branches
and groups of industry; there is a good deal of material, especially with regard to
cartelistic price policy, to be found in these volumes. This applies still more to the
work of another subcommittee which was entrusted with the special task of preparing
industrial monographs. The following volumes have been issued, containing, besides
other subjects and general topics relating to specific groups of industry, elaborate
studies of the development and structure of industrial combination:
1. Die Rohstoffversorgung der deutschen eisenerzeugenden Industrie.
2. Die deutsche Kaliindustrie.
3. Die deutsche Kohlenwirtschaft.
4. Die deutsche Elektrizitatswirtschaft.
5. Die deutsche chemische Industrie.
6. Die deutsche eisenerzeugende Industrie.
7. Der deutsche Wohnungsbau.Hermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 228
8. Die Versorgung der deutschen Wirtschaft mit NichtEisen-Metallen.
Of these volumes Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 have been largely used by the author. Another
volume, edited by Dr Demburg, the chairman of the Enqueteausschuss, and his
assistants, Dr Hecht and Dr Neu, represents a general report of the whole field covered
by the Committee under the title:
Erzeugungsund Absatzbedingungen der deutschen Wirtschaft.
As regards non-official literature Prof. Robert Liefmann’s book,
Robert Liefmann, Kartelle, Konzerne und Trusts. Stuttgart, 1934, 9th ed.,
must be mentioned in the first place. It is generally considered a sort of pioneer work
on the subject; indeed it was published in an English translation, Cartels, Combines
and Trusts by Messrs Methuen in 1933 with a preface by Prof. D. H. Macgregor of
Oxford. This book contains an enormous amount of material and facts; it is, however,
in the main descriptive and in spite of all his knowledge of the subject the author leaves
the student with some feeling of dissatisfaction as regards the fundamental and general
economic laws underlying the development of industrial combination. Yet German
literature certainly does not lag behind in that respect. This can be gathered from a
study of the very able book by
Dr Arnold Wolfers, Das Kartellproblem im Lichte der deutschen Kartellliteratur.
Munich, 1931.
This book, which forms vol. 180 of the Schriften des Vereins für Sozialpolitik,
embodies a very exhaustive survey of German cartel literature, especially that of a
theoretical and academic character. The following new publications reviewed by
Wolfers may be of particular interest to the readers of this book, in so far as theoretical
problems were to be dealt with:
H. v. Beckerath, Der moderne Industrialismus. Jena, 1930.
M. J. Bonn, Das Schicksal des deutschen Kapitalismus. Berlin, 1930.
Josef Dobretsberger, Konkurrenz und Monopol in der gegenwärtigen Wirtschaft.Hermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 229
Leipzig and Vienna, 1929.
J. Herle, Neue Beitrage zum Kartellproblem. Berlin, 1929.
O. Klug, Das Wesen der Kartell-Konzernu. Trustbewegung. 1930.
Liefmann, Internationale Kartelle. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv. 1927.
H. Mannstaedt, Die monopolistischen Bestrebungen und ihre Bedeutung vor und
nach dem Kriege. 1928.
H. Stark, Die Theorie der Kartelle. Berlin, 1930. S. Tschierschky, Kartellorganisation.
Berlin, 1928.
———  Kartellpolitik. Berlin, 1930.
As to the actual development of industrial combination in more recent years the two
volumes, Strukturwandlungen der deutschen Volkswirtschaft, containing articles the
substance of lectures edited by Prof. Bernhard Harms of Kiel (Reimar Hobbing, Berlin)
in 1928, supply a good deal of new material and descriptive matter. Attention may
be called to the articles by:
Prof. Dr J. Hirsch, Wandlungen im Aufbau der deutschen Industrie.
Dr H. Schaeffer, Kartelle und Konzerne.
Franz Eulenburg, Die deutsche Industrie auf dem Weltmarkte.
The legal aspects of German industrial combination have been dealt with by a good
many authors. So far as this book is concerned a small, but rather good study by
Dr Fritz E. Koch, Grundziige des englischen Kartellrechts. Berlin, 1927,
was very useful, as it draws interesting parallels between the German and English
legal treatment of combines. Besides this a treatise by a well-known German legal
authority on the subject
Prof. J. Flechtheim, Neue Rechtsformen industrieller Zusammenschliisse, in
Strukturwandlungen (cp. the above remark), 1928,Hermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 230
and
Dr Oswald Lehnich, Kartelle und der Staat. Berlin, 1928,
were particularly useful. The already mentioned “Generalbericht” of the ist
sub-committee of the Enqueteausschuss (“Kartellpolitik”) offers a wide range of
information on the legal, administrative and judicial side of the present situation,
dealing in Part B with the “Practice of the Cartel Policy of the State.”
As regards questions of organisation a good many of the above-mentioned works
could be used; of most recent publications a treatise by
Prof. Richard Passow, Kartelle. Jena, 1930,
will be of interest, especially as regards the question of compulsory cartels. A book,
dealing with questions of monopoly organisation from a mainly theoretical and
sociological point of view, is that of
Dr Ench Egner, Der Sinn des Monopols in der gegenwartigen Wirtschaftsordnung.
Leipzig, 1931,
while
Dr W. Hasenack, Unternehmertum und Wirtschaftslähmung. Berlin, 1932,
places considerations of commercial science in the forefront of his study on many
problems related to that of industrial combination.
Another book dealing with a theoretical problem bordering on the problem of
monopolist organisation in many points — the much discussed “slogan” of
Planwirtschaft — is that by an eminent theorist of Berlin University:
Prof. Dr Friedrich v. Gottl-Ottlilienfeld, Der Mythus der Planwirtschaft. Jena,1932.
All the last-mentioned works will be of more interest from the point of view ofHermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 231
academic thought aroused by the latest development of cartels and trusts and their
organisation than from that of getting a broader knowledge of their actual structure
and activities.
As to the international field of industrial combination, to which we have frequently
alluded, two books merit special attention:
C. Lammers, Internationale Industriekartelle. Berlin, 1930, and Prof. Dr Kurt
Wiedenfeld, Kartelle und Konzerne. Berlin, 1927.
The last-mentioned study was prepared for a committee of the International Economic
Conference. A small volume, which is particularly interesting in connection with cartels
in the Central-European zone, is that by a former Hungarian Secretary of State:
Prof. Elèmer Hantos, Mitteleuropäische Kartelle im Dienste des industriellen
Zusammenschlusses. Berlin, 1931.
A very able book on international monopolies is that by
Alfred Plummer (University of Oxford), International Combines in Modern Industry.
London, 1934.
A good many international cartels and concerns connected with German industrial
combination are aptly dealt with in this study.
Of monographs on particular industries or groups of industry dealing with problems
of industrial combination an elaborate list will be found in Wolfers loc. cit. pp. 160–9.
For the purpose of this book the following publications were particularly useful in
connection with the development of industrial combination in various trades:
Dr Buchmann, Prof. Mathesius, Dr Petersen and Dr Reichert, Zur Frage des
internationalen Eisenpreisausgleichs. Berlin, 1927.
William Meinhardt, Entwicklung und Aufbau der Gluhlampen industrie. Berlin, 1932.Hermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 232
Hans J. Schneider, Der Wiederaufbau der Grosseisenindustrie an Rhein und Ruhr.
Berlin, n.d.
Prof. Flechtheim and Dr Reichert, Kartelle als Produktionsförderer. Schriften der
Kartellstelle des Reichsverbandes der Deutschen Industrie. January, 1928.
Prof. Dr Ludwig Bernhard, Der “Hugenberg-Konzern.” Berlin, 1928.
Ausgewählte Kapitel aus der chemischen industriellen Wirtschaftspolitik 1877–1927.
Verein zur Wahrung der Interessen der chemischen Industrie. Berlin, 1927.
H. Lüthgen, Das Rheinisch-Westphälische Kohlensyndikat in der Vorkriegsund
Nachkriegszeit und seine Hauptprobleme. Leipzig, 1926.
A. Marcus, Die grossen Chemiekonzerne. Leipzig, 1929.
Wilhelm Grotkopp, Der schwedische Zündhoiztrust. Braunschweig, 1929.
On many points in the book comparisons with conditions in England have been made.
The following publications will prove useful for further research:
Hermann Levy, Monopolies, Cartels and Trusts in British Industry, 2nd ed. London,
1927.
—–—  Die Grundlagen der Weltwirtschaft. Leipzig, 1931.
Patrick Fitzgerald, Industrial Combination in England. London, 1927.
Harold Macmillan, M.P., Reconstruction. London, 1933.
D. H. Macgregor, Enterprise, Purpose and Profit. Oxford, 1934.
Besides these, parts of the Report on “Factors in Industrial and Commercial Efficiency
(Committee on Industry and Trade) 1927 and the Macmillan Report on Finance and
Industry, Cmd. 3897 could be used with advantage. In comparing German and English
industrial conditions and organisation valuable material will be found in the Survey
of Metal Industries (Committee on Industry and Trade) 1928, especially as regards
coal, iron, steel and electricity (Electric manufacturing industry and electricity supply).
A very intelligent Report on economic conditions in Germany by J. W. F. Thelwall
(Dept. of Overseas Trade, 1934) may also be consulted with regard to many industries
and their organisation.
As regards official or semi-official facts and figures used in this book the following
publications may be mentioned:Hermann Levy, Industrial Germany, 233
Statistische Jahrbuch des Deutschen Reiches. Berlin, 1933.
Vierteljahrshefte zur Konjunkturforschung. Sonderheft 19. Die Energiewirtschaft
der Welt in Zahlen. Berlin, 1930.
———  Kapitalbildung und Investitionen in der Deutschen Volkswirtschaft 1924
bis 1928. Berlin, 1931.
 ———  Heft 3. 5 Jahrgang. Berlin, 1930.
 ———  Sonderheft 31. Die Industriewirtschaft (Dr Wagenfuhr). Berlin, 1933.
Die Wirtschaftlichen Krafte der Welt. Herausgegeben von der Dresdner Bank. Berlin,
1930.
Jahrbuch des Allgemeinen Gewerkschaftsbundes. Berlin, 1932.
Wirtschaftsberichte der Commerzund Privatbank. 1933 to 1 July 1934.
Aniagewerte, Dresdner Bank. 1934.
A number of articles, published by trade papers and reviews, which have been useful
in the treatment of various subjects, have been quoted in full in the respective places
in the text.1. In a book published in 1933 by Allen and Unwin Dr Piotrowsky tries to refute my
views regarding the period of English and German early monopolist organisation, cp.
my book on Monopolies, Cartels and Trusts in British Industry, 2nd ed., pp. 90 ff.
While in my opinion the formation of early industrial monopolies in Germany came
much later than in England and developed under rather different, i.e., less damaging,
conditions than under James I and Charles I, the author, following the research work
of Strieder, is concerned to point out that German monopolies existed about 100
years before the English development of monopolies. The facts to which Dr
Piotrowsky alludes are certainly correct, but they are not to the point. Owing to the
nature and object of my studies, I purposely dwelt on industries which belong to the
early period of modem “industrial” capitalism. A monopolist organisation of such
groups of industry must be carefully distinguished from monopolies of a commercial
character, which existed at any time in mediaeval history, as also from certain mining
organisations and from the monopolist domination of handicrafts by capitalist or
commercial entrepreneurs. There can be no doubt that the manufactures which were
most prominent in the monopoly organisation in England and Germany during the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and which represent the first stages of modem
industrial capitalism and mark the beginning of the factory system, had never
developed or at any rate not developed on the lines of modem “industrial” capitalism
in the days to which Dr Piotrowsky alludes.
2. The importance of these results of fuel economy on the organisation of the iron
and steel industry is fully recognised by the English Survey on Metal Trades
(Committee on Industry and Trade), 1928. The Report says on page 8: “The new
methods of fuel economy meant that, in order to carry on production with the lowest
consumption of fuel and with the greatest efficiency, it was as a rule desirable to
concentrate coking ovens, blast furnaces, steel works and rolling mills all on one site,
so that waste gases from the former might be available for use in connection with the
two latter, and the hot metal from the blast furnace could be converted into steel and
then rolled without being allowed to get cold.” The Report stated on the other hand
on page 25 that “in the efficiency of its coking plant and in the organisation of the
.coking industry Great Britain still undoubtedly lags behind the United States and the
Continent of Europe.” The Report gives a very careful explanation of this difference,
noting for instance the influence of currency inflation in Germany as stimulating
capital outlay and the replacement after the War of destroyed coke ovens in France
and Belgium by those of the most modem type. But there should be no doubt that the
early recognition of vertical combination in Germany has greatly favoured the
improvement and the organisation of the coking industry in that country.
3. The improvement in fuel economy has been greatly assisted by an institution called
the “Warmestelle,” which was established in 1919 by the Verein Deutscher
Hutteneisenleute. The Warmestelle does not itself undertake research to any great
extent, but acts as a centre for co-ordination and propaganda in the interests of fuel
economy. Recording and measuring apparatus is installed at all important points in
the works, with a view to keeping close check on fuel consumption in each process,
and to detecting the cause of any wastage. Fuel control on these lines is now
practically universal in the German iron and steel industries. An interesting
description was given by the Enqueteausschuss on the German Iron Industry, 1930,
pp. 151 ft., pp. 25–27 and passim.
4. According to the Enqueteausschuss, Die deutsche Eisenerzeugende Industrie,
1930, pp. 36–37, the English steel furnaces were producing in 1927 about 15,000
tons per furnace in the year, in contrast to 27,000 tons in Germany.
5. Exclusive of the U.S.A. and Canada.
6. The “Ausnützungsfaktor” represents the average time during which the plant
supplying electricity is actually used The full utilisation of the efficiency of installed
plant would represent 8760 hours a year, equivalent to 8760 kilowatt-hours (kw.-h.).
In English terminology this is expressed by million “units” (kilowatt-hours)
generated per annum.
7. It is statistically proved that the larger the power works the greater has been the
actual utilisation of its generating efficiency.
8. It may be noted in this respect that the development of exports by different
countries had greatly changed since 1913. Exports of steel rails from principal
exporting countries were as follows:
Thousand tons
From
United  From From  From From
Kingdom Belgium  France  Germany U.S.A.  Total
1910–13  438.2 165.8 63.1  506.8 407.8  1581.7
(average)
1926  164.3 213.2 317.1  340.2 187.6  1222.4 9. Cp. also Fitzgerald, p. 46: “It is true that there is practically no foreign competition
in the home market, but there are about 55 separate enterprises, and several of these
are highly efficient.” An analysis of the circumstances responsible for this diversity
of conditions will be found in my book, 2nd ed. 1927, pp.211–12.
10. In fact the psychological attitude may lead to an overrating of the possibilities of
cartelisation. The “mode” of industrial cartelisation will then lead to the formation
of rather inefficient combines, cp. Schaeffer, p. 330.
11. Quite an interesting parallel to this may be found in the development of the
American iron and steel industry, cp. E. D. Maccallum, The Iron and Steel Industry
of the U.S.A., 1931, on “Geographical Distribution of the Industry,” pp. 34–6. 
12. A very interesting statement on this point which is so frequently overlooked was
given before the Enqueteausschuss by Mr Petersen (Eisenerzeugende Industrie) from
the Verein Deutscher Eisenhüttenleute (Dusseldorf), cp. p. 152, loc, cit.: “Market
conditions have a very deep influence on rationalisation and the technique of pig iron
furnaces. Thus the size of the market in the U.S.A. allows a specialising of single
works and therefore the manufacture of similar products in large quantities. This
again permits a far-reaching mechanisation, which becomes complete in the works
fitted out with conveying appliances... the small countries are in a much less
favourable position, especially when they endeavour to supply the home markets by
their own production. They will be the least able to employ the conveying system or
any cheap mass production.”
13. Prof. Macgregor in his very interesting study, Enterprise, Purpose and Profit,
published by the Oxford Press in 1934, gives a detailed classification of the different
issues of trade practice connected with industrial combination in England. There are
practices which are “against good conduct,” there is secondly the “intention to create”
pernicious monopoly, there are cases where economic enquiry is essential and others
“where the problem is whether what is being done goes beyond what anyone ought
to expect who goes into competitive business.” As regards the practical legal aspect
of the problem in England Prof. Macgregor is, however, well aware, although he only
wishes to speak as a “layman,” that the courts of the country tend to disclaim their
competence to deal with “economic results,” and this is entirely in accordance with
our own view of the subject. But it would be interesting and certainly of great value
if the question of the outspoken reluctance of English legal practice with regard to
economic issues of this kind could find some scientific and interpretative
explanation. And one may add that the economist will have as good a title to be
interested in such investigation as the student of English Law.
14. It is to be noted that with regard to cartel agreements no Statute has been
compulsorily imposed upon the parties by the Government, but the existing
agreements were either compulsorily prolonged or new agreements arranged by the
parties.15. It must be kept in mind, that trustification by fusion does not mean a definitive
break of the trust with the system of partnerships. It is generally found that even
when the fusion of the main undertakings has been accomplished there remains a
wide field for holdings or participations. This can be seen from the publication of the
Report of the ordinary general meeting of the I.G. Farben for 1933. There were not
less than twenty-eight partnerships mentioned, among which were such with
companies connected with the manufacture of dyes, chemicals, coal, lignite,
celluloid, motor cars (Ford), fertilisers, ammonia, sugar, etc.
16. For details of this and the following passages cp. an article written by the author
in the Arbeitgeber of 1 February 1932, pp. 59–62.
17. I have tried to disclose the different forces which led to the American
“prosperity” and were responsible for the “great wonder” turning into the “greatest
catastrophe,” in an article published by the Weltmrtschaftlichef Archiv, January 1932,
pp. 203–32, “Die Wirtschaft der Vereinigten Staaten und die Weltwirtschaftskrisis.”
18. Cp. also the interesting remarks about “the reason for an effective code of trade
practice” in Macgregor’s essay, loc. cit. pp. 54–61.